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This thesis studies three game theoretic models of pricing, in which a seller is interested in optimally
pricing and allocating her product or service to a market of agents, in order to maximize her revenue.
These markets feature a large number of self-interested agents, who are generally heterogeneous
with respect to some payoff relevant feature, e.g., willingness to pay when agents are consumers or
private cost when agents are firms. Agents strategically interact with one another, and their actions
affect other agents’ payoffs, either directly through social influence or competition, or indirectly
through a review system. The seller has demand uncertainty and strives to optimize expected
discounted revenues. I use either a mean-field approximation or a continuum of agents assumption
to reduce the complexity of the problems and provide crisp characterizations of system aggregates
and equilibrium policies.
Chapter 2 considers the problem of an information provider who sells information products, such
as demand forecasts, to a market of firms that compete with one another in a downstream market.
We propose a general model that subsumes both price and quantity competition as special cases.
We characterize the optimal selling strategy and find that it depends on both mode and intensity of
competition. Several important extensions to heterogeneous production costs, information quality
discrimination, and information leakage through aggregate actions are studied.
Chapter 3 considers the problem of optimally extracting a stream of revenues from a sequence
of consumers, who have heterogeneous willingness to pay and uncertainty about the quality of the
product being sold. Using an intuitive maximum likelihood procedure, we characterize the solution
of consumers’ quality estimation problem. Then, we use a mean-field approximation to characterize
the transient dynamics of quality estimates and demand. These allow us to simplify and solve the
monopolist’s problem, and ultimately provide a characterization of her optimal pricing policy.
Chapter 4 considers the problem of a seller who is interested in dynamically pricing her product
when consumers’ utility is influenced by the mass of consumers that have purchased in the past.
Two scenarios are studied, one in which the monopolist has commitment power and one in which she
does not. We characterize the optimal selling strategy under both scenarios and derive comparisons
on equilibrium prices and demands. Our main result is a characterization of the value of price
commitment as a function of the social influence level in the market.
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Pricing and revenue optimization is a growing and expanding area in the field of operations research.
It comprises a set of models and tools that allow a seller, business or individual, to scientifically
approach the problem of setting prices, which is the interface between her product or service and
the market. Initially developed to solve the classic problems of airline, hotel, and retail pricing,
these models have recently evolved to address novel questions that arise in the internet economy
where there is a constant release of information about product characteristics and consumer prefer-
ences and choices. New areas of application include high-frequency auction mechanisms in on-line
advertising, customized pricing, and more broadly dynamic pricing in online markets. Recent ad-
vances in mobile technologies, opened yet another novel and promising area of application which is
pricing in two-sided markets. In these types of markets there is usually a company that sets prices,
or provides prices recommendation to sellers, and the exchange happens between independent buy-
ers and sellers on the platform. In this context pricing is the mean of both demand and supply
management. New models that will be developed will likely build on the latter set of models on
dynamic pricing in online markets, to which part of this thesis contributes.1
Microeconomics is a discipline that starts by modeling the behavior of individual agents who
interact in a market, and builds up to make statements and predictions about aggregate economic
1For an overview of this field and a treatment of its typical problems see Talluri and van Ryzin [2005] and Phillips
[2005].
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outcomes. Game theory is the subset of models that deal with situations in which agents strate-
gically interact, i.e., situations in which the actions of an agent directly affect the payoff of other
agents. For example, a monopolistic seller changing her present or future price, or two firms who
compete by lowering their prices in order to attract more demand. Game theoretic models have
been applied extensively in recent years to online markets. On the practical side, algorithmic game
theory drives most of the online advertising industry. On the theoretical side, games of incomplete
information and games with a large number of agents have been a prominent area of research,
because they allow to understand drivers and outcomes of agents’ decision in online markets. In
particular, performing mean-field approximations or building models with a continuum of agents
are common practices that dramatically simplify the analysis. These models abstract from reality
since they imply that a single agent has a negligible impact on other agents’ payoffs, however they
are very powerful because of their computational tractability and they allow to draw insightful
predictions about system behavior in large and complex markets. Finally, I would argue that these
models are plausible for studying online markets, where there are many agents and their individual
impact on system aggregate is small.
This thesis draws tools from and strives to contribute to the literature in both game theoretic
models and revenue optimization. Although the three problems being studied are different in nature,
there are at least few common themes that characterize all the models in this thesis that is worth
emphasizing. There is a seller that interacts with a large market of agents, consumers or other
businesses, and seeks to optimally allocate and/or price its product or service. Agents’ payoffs are
affected by the actions of other agents, either directly through social externalities or competition,
or indirectly through some information release mechanism. Agents’ heterogeneity, and the ability
of the seller to optimize over it, plays a key role in determining optimal pricing and equilibrium
strategies. Finally, we always use either a mean-field approximation or a continuum of agents
assumption to reduce aggregate uncertainty and generate crisp insights on the structure of optimal
policies for the seller. In the remainder of this chapter I provide a more detailed introduction to
the content of each chapter.
Chapter 2 is motivated by the growing interest in markets for information and studies the
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problem of optimal sale of information, such as demand forecasts, to a set of competing firms.
We show that the nature and intensity of competition among the information provider’s potential
customers have a first-order impact on her optimal selling strategy and profits. More specifically, our
analysis illustrates that the value the provider can extract from her customers is largely determined
by the trade-off between (i) the direct (positive) effect that more precise information has on their
profit as it enables them to make more informed decisions and (ii) the strategic effects that may
arise due to the fact that the information provider’s customers may interact with one another in
other markets. We present our findings in an environment that features a monopolistic information
provider who can sell informative signals to a set of firms that compete with one another in a
downstream market. We find that, when firms compete by setting prices, it is always optimal for
the information provider to sell her most informative signal to the entire market of firms. This
is a consequence of the fact that in this case firms’ actions are strategic complements. On the
other hand, when firms compete by setting quantities, it might be optimal for the provider to
sell to a smaller fraction of firms at higher prices. Moreover, we find that in the presence of cost
heterogeneity, if the providers excludes some firms from the sale, she always chooses the most
inefficient firms. An important extension is the scenario in which private information can leak
though aggregate actions, in this case we characterize the impact of the intensity of leakage on the
provider’s equilibrium strategy and profits.
Taken together, our findings provide a step towards understanding the intricacies involved in
markets for information. Unlike traditional markets for physical goods, it is relatively inexpensive to
offer a diverse menu of information products that differ in their precision and pricing. Our results
highlight that the value that a given buyer can extract from procuring such products depends
not only on the product’s characteristics (such as its price and precision), but also on the seller’s
market share and the environment in which her customers interact. Our modeling framework
provides several qualitative insights in how an information provider may optimally incorporate the
characteristics of such strategic interactions into her selling strategy.
Chapter 3 is motivated by the widespread adoption of online review systems by consumers in
a number of industries, online retail, food and hospitality to name a few. We study the optimal
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pricing problem of a monopolist that launches a product for sale to a stream of consumers that
arrive on the market with heterogeneous willingness to pay and are uncertain about the product
quality. Upon purchasing the product, consumers leave a binary like/dislike review based on their
experienced utility net of price. Future consumers use the public review information in order to
form a quality estimate and make their purchase decision. Our first result is a characterization of
the quality estimate of consumers. We propose an intuitive maximum likelihood procedure that
consumers use to make inference about the product quality from the observed amount of likes
and dislikes. First, we characterize the maximum-likelihood estimator and study its asymptotic
properties. Then, we characterize the learning transient based on a mean-field approximation.
Finally, we solve for the pricing policy that maximizes the seller’s discounted revenue.
This chapter strives to contribute in three ways. First, in terms of modeling, by specifying a
social learning environment that tries to capture aspects of online reviews as well as the possible
bounded rationality of consumers. Second, by proposing a tractable methodological framework,
based on mean-field approximations, to study the learning dynamics and related price optimization
questions in the presence of social learning. This approach is flexible and applicable in other related
settings where the microstructure of the learning process and nature of information are different.
Third, in addressing some of the pricing questions faced by revenue maximizing sellers in such
settings.
Chapter 4 is motivated by the empirically observed fact that, in markets where consumers are
connected and can observe the adoption patterns of other consumers, the popularity and appeal of
products depends on the mass of consumers that purchase in the early stages of the product life-
cycle. We study the problem of a seller that offers a product for sale to a large market of consumers
and can set different prices for two periods, an introductory period and a mature period. Consumers
are heterogeneous in their private valuation for the product and their overall willingness to pay is
affected by the mass of consumers that purchased before them. Two different scenarios are studied,
one in which the seller has commitment power and one in which she does not.
We find that the optimal price path is generally increasing, i.e., the seller offers a lower price in
the introductory period and a higher price in the mature period. Moreover, equilibrium prices vary
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with the level of social influence in the market, and can be very different depending on whether the
seller has commitment power or not. We characterize the equilibrium thresholds that consumers use
to make purchase decisions based on their private valuations, and we find that, under both scenarios,
these thresholds are such that the consumers with lower valuations never buy the product when
the social influence level is low and everybody buys when the social influence level is high. The
most important result provides a characterization of the value of price commitment as a function
of the social influence level.
Chapter 2
Information Sale and Competition
2.1 Introduction
Recent advances in information technology have streamlined the process of mining, aggregating,
and processing high volume data about economic activity. Arguably, it is widely believed that the
availability of more accurate information about the business environment and market conditions
can be hugely beneficial to firms across a wide variety of industries. For example, in a cross-industry
study, Brynjolfsson et al. [2011] document that firms that emphasize data-driven decision making
and invest heavily in information technology outperform their peers by a wide margin.
Such a realization has in turn led to a sizable demand for Business-to-Business information
services. Several firms ranging from Nielsen N.V. to Thomson-Reuters and IRI Worldwide have
built their business models around collecting, customizing, and selling information products to
other market participants. For example, the market research firm IRI Woldwide offers its clients a
variety of consumer, shopper, and retail market analyses focused on the consumer packaged goods
industry, whereas the Economist Intelligence Unit sells industry-wide market analysis reports.1
1IRI offers an array of information products at different price points. For example, the Basic “Market Advantage
Solution” includes a summary of industry sales and a detailed analysis of pricing strategies employed by a firm’s
competitors. The Premium “Market Advantage Solution”, on the other hand, provides a more in-depth analysis of
sales and competitors’ pricing strategies along with more specialized analytics services. The Basic product is priced
around $10,000 whereas the price for the Premium offering can range between $100,000 and $500,000. Similarly, the
Economist Intelligence Unit offers several information products for a variety of industries. For example, their basic
product for telecommunications industry provides a general overview of the industry and is priced at $205, whereas
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We present our main findings in the context of an environment that involves a monopolistic
information provider who can sell potentially informative signals to a collection of firms that com-
pete with one another in a downstream market. More specifically, we assume that the customer
firms face demand uncertainty and that the provider is endowed with a private signal that is (par-
tially) informative about the actual demand realization, thus creating potential gains from trade.
Crucially for our argument — and in line with the observation that many real-world information
providers offer a variety of information products of varying qualities — we allow for a setting in
which the provider can offer information products that are potentially less precise than her private
information. In other words, the provider can potentially distort the informativeness of the signal
at her disposal by reducing its accuracy.
As our main result, we show that the optimal selling strategy of the provider is largely dependent
on the nature and intensity of competition among its potential customers in the downstream market.
More specifically, we first show that when firms engage in price competition (Bertrand), the provider
finds it optimal to sell her signal with no distortion to the entire set of firms. This is due to the
fact that in a Bertrand market, firms’ actions are strategic complements and hence, each firm’s
marginal benefit of procuring a more accurate signal is increasing in the fraction of its competitors
that purchase the provider’s information product. Therefore, the provider would obtain maximal
profits by flooding the market with highly precise signals.
The situation, however, can be dramatically different if the information provider’s customers
compete with one another in quantities (Cournot). For such a downstream market, we show
that the provider may no longer find it optimal to sell an undistorted version of her signal to
all firms. Rather, she may find it optimal to either (i) reduce the quality of her information
product by selling a signal of a lower precision than the one she possesses; (ii) strategically limit
her market share by excluding a subset of its customers from the sale; or finally (iii) employ both
strategies simultaneously by reducing the quality and quantity of the products offered. This is
due to the fact that in a Cournot market, firms’ actions are strategic substitutes, which leads to
a more specialized report that includes finer information on network and pricing strategies costs $2,950. They also
offer customized reports at prices that are negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
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the emergence of two opposing effects. On the one hand, obtaining additional information about
demand directly benefits firms as they can better align their production decisions with underlying
market conditions. On the other hand, however, the provider’s signal can also serve as a correlating
device among its customers’ equilibrium actions. In particular, providing the information product
to an extra firm can only increase the correlation in the firms’ production decisions, an outcome
that reduces each firm’s profit and hence, can adversely affect the provider’s bottom line. Therefore,
when downstream competition is intense enough (for example, when firms’ products are sufficiently
substitutable), this latter, strategic channel would dominate the positive effect of reducing demand
uncertainty, implying that the information provider would be better off by restricting the quantity
and/or quality of the information products that it offers its customers. Interestingly, unlike in
Bertrand competition, the provider’s profits in a Cournot market are decreasing in the intensity
of competition and may end up being significantly lower than in the absence of any competition
among the downstream firms.
Finally, we discuss a number of extensions to our benchmark setup. First, we let the provider
offer a menu of information products with potentially different precisions and at different prices. We
provide an explicit characterization of the optimal selling strategy as a function of the nature and
intensity of competition. We show that when firms compete in quantities and offer substitutable
products, there is a continuum of selling strategies that lead to the same equilibrium profits for
the provider. In addition, we explore the implications of firm heterogeneity for the provider’s
selling strategy. More precisely, we consider a setting in which firms differ in their production
costs and show that it is optimal for the provider to sell higher precision information products (at
higher prices) to the more efficient firms, i.e., the optimal menu features information products with
precisions that are decreasing in the firms’ production costs.
Taken together, these findings provide a step towards understanding the intricacies involved in
markets for information. Unlike traditional markets for physical goods, it is relatively inexpensive to
offer a diverse menu of information products that differ in their precision and pricing. Our results
highlight that the value that a given buyer can extract from procuring such products depends
not only on the product’s characteristics (such as its price and precision), but also on the seller’s
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market share and the environment in which her customers interact. Our modeling framework
provides several qualitative insights in how an information provider may optimally incorporate the
characteristics of such strategic interactions into her selling strategy.
2.1.1 Related literature
Our paper is related to the extensive literature that studies firms’ strategic considerations in sharing
information with one another in oligopolistic markets. For example, Vives [1984], Gal-Or [1985], Li
[1985], and Raith [1996] provide conditions under which firms find it optimal to share their private
information about market conditions with their competitors.
Relatedly, a more recent collection of papers, such as Li [2002], Li and Zhang [2008], Shin and
Tunca [2010], Shamir [2012], Ha and Tong [2008], Ha et al. [2011] and Shang et al. [forthcoming],
studies information sharing incentives in vertical supply chains. For instance, Shamir and Shin
[2013] determine conditions under which firms can credibly share their demand forecasts with one
another, whereas Cui et al. [forthcoming] provide a theoretical and empirical assessment of the
value of information sharing in two-stage supply chains. This literature, for the most part, focuses
on firms’ information sharing strategies according to which each firm decides whether or not to
disclose its information in full to other firms. In contrast, we consider a setting in which a third-
party decides not only the price but also the accuracy of the information product(s) she makes
available to a set of competing firms. This allows for richer equilibrium outcomes that highlight
the interplay between the nature of competition, the optimal selling strategy, and the profits for
the information provider.
Our work is also related to the growing theoretical literature on the social and equilibrium
value of public information. Morris and Shin [2002] illustrate that public disclosure of informa-
tion regarding a payoff-relevant parameter may adversely affect social welfare as it may crowd out
agents’ reliance on their private information. Angeletos and Pavan [2007] extend this framework
and provide a complete taxonomy of conditions under which private and public signals are effi-
ciently utilized in equilibrium. Relatedly, Bergemann and Morris [2013] study games of incomplete
information with the goal of providing equilibrium predictions that are robust to all possible in-
CHAPTER 2. INFORMATION SALE AND COMPETITION 10
formation structures. Their analysis illustrates that information disclosure policies that involve a
partial sharing of a firm’s private information may lead to higher equilibrium payoffs.
The question of optimal sale of information has also been studied in the context of trading
in financial markets. For example, Admati and Pfleiderer [1990] consider a monopolistic seller of
information interacting with a set of traders. They argue that if market prices aggregate agents’
private signals, agents may find it optimal to free-ride on the information revealed via prices (as
opposed to purchasing signals from the seller), thus diluting the equilibrium value of information.
In contrast, our paper focuses on a different type of inter-firm strategic interaction, as firms in our
framework cannot free-ride on the information generated by the actions of other firms.
Finally, our work is related to the more recent work of Bergemann and Bonatti [forthcoming],
who explore selling information in the form of cookies in the context of online advertising as well
as Xiang and Sarvary [2013] who consider a market for information with competition on both
the demand and supply sides of the market. In a similar application context, Babaioff et al.
[2012] study the design of optimal mechanisms for a data provider to sell information to a single
buyer and provide conditions under which a single round of communication is sufficient for profit
maximization.
Outline of the Paper: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains the
model and shows that our framework nests Bertrand and Cournot competition as special cases.
We provide a characterization of the equilibrium in Section 2.3, where we show that the nature of
downstream competition has a first-order impact on the monopolist’s optimal information selling
strategy. In Section 2.4, we generalize our setting by allowing the monopolist to discriminate both
on prices and on the quality of information offered to its customers. In Section 2.5 we allow for
some degree of information leakage through aggregate actions and study the effect of leakage on
the seller’s equilibrium strategy and profits. Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 present two extensions, for
the case of heterogeneous firm and for the discrete version of our model with a finite number of
firms. Section 2.8 concludes. All the proofs are presented in the Appendix.
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2.2 Model
Firms: Consider an economy consisting of a unit mass of firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] that compete
with one another in a downstream market. Each firm i takes an action ai ∈ R in order to maximize
its profit







aidi denotes the aggregate action taken by the firms, θ ∈ R is an unknown payoff-
relevant parameter, and {γ0, γ1, γ2} are some exogenously given constants. Depending on the
context, action ai may represent the quantity sold or the price set by firm i. As we will show in
Subsection 2.2.2, the above framework nests Cournot and Bertrand competitions as special cases.
For the time being, however, we find it more convenient to work with the general setup above
without taking a specific position on the mode of competition.
The unknown parameter θ is randomly drawn by nature before firms choose their actions. As we
will discuss in the following subsections, this parameter can represent the intercept of the (inverse)
demand curve in the downstream market. All firms hold a common prior belief on θ, which for
simplicity we assume to be the (improper) uniform distribution over the real line.2 Even though
firms do not know the realization of θ, each firm i observes a noisy private signal
xi = θ + εi , εi ∼ N(0, 1/κx),
with κx capturing the signals’ precision. The noise terms εi are independently distributed across
firms.
Given firm i’s profit function in (2.1), we let










2More formally, suppose that θ is distributed according to a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance σθ.
By letting σθ → ∞, we obtain a distribution with full support over (−∞,∞) that, in the limit, assigns the same
probability to all intervals of identical Lebesgue measures.
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denote the degree of strategic complementarity in firms’ actions. Note that β > 0 corresponds to an
economy in which firms’ actions are strategic complements: the benefit of taking a higher action to
firm i increases the higher the actions of other firms are. In contrast, when β < 0, firms face a game
of strategic substitutes, where i’s incentives for taking a higher action decrease with the aggregate
action A. Finally, β = 0 corresponds to a market in which firms face no strategic interactions.
Throughout the paper, we assume that γ2 > max{2γ1, 0}. This assumption, which implies
that β ∈ (−∞, 1/2), is made to guarantee that firm i’s profit is strictly concave in ai and that i’s
marginal profit is more sensitive to its own action ai than to the aggregate action A.
Information Provider: In addition to the competing firms, the economy contains a monopolist
who possesses some private information about the realization of the unknown parameter θ that it
can potentially sell to the firms before they take their actions. The provider has access to a private
signal z with precision κz given by
z = θ + ζ , ζ ∼ N(0, 1/κz),
where the noise term ζ is independent of εi’s. Given that our main focus is on the market for
information, we assume that this signal has no intrinsic value to the provider and that she can only
benefit from the signal by selling it to the firms.
The key feature of our model is that the provider has control over both the “quantity” and
“quality” of information sold to the firms: the information provider not only chooses the set of firms
I ⊆ [0, 1] that she decides to trade with, but can also choose the precision of the signal offered to
the firms. More specifically, she offers a signal
si = z + ξi , ξi ∼ N(0, 1/κξ),
to firm i ∈ I at price pi, where ξi is independent from z and 1/κξ captures the variance of the
noise introduced by the provider into si. This specification thus captures the idea that the provider
can control the quality of the information sold to the firms: by choosing a smaller κξ, the provider
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can “damage” the signals offered to the firms.3 Throughout the paper, we refer to si as the market
signal sold to firm i.
In general, the noise added to different firms’ signals by the provider may be correlated with
one another. To capture this idea formally, we assume that in addition to their precision κξ,
the provider can also determine the correlation between different firms’ market signals by setting
ρξ = corr(ξi, ξj) ∈ [0, 1]. Our specification thus accommodates situations in which the information
provider offers identical or conditionally independent signals to any subset of the firms as special
cases.
Putting the above together, the market signal si offered to firm i ∈ I can be rewritten as
si = θ + ηi , ηi ∼ N(0, 1/κs) and corr(ηi, ηj) = ρ,
where κs = (1/κz + 1/κξ)
−1 is the signal’s precision and ρ = (κξ + ρξκz)/(κξ + κz). Note that
by construction, signals sold by the provider cannot be more precise than the information she
possesses; that is, κs ≤ κz.
We remark that given firms’ ex ante symmetry, we can assume, without loss of generality, that
I = [0, λ], where λ ∈ [0, 1] captures the fraction of firms that the information provider decides to
trade with. Also note that even though we assume that the seller chooses the fraction of firms
she wants to trade with before offering them her information products, as we show in Section 2.4,
our setting is isomorphic to an environment in which the provider announces the features of her
product(s) — i.e., price and precision — and firms subsequently decide whether to purchase the
products.
Finally, with some abuse of terminology, we refer to the firms who purchase the market signal
si as informed firms, whereas firms that were denied the signal or decided not to purchase it from
the information provider are simply referred to as being uninformed.
3Note that in our baseline setting, the provider offers a signal of the same precision to all firms i ∈ I; that is,
κξ is independent of i. We relax this assumption in Section 2.4 and show that all our insights are robust to this
assumption.
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2.2.1 Contracts and Equilibrium
Once the seller’s and the firms’ private signals are realized, the former has the option to sell
potentially informative signals about θ to the latter. To capture this idea formally, we assume that
the information provider makes a take-it-or-leave it offer (κξ, pi, ρξ) to a fraction λ of the firms,
where κξ captures the quality of the market signal offered to firm i and pi is the corresponding
firm-specific price.
Following the seller’s offer, each firm i ∈ [0, λ] then decides whether to accept (bi = 1) or reject
(bi = 0) its corresponding offer. This stage is then followed by the competition subgame between
the firms in which they choose their actions ai. Note that whereas the strategy of an uninformed
firm i is a mapping from its private signal xi to an action, the strategy of an informed firm maps
the pair (xi, si) to an action.
Given this setup, we have the following natural solution concept:
Definition 2.2.1. An equilibrium consists of a fraction λ of firms that receive an offer, a set of
individual prices {pi}i∈[0,λ], market signal precision κξ and correlation ρξ chosen by the information
provider, acceptance/rejection decisions bi ∈ {0, 1} for each firm, and firm-specific strategies such
that:
(i) The information provider maximizes her profits.
(ii) Firm i ∈ [0, λ] accepts the provider’s offer only if it is individually rational to do so, taking
the acceptance/rejection decisions of other firms as given.
(iii) Once the provider’s offers are accepted or rejected, the firms’ actions constitute a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium of the competition subgame.
2.2.2 Examples
As already mentioned, Cournot and Bertrand competition can be derived as special cases of our
general framework above. This feature of the model enables us to provide a comparison of the
optimal information selling strategies in markets with different modes and intensities of competition.
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The following simple examples illustrate how in the presence of linear demand functions, various
forms of competition can induce quadratic profit functions in the form of Equation (2.1). We will
use these examples in the subsequent sections to discuss the implications of our results for the
optimal trading strategies of the information provider.
Example 2.2.1 (Cournot competition). Consider a market in which firms sell a possibly differen-
tiated product to a downstream market and compete by setting quantities. Firm i faces an inverse
demand function given by
ri = γ0θ − (1− δ)Q− δqi, (2.3)
where qi is the quantity sold by firm i, Q =
∫ 1
0 qidi is the aggregate quantity sold to the downstream
market, and θ captures the intercept of the (inverse) demand curve. In this setting, δ ∈ [0, 1]
represents the degree of product differentiation among firms, as a smaller δ corresponds to a more
homogenous set of products.4 Assuming that firms’ marginal cost of production is zero, it is then
immediate that their profit function πi = riqi is simply a special case of our framework in (2.1),
with action ai representing the quantity sold by firm i.
Note that in this environment, the degree of strategic complementarity defined in (2.2) is equal
to β = (δ − 1)/2δ < 0, thus implying that firms face a game of strategic substitutes. Parameter
β also captures the intensity of competition between the firms. In particular, given that β is
increasing in δ, a larger β corresponds to a market in which products are more differentiated. In
the extreme case that β → 0, the products are no longer substitutes and each firm essentially
becomes a monopolist in its own market. At the other extreme, as β → −∞, the products become
perfect substitutes and the oligopoly converges to a perfectly competitive market.
Example 2.2.2 (Bertrand competition). Next, consider a market in which firms compete in prices
and face a linear demand function given by
qi = γ0θ + (φ− 1)R− φri,
4See Myatt and Wallace [2015] for microfoundations for this demand system.
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where ri is the price set by firm i and R =
∫ 1
0 ridi is the average price in the market. Note that
this demand system can be obtained by inverting (2.3) and setting φ = 1/δ > 1. Once again,
it is immediate that firm i’s profit function πi = riqi would coincide with (2.1), where action ai
now represents the price set by firm i. Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that, in this
environment, β = (φ − 1)/2φ > 0, thus implying that the competition game between the firms
exhibits strategic complementarities, the degree of which is increasing in φ.
Example 2.2.3. Once again consider the Cournot competition setting described in Example 2.2.1,
but instead suppose that firms produce homogeneous products, i.e., δ = 0, and have quadratic
production costs given by c(qi) = q
2
i /2. The profit of firm i is then given by




which again fits within our general framework.
We conclude this section by remarking that even though, for the sake of tractability and expo-
sition, we focus on an environment consisting of a continuum of firms, as we show in Subsection
2.7, our results and qualitative insights carry over to a setting with finitely many firms.
2.3 Optimal Sale of Information
In this section, we present our main results and characterize the information provider’s optimal
information selling strategy. Our results show that the seller’s strategy is highly sensitive to the
mode and intensity of competition in the downstream market as expressed by β.
2.3.1 Competition Subgame
We start our analysis by studying the equilibrium in the competition subgame between the firms
once the contracts offered by the information provider are accepted or rejected. Without loss of
generality, let [0, `] denote the set of firms who accept the seller’s offer, where, clearly, ` ≤ λ. Our
first result generalizes the results of Angeletos and Pavan [2007] and provides a characterization of
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the firms’ equilibrium strategies in the competition subgame.
Proposition 2.3.1. The competition subgame between the firms has a unique Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium in linear strategies. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategies of the firms are given by
ai =

α[(1− ω)xi + ωsi] if i ∈ [0, `]





(1− β`ρ)κx + κs
and α = γ0/(γ2 − γ1).
Proposition 2.3.1 states that the equilibrium action of an informed firm is a weighted sum of its
original private signal and the signal it obtains from the information provider. More importantly,
however, it shows that the weights firm i assigns to its two signals not only depend on their relative
precisions, but also on the fraction of informed firms, `, as well as correlation ρ in the market
signals. In particular, the equilibrium weight that each informed firm assigns to the market signal
si is increasing in the degree of strategic complementarities β, regardless of the values of ρ and
`.5 This is due to the fact that in the presence of stronger strategic complementarities, firms have
stronger incentives to coordinate with one another, and as a result, rely more heavily on their
market signals, which can function as (imperfect) coordination devices. On the other hand, in
the absence of strategic considerations (i.e., when β = 0), the optimal strategy of all firms would
be independent of ` and ρ, making the weight assigned to each signal proportional to its relative
precision.
Relatedly, Proposition 2.3.1 also establishes that for a given positive (negative) β, the equilib-
rium weight that informed firms assign to their market signals is increasing (decreasing) in ` and
5Recall that ρ ≥ 0.
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ρ. To see the intuition underlying this observation, suppose that β > 0.6 In such an economy,
firms face a game of strategic complements, as for example would be the case if they compete à la
Bertrand as in Example 2.2.2. Given that firms value coordinating their actions with one another,
a given informed firm i assigns a higher weight to its market signal — above and beyond what its
relative precision would justify — the more other firms base their own decisions on the signal sold
by the information provider (i.e., higher `) and the more informative si is about the signals of other
firms (i.e., higher ρ).
With Proposition 2.3.1 at hand, in the remainder of this section, we turn to the the seller’s
problem and characterize her optimal information selling strategy as a function of the mode and
intensity of competition in the downstream market. In order to present our results in the most
transparent manner, we study Bertrand and Cournot competition separately.
2.3.2 Bertrand Competition
First, consider the case in which firms compete with one another à la Bertrand. As already
mentioned in Example 2.2.2, such a market corresponds to a special case of our general framework
with β > 0. Also, recall that the information provider needs to choose the fraction of firms with
whom she trades (λ), the precision of the signal offered to the firms (κs) and the correlation induced
in the noise terms (ρξ). We have the following result:
Proposition 2.3.2. If β > 0, the information provider sells her signal without any distortions to
all firms; that is, κ∗s = κz and λ








[(1− β)κx + κz]2
. (2.4)
The above result thus establishes that under Bertrand competition, it is always optimal for the
provider to sell her signal z to the entire set of firms without any additional noise. To understand
the intuition underlying this result, recall that in a Bertrand market, the firms’ actions are strategic
complements: setting a lower price becomes more attractive the lower the prices of other competing
6The argument for β < 0 is identical.
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firms are. Such strategic complementarities induce a strong coordination motive among the firms.
Therefore, providing the market signal to an additional marginal firm, not only increases the profits
of the seller directly (via sales to that new marginal firm), but also increases the surplus of all other
firms who have already acquired the signal. This extra surplus can thus be appropriated by the
seller via higher prices, leading to even higher profits. Consequently, the information provider
always finds it optimal to sell to the entire market of firms. An identical argument then shows
that the provider would not distort the signal either: sharing a more precise signal with a new firm
increases the value of the market signal to the rest of the informed firms.
Proposition 2.3.2 also characterizes the expected profit of the seller. From (2.4), it is easy to
verify that Π∗ is increasing in the quality of information available to the monopolist (κz), but
is decreasing in the precision of the firms’ private signals (κx). The intuition underlying these
observations is simple. Given that the information provider always has the option to reduce the
precision of the signals it offers to the firms, her profits can never decrease by having access to a
more precise signal. On the other hand, however, the extra benefit of the market signal to the firms
is lower the more informed they are to begin with, thus reducing the provider’s expected profits.
More importantly, however, (2.4) also shows that the monopolist’s expected profit increases
in the degree of strategic complementarities β. Recall from Example 2.2.2 that β = (φ − 1)/2φ,
where 1/φ = δ is the degree of product differentiation among the firms. Therefore, increasing
β is essentially equivalent to a lower degree of product differentiation, and hence, more intense
competition. Thus, as β increases, coordination becomes more important to the firms, increasing
the value of the seller’s signal which in turn leads to higher expected profits.
As a final remark, note that since it is never optimal for the information provider to add noise
to the signals, the correlation ρξ = corr(ξi, ξj) is immaterial for her profits.
2.3.3 Cournot Competition
We next focus on the case in which firms compete with one another à la Cournot. Recall from
Example 2.2.1 that such a market is a special case of our general setup with β < 0. In this case,
firms choose quantities and their actions are strategic substitutes. Note that, unlike the case of
CHAPTER 2. INFORMATION SALE AND COMPETITION 20
Bertrand competition, firms no longer value coordination per se. The following two propositions
provide a characterization of the optimal information selling strategy of the monopolist as a function
of the degree of strategic substitutability among the actions of downstream firms.
Proposition 2.3.3. If −(1+κz/κx) ≤ β < 0, the information provider sells her signal without any
distortions to all firms; that is, κ∗s = κz and λ









[(1− β)κx + κz]2
. (2.5)
Thus, in a Cournot market with a weak enough intensity of competition, the seller finds it
optimal to follow the same strategy as in a Bertrand market: sell an undistorted version of her
signal to the entire set of firms. The intuition underlying this result is straightforward: acquiring
information about the demand intercept (θ) allows each firm i to better match its supply decision
to the underlying demand and as a consequence, to increase its profit. The monopolist can then
appropriate the increase in i’s sales by demanding a higher price in exchange for the signal. There-
fore, the provider is always better off by making the most precise version of her signal available to
all firms i.
Even though the seller follows the same strategy as in the Bertrand market, comparing expres-
sions (2.4) and (2.5) implies that her expected profit is lower under Cournot competition (β < 0).
This is due to the fact that unlike Bertrand competition, firms do not have an incentive to coordinate
their actions, undermining the role of the market signal as a coordination device.
Interestingly, the predictions of Propositions 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 no longer hold if the intensity at
which downstream firms compete with one another in a Cournot market is high. We have the
following result:
Proposition 2.3.4. If β < −(1 + κz/κx), the information provider maximizes her expected profit




s = 0. (2.6)
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The key observation here is that the pair κ∗s = κz and λ
∗ = 1 does not satisfy (2.6), leading to
the following corollary:
Corollary 2.3.1. Suppose that β < −(1 + κz/κx). Then, either κ∗s < κz or λ∗ < 1.
Therefore, when firms compete with one another à la Cournot and offer goods that are strong
substitutes — corresponding to a large enough negative β — it is optimal for the seller to distort
the information (κ∗s < κz) and/or exclude a fraction of the firms from the sale (λ
∗ < 1).
To see the intuition underlying the above result, recall that in a Cournot market, firms’ actions
are strategic substitutes, i.e., increasing a firm’s supply leads to higher marginal profit the lower
the supply decisions of its competitors are. Therefore, providing the market signal to an additional
firm i affects its profit through two distinct channel. On the one hand, a more precise market signal
enables i to better match its supply to the realized demand. On the other hand, however, making
such a signal available to i increases the correlation in the firms’ actions, as now i’s action would
be more correlated with the market parameter θ. The presence of this second effect implies that
the strategic value of the seller’s signal to firm i and consequently i’s willingness to pay for it are
decreasing in the fraction of firms that accept the provider’s offer. When the competition among the
firms is sufficiently intense (i.e., the goods they offer are sufficiently substitutable), this strategic
effect would dominate the first effect, thus making it profitable for the information provider to
restrict her offer to a strict subset of the firms (λ∗ < 1).
By Proposition 2.3.4, an alternative optimal strategy for the monopolist would be to distort
the information she sells to the market. In fact, as Equation (2.6) suggests, the fraction λ of
the firms that the monopolist trades with and the precision κs of the signal offered to the firms
are substitutes: as the monopolist increases her market share, she finds it optimal to increasingly
distort the signals.
Note that the information provider’s expected profit decreases in the degree of strategic substi-
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Figure 2.1: Optimal selling strategy for different levels of β (left); Equilibrium profit as a function
of β (right). We use the following set of parameters for this example: α = γ2 = 1 for the firms’
payoff functions and κx = 1, κz = 2 for the signal precisions of the firms’ private signals and the
provider’s information respectively.
tutability (|β|) of the firms’ actions. This is a consequence of the fact that the strategic value of the
seller’s signal and consequently a firm’s willingness to pay for it decrease as the market becomes
more competitive. This is in contrast with the case of Bertrand competition where the seller’s
expected profit increases with the intensity of competition among the firms as they have a stronger
incentive to purchase the market signal and coordinate their actions.
We also remark that regardless of the value of β and the strategy adopted by the information
provider, she never has an incentive to introduce correlation into market signals, i.e., it is always
optimal to set ρ∗ξ = 0. Increasing the correlation in the signals provided to downstream firms would
invariably increase the correlation among their actions and lead to lower profits for the seller.
Finally, note that the threshold − (1 + κz/κx) at which the seller finds it optimal to limit her
market share and/or strategically distort the market signal is decreasing in the ratio κz/κx, implying
that the more informed the information provider is relative to her customers, the more likely it is
that she will be able to fully exploit her informational advantage by selling it to the entire market
of firms without distortion.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the optimal selling strategy and the equilibrium profit of the information
provider for the following set of parameters: α = γ2 = 1, κx = 1, and κz = 2. It turns out that
for these parameters the threshold at which the seller finds it optimal to strategically distort the
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β = 0 β = −3 β = −5 β = −10 β = −20
Π∗β
/
Π∗0 1 .250 .150 .075 .038
Πno-distβ
/
Π∗0 1 .250 .141 .053 .017
Increase in Profits (%) 0% 0% 6.67% 40.83% 120.42%
Table 2.1: Comparing profits under the optimal information selling strategy with selling the
provider’s signal undistorted to the entire market.
market signal is equal to −3. Note that as the left plot highlights for values of β greater than the
threshold, the provider sets the precision of the market signal to κ∗s = 2, i.e., she does not distort
the information she has at her disposal, and does not exclude any firms from the sale (λ∗ = 1).
On the other hand, for values of β lower than the threshold, the seller finds it optimal to distort
the information she provides to the market and limit her market share (in particular, her optimal
selling strategy is given by Equation (2.6)). The right plot illustrates how the provider’s profit
varies with the intensity of competition. Note that the seller is always better off when firms view
their actions as strategic complements (β > 0) as opposed to strategic substitutes.
We conclude this section by exploring the extent to which an information provider can increase
her profits by strategically distorting the information she provides to her downstream customers
and/or limiting her market share. In Table 2.1 we compare the profits for a provider that optimally
sells her information to the firms (Π∗β) with the profits for a provider that sells the information she





profits for a provider that follows her optimal strategy in the absence of competition, i.e., when
β = 0. The first two rows of the table clearly highlight the effect of intensifying the competition
among the firms on the providers’s profits. Furthermore and quite importantly, as we report in the
third row of the table the provider earns significantly higher profits under competition when she
distorts her market signal and/or limits her market share — the increase in her profits by following
the optimal strategy characterized in Proposition 2.3.4 ranges from 6.67% to 120.42% as the extent
to which firms view their actions as strategic substitutes increases.
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2.4 Information Quality Discrimination
In our baseline model presented in Section 2.2 and analyzed in Section 2.3, we assumed that the
information provider can only offer a single product to the entire market, in the sense that she
offers a market signal of the same precision to all firms. In this section, we relax this assumption
by allowing the seller to offer signals that potentially differ in both price and precision. Formally,
the information provider makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each firm i ∈ [0, 1], specifying the
signal precision κsi and price pi. Note that as in our earlier setting, the seller cannot offer a signal
of a higher precision than her own private signal, that is, κsi ≤ κz for all i. Furthermore, it is
immediate to verify that the baseline model of Section 2.2 is a special case of this more general
model, as the monopolist can simply exclude firm i by either charging pi = ∞ or providing a
completely uninformative signal with precision κsi = 0. The following result, which generalizes
Propositions 2.3.2–2.3.4, shows that all our earlier insights remain valid under this more general
specification.
Proposition 2.4.1. The optimal information selling strategy for the information provider is given
as follows:
(a) If β ≥ −(1 + κz/κx), the information provider offers an undistorted version of her signal to








[(1− β)κx + κz]2
.
(b) If β < −(1 + κz/κx), the information provider offers a market signal of precision κ∗si to firm





di = − κz
βκx
(2.8)









Statement (a) of the above result shows that the information provider offers an undistorted
version of her signal to all firms in the downstream market if either they compete à la Bertrand,
or alternatively, if the intensity of the Cournot competition is not strong enough. In this sense,
this result generalizes Propositions 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, establishing that the seller has no incentive to
discriminate among the firms in either price or information quality.
Statement (b) of Proposition 2.4.1 considers the setting in which firms’ actions are strong
strategic substitutes, for example, when they compete à la Cournot and produce goods that are
highly substitutable. Consistent with the discussion in Subsection 2.3.3, this result shows that the
information provider finds it optimal to either distort the signals sold to the downstream firms or
strategically restrict her market share. In particular, it is easy to verify that κ∗si = κz for all i
does not satisfy the optimality condition (2.8). The intuition underlying this result parallels those
behind Proposition 2.3.4 and Corollary 2.3.1: providing high quality signals to all firms increases
the induced correlation in their actions, which in turn reduces their profit when their actions are
strong strategic substitutes. Thus, the monopolist would be better off by limiting its market share
or reducing the quality of the signals sold to the firms. Note, however, that the optimal strategy
of the information provider is not unique. Rather, any signal precision profile {κ∗si} that satisfies
(2.8) would lead to the same expected profit. Nevertheless, irrespective of the strategy chosen by
the monopolist, her incentive to lower the precision of the market signals increases as firms’ actions
become stronger strategic substitutes. In particular, as β → −∞, the downside of coordination
among firms that trade with the monopolist is so strong that essentially no trade takes place in
equilibrium: the information provider offers a completely uninformative signal κ∗si → 0 to all firms
at price p∗i → 0.
Example 2.4.1 (Selling two products). Consider a Cournot market in which β < −(1 + κz/κx).
Suppose that the information provider can offer two distinct information products: a premium
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product of precision κ̄s at price p̄ and an inferior product of precision κs < κ̄s at price p. Let λ̄
and λ denote the fraction of firms offered the premium and inferior products, respectively, where
by construction λ̄ + λ ≤ 1. Condition (2.8) implies that it is optimal for the seller to design her














The above equation highlights the trade-off between information quality and quantity faced by the
information provider in designing her menu of products. In particular, increasing the precision κ̄s
of the premium product requires either a reduction in its supply λ̄, or alternatively, a reduction in
the precision or the supply of the inferior product.
Note that, by selling a premium product the information provider is placing the well-informed
firms at an advantage vis-à-vis their less-informed competitors. This enables her to charge the
former set of firms a higher price. In fact, as equation (2.9) highlights, p̄ > p.
We end this discussion by remarking that the ability to discriminate on information quality does
not offer the seller any advantage compared to our benchmark model of Sections 2.2 and 2.3. In
particular, equation (2.8) always has a solution such that κsi = κs for a fraction λ of the firms and
κsi = 0 for the rest. In other words, offering two information products, one with non-zero precision
at a strictly positive price and another with zero precision at zero price, is sufficient for the seller
to maximize her expected profit.
2.5 Information Leakage
Firms’ actions typically reflect the payoff-relevant information they have at their disposal. Thus,
a seller of information may need to take into account the dilution in the value of information to
the competing firms due to its leakage through their actions. This section explores an extension of
our benchmark setting that directly incorporates information leakage through the firms’ actions.
In particular, in addition to its private and market signals xi and si, respectively, firm i also has
access to signal Si which centered around the aggregate action that is in the market. The precision
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of this signal about the aggregate action can be viewed as a measure of information leakage.
To illustrate clearly the effect leakage on the information provider’s optimal selling strategy
and profits, we focus on equilibria in which all firms purchase the provider’s information, i.e.,
λ = 1. Note that this is without loss of generality since there always exists a profit maximizing
selling strategy that induces such equilibrium behavior. Moreover, we assume that ρξ = 0, i.e.,
the provider sells information signals that are independent conditional on the realization of state θ
(this is, again, without any loss of generality as we establish in Section 2.3). Thus, the information
provider optimizes over the precision κs of her information product. Moreover, in addition to signals
xi and si, firm i observes signal Si that takes the following form
Si = A+ νi , νi ∼ N(0, 1/κν),
where the noise terms νi’s are independently distributed across firms and the precision κν measures
the extent of information leakage in the market. In particular, when κν = ∞ then signal Si is
perfectly informative of the aggregate action A whereas when κν = 0 then Si does not convey
any payoff-relevant information to firm i, i.e., there is no information leakage, and the setting is
equivalent to our benchmark model.
We extend the firms’ strategy space by allowing them to condition their actions on firm Si.
In particular, firms specify a supply function that depends on the information they have at their
disposal, i.e., signals xi, si, and Si. In other words, firm i’s action is a map from the signal
space to the space of supply functions, i.e., a function ai(xi, si, Si), as opposed to a scalar as in




a(xi, si, Si) di. The equation has a unique solution for a linear-quadratic framework with




.8 The profit of firm i for
7Our approach builds on Vives [2011] that studies competition among firms that possess private payoff-relevant
information. Using supply functions and having firms condition on a (potentially noisy) signal about the aggregate
action, allows us to directly incorporate information leakage into our benchmark model and study how the provider’s
optimal selling strategy and profits vary as a function of the extent of leakage in a market.
8This solution, which we characterize in the proof of Proposition 2.5.1, depends on state θ, the provider’s noise ζ,
and the coefficients of the firm’s equilibrium strategies.
CHAPTER 2. INFORMATION SALE AND COMPETITION 28
any given realization of signals is given as





where Si = A + νi and A = Â
(
{a(xj , sj , Si)}j∈[0,1]
)
. Given signals (xi, si, Si), firm i determines
its equilibrium strategy ai = a(xi, si, Si) so as maximizes its expected profit E[πi|xi, si, Si] in the
competition subgame, taking the strategies of other firms as given.
The following proposition summarizes our findings regarding the effect of information leakage
on the provider’s optimal selling strategy and equilibrium profits.
Proposition 2.5.1. Let Π∗ denote the equilibrium profits of the information provider in the pres-




< 0 for all β ∈ (−∞, 1/2).
(b) There exists −(1 + κz/κx) < β̄ < 0 such that κ∗s < κz for all β ∈
[
− (1 + κz/κx), β̄
)
.
Part (a) of Proposition 2.5.1 establishes that the monopolist’s equilibrium profits decrease in
the presence of information leakage. This is true regardless of the value of β, i.e., whether actions
are strategic complements or substitutes (Bertrand or Cournot competition). As one would expect,
when firms are able to (partially) infer their competitors’ information by observing a signal about
their aggregate action, the value of the provider’s information decreases and, thus, her profits go
down.
More importantly, part (b) of Proposition 2.5.1 establishes that the range of β’s for which the
information provider finds it optimal to distort her information in the presence of leakage is wider
than when firms determine their actions based solely on signals xi and si. The provider’s incentives
to distort the information she sells to the downstream market grow stronger as her ability to extract
surplus from the firms when increasing the precision of signal si is hindered by information leakage.
That said, even in the presence of leakage, distorting her information is never optimal when firms’s
actions are strategic complements, i.e., as in Bertrand competition. 9
9Note that this does not imply that the optimal selling strategy is the same as in the absence of leakage. In
particular, the provided is forced to sell her information at a lower price.
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Figure 2.2: The provider’s equilibrium profits (left) and her optimal selling strategy (right) as
functions of β for different levels of information leakage. We use the following set of parameters for
this example: α = γ2 = 1 for the firms’ payoff functions and κx = 1, κz = 2 for the signal precisions
of the firms’ private signals and the provider’s information respectively. We plot the provider’s
profits and the precision of the signal she sells to the downstream market (κ∗s) as a function of β
for three levels of information leakage κν = 0 (no leakage), κν = 1, and κν = 10.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the equilibrium profits and the provider’s optimal selling strategy for
different levels of leakage. As can be clearly seen in the left plot shows the provider’s profits are
decreasing in the level of information leakage in the market irrespective of the value of β. The right
plot explores the impact of leakage on the provider’s optimal selling strategy. In particular, she
finds it optimal to distort the information she sells to the downstream market for a wider range of
β’s than in the absence of leakage. In addition and as already mention above, distortion is never
optimal in the presence of strategic complementarities (β > 0) irrespective of the level of leakage.
Table 2.2 presents our numerical solutions for different level of leakage at different values of
β. We report both the equilibrium profits and the optimal precision in three different scenarios,
our baseline where there is no leakage (κν = 0) as well as two scenarios with low and high leakage
intensity respectively. These allow us to appreciate how severely leakage decreases the equilibrium
profits. In particular, comparing the equilibrium profits when the level of leakage is high to the
equilibrium profits in the absence of leakage, we see that at β = 1/3 the equilibrium profit with high
leakage is only 5% of the corresponding profit when there is no leakage. Moreover, when β < 0 the
negative effect of leakage on profits is more severe the higher the level of strategic substitutability,
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Leakage Level β = −4 β = −3 β = −2 β = −1 β = 0 β = 1/3
κν = 0 .0625 .0833 .1200 .1875 .3333 .4218
Equilibrium Profits κν = 1 .0082 .0014 .0189 .0420 .1134 .1606
κν = 10 .0002 .0003 .0005 .0008 .0050 .0209
κν = 0 1 2 2 2 2 2
Optimal Precision κν = 1 .40 .65 2 2 2 2
κν = 10 .08 .12 .16 .36 2 2
Table 2.2: Equilibrium profit and optimal precision for different levels of information leakage.
when β = −4 we see that the equilibrium profits under high leakage are extremely low, less than
.5% of the corresponding profits in the absence of leakage. Moreover, the second part of the table
highlights the impact on information leakage on the optimal selling strategy when β is negative,
for example, when β = −2 it is optimal to sell a signal with full precision when leakage is absent
or low, but when leakage is high the seller dramatically decreases the signal precision to only 8%
of her best signal precision.
2.6 Heterogeneous Firms
Our analysis thus far focused on an environment consisting of a continuum of homogenous firms.
In this section, we discuss how our results are affected by introducing heterogeneity among the
firms (in terms of their production costs). Once again, consider the environment presented in
Example 2.2.1, where firms compete with one another in quantities. We generalize this setting
in two dimensions, by (i) allowing heterogeneity in firms’ production costs and (ii) introducing a
transaction cost borne by the information provider whenever she trades with a downstream firm.
More specifically, we assume that downstream firms are heterogeneous with respect to their
costs of production: firm i faces a quadratic production cost of Ci(qi) = ciq
2
i /2, where qi is the
quantity produced by i and ci > 0. The firm’s profit is thus given by
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where Q denotes the aggregate quantity in the market and γ1 < 0 is some constant. Note that even
though the above expression is similar to (2.1), the extent of strategic complementarities can no
longer be captured by a single parameter β, as now firms face potentially heterogeneous production
costs.
As for transaction costs, we assume that the seller incurs a cost equal to vκsi whenever she sells
a signal of precision κsi to firm i, where v > 0. This cost can, for example, capture the idea that
the firm cannot provide verifiable and/or credible information to its customers at no cost. Rather,
it needs to spend resources to ensure its customer that the market signal is indeed as informative as
claimed. Alternatively, it can be thought of as the cost associated with customizing the provider’s
information to meet the customer’s informational needs. As in Section 2.4, we allow the seller to
discriminate along both signal precision and price. We have the following result:
Proposition 2.6.1. There exist v > v such that
(a) if v > v, the information provider does not transact with any of the firms; that is, κ∗si = 0 for
all i.
(b) if v < v, the information provider sells her signal with no distortion to all firms; that is,
κ∗si = κz for all i.
(c) For any v ∈ (v, v), then there exist c∗ such that
κ∗si =

0 if ci > c
∗










The above result thus establishes that the information provider finds it optimal to follow an
information selling strategy that involves offering a signal to firm i with a precision that is decreasing
in the firm’s cost ci, i.e., the provider sells higher quality signals to more efficient firms. Formally,
κ∗si is always non-increasing in ci. However, note that this does not mean that the monopolist sells
her best available information to all firms, even when transactions are costless. Rather, due to the
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presence of strategic interactions between downstream firms (and in line with our earlier results),
the provider may either sell distorted signals to some firms or simply even exclude them by offering
non-informative signals κ∗si = 0 altogether. Thus, Proposition 2.6.1 generalizes Propositions 2.3.4
and 2.4.1 to the case in which firms face heterogeneous production costs.
We end this discussion by remarking that, depending on the parameter values, the threshold
v in the above result may be negative, thus ruling out the case in which the information provider






di < − 1
γ1
(1 + κz/κx),
which reduces to the condition of Proposition 2.3.4 when firms face identical production costs.
2.6.1 Cost dispersion and optimal information selling strategy
This subsection considers a setting in which the firms that compete in the downstream market can
be of one of two types that differ in their production costs. In particular, type i ∈ {1, 2} firms have
production costs that take the form Ci(qi) = ciq
2













for some δ > 0. Note that since the two types have equal mass, c is equal to the average cost
coefficient in the market and δ can be viewed as a measure of dispersion in costs. The following
proposition characterizes the effect of increasing the dispersion (increasing δ) on the optimal selling
strategy.
Proposition 2.6.2. Let κ∗s1 and κ
∗
s2 be the optimal signal precisions offered to firms of type 1 and
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δ = .5 δ = 1 δ = 2 δ = 4
κ∗s1 1.334 1.505 1.819 2
κ∗s2 .976 .789 .409 0
Profits 1.067 1.076 1.114 1.251
Table 2.3: Optimal information selling strategy and equilibrium profits as a function of the cost
dispersion between the two types of firms. For this example, we use the following set of parameters:
κx = 1, κz = 2, c = 1/6, γ1 = 3/5, and γ0 = 10.
Proposition 2.6.2 establishes that as the cost dispersion among the downstream firms increases,
the provider finds it optimal to sell increasingly more accurate signals to the efficient type while
decreasing the accuracy of the signals she sells to the type that has high production costs.
Table 2.3 reports a set of numerical results that shed additional light on the effect of cost
dispersion on the provider’s information selling strategy and equilibrium profits. In particular,
when the dispersion between the firms’ production costs is sufficiently high, the monopolist may
find it optimal to exclude the less efficient type altogether from the information sale. Moreover, the
provider’s profits are increasing in the dispersion (although she may be selling to a smaller subset
of firms).
2.7 Finite Number of Firms
To simplify the exposition and allow for a tractable analysis, most of the paper focused on an
environment with a continuum of firms. In this section, we show that our qualitative insights
regarding the monopolist’s optimal information selling strategy carry over to a market consisting
of finitely many firms. In particular, we focus on a Cournot oligopoly with a finite set of firms
N = {1, ..., n} which compete with one another in quantities. The inverse demand function in the
market is given by
r = γ0θ + γ1Q,
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where Q = 1n
∑
i∈N qi is the average quantity, qi is the quantity produced by firm i, r denotes the
market price, and γ1 < 0 is some constant. We assume that firm i faces quadratic production costs
given by c(qi) = γ2q
2
i /2. Therefore, firm i’s profit can be expressed as














j 6=i qj . Note that firm i’s profit function has the same form as the one when a














As in the environment with a continuum of firms, we assume that each firm i observes a noisy
private signal xi about the realization of θ and that the information provider can offer a market
signal si to firm i. We denote with K the set of firms that the information provider trades with,
where |K| = k ≤ n. Lemma 2.9.5 in the Appendix provides a complete characterization of the
equilibrium for the competition subgame for any k, which can be viewed as the discrete analog
of Proposition 2.3.1 in Section 2.3. Finally, for the remainder of this section, we assume that the
provider sells an information signal to all firms, i.e., K = N , and we focus on characterizing the
signal’s precision that maximizes the provider’s profit (note that as we argued in Section 2.3 there
always exists an optimal information selling strategy that involves selling a signal to all firms). We
obtain the following characterization for the optimal signal precision:
Proposition 2.7.1. The optimal information selling strategy is given as follows:
(a) If βn ≥ − (1 + κz/κx), the information provider offers an undistorted version of her signal,
i.e.,κ∗s = κz, to all k firms.
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[(1− βn)κx + κz]2















Proposition 2.7.1 establishes that the insights underlying our main results remain unchanged
when the downstream market is composed of a finite number of firms. Additionally, it is straight-
forward to verify that as n grows to infinity we recover the results of Section 2.3.3, both in terms of
the optimal strategy as well as in terms of the profits for the information provider.10 Finally, since
βn ↓ β we obtain that the set of markets for which the monopolist chooses to distort is increasing
in n.
2.8 Conclusions
This paper considers the problem of selling information to a set of firms that compete in a down-
stream market. We establish that both the information provider’s optimal selling strategy as well
as her profits depend critically on the environment in which its cutomers operate. In particular, our
results highlight that the extent of strategic substitutability and complementarity in the latter’s
actions has a first-order impact on the former’s optimal strategy: when the firms’ actions are strate-
gic complements, the provider finds it optimal to sell an undistorted version of her information to
the entire market of firms, whereas if their actions are strategic substitutes, the optimal strategy
involves offering an inferior information product, and/or limiting the supply of information.
Our results are largely driven by the following trade-off: on the one hand, information about
market conditions, e.g., demand realization, has always a direct positive effect on firms’ profits as
10Note that as n → ∞ expected profits diverge, however average profits 1
n
Π∗ converge to the result we obtained
for a continuum of firms.
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they can better align their actions with the underlying environment. On the other hand, however,
in the presence of strategic substitutability among the firms, the provider’s signal may have an
additional (adverse) effect by increasing the correlation between the firms’ actions. It turns out
that this latter effect may dominate the former when firms’ view their actions as strong strategic
substitutes, in which case the provider finds it optimal to degrade the quality of her information
products and/or exclude a subset of the firms from the sale.
We showcase the implications of our results in the context of Bertrand and Cournot competition
thus complementing the extensive prior literature in operations management that explores vertical
and horizontal information sharing in a supply chain. We extend our findings to the case when
firms differ in their production costs and establish that the optimal selling strategy involves offering
several information products with varying precisions and at different prices. In particular, we show
that in equilibrium, the information provider offers more precise signals to the more efficient firms
at higher prices in order to maximize her profit.
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2.9 Proofs
With the exception of our results in Section 2.6, firms in our model are otherwise ex ante symmetric.
Therefore, unless otherwise noted, we assume without loss of generality that the price offered by
the provider to the firms is non-decreasing in the firms’ index; that is, pi ≥ pj for i > j. Given
that excluding a firm i from trade is equivalent to offering a price pi = ∞, the above assumption
also implies that the set of firms that are offered a contract by the provider is of the form [0, λ] for
some λ ∈ [0, 1].
Let ` denote the fraction of firms who accept the provider’s offer. In view of the above assump-
tion, it is immediate that
` = sup{i ∈ [0, λ] : bi = 1},
and that bi = 1 for all i ≤ `.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1









where Ii = {xi} if i ∈ [`, 1] and Ii = {xi, si} if i ∈ [0, `]. Consequently,
ai = E [βA+ (1− β)αθ|Ii] ,
where β = γ1/γ2 is the degree of strategic complementarity in the downstream market as defined
in (2.2) and α = γ0/(γ2 − γ1). Thus, the firms’ equilibrium actions are given by
ai =

E [βA+ (1− β)αθ|xi] ∀i ∈ [`, 1],
E [βA+ (1− β)αθ|xi, si] ∀i ∈ [0, `].
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Noticing that E [θ|xi] is linear in xi and E [θ|xi, si] is linear in xi and si, we conjecture that equilib-




c0xi ∀i ∈ [`, 1]
c1xi + c2si ∀i ∈ [0, `]
,
for some constants c0, c1, c2 ∈ R.














= [β`(c1 + c2) + β(1− `)c0 + (1− β)α]xi,
where we are using the fact that E[θ|xi] = E[xj |xi] = E[sj |xi] = xi. Consequently, the equilibrium
strategy coefficients must satisfy c0 = β`(c1 +c2)+β(1−`)c0 +(1−β)α for any admissible ` ∈ [0, 1],
which implies
c0 = α and c1 + c2 = α. (2.11)
On the other hand, replacing the candidate equilibrium strategy of an informed firm i ∈ [0, `]
in its first-order condition yields











∣∣∣xi, si] , (2.12)
where we use the expressions for the coefficients we derived in (2.11). We can now use the above
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expression to solve for c1. To this end, note that let
E[θ|xi, si] = E[xj |xi, si] = δ1xi + (1− δ1)si
E[sj |xi, si] = δ1(1− ρ)xi + [1− δ1(1− ρ)]si,
where δ1 = κx/(κx + κs). Consequently, we can rewrite (2.12) as
c1xi + (α− c1)si =[β`c1δ1 + β`(α− c1)δ1(1− ρ) + β(1− `)αδ1 + (1− β)αδ1]xi
+ [β`c1(1− δ1) + β`(α− c1)(1− δ1(1− ρ)) + β(1− `)α(1− δ1) + (1− β)α(1− δ1)]si,
and conclude that the equilibrium coefficient c1 must satisfy
c1 = β`c1δ1ρ+ αδ1(1− β`ρ).
Solving for c1 thus implies that
c1 = α
(1− β`ρ)κx
(1− β`ρ)κx + κs
,
and hence,
c2 = α− c1 = α
κs
(1− β`ρ)κx + κs
.
Combining the above, we conclude that firms’ actions at equilibrium are given by
ai =

αxi ∀i ∈ [`, 1]
α (1−β`ρ)κx(1−β`ρ)κx+κsxi + α
κs
(1−β`ρ)κx+κs si ∀i ∈ [0, `]
,
completing the proof.
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Two Auxiliary Lemmas
We state and prove two lemmas that we use in the remainder of the appendix. The first lemma
characterizes the expected surplus of an informed firm, whereas the second lemma shows that, for
any given λ, the provider always finds it optimal to charge a constant price to all firms i ∈ [0, λ].
Lemma 2.9.1. The expected surplus of each firm from buying the market signal is given by








[(1− β`ρ)κx + κs]2
, (2.13)
where ` denotes the fraction of informed firms.
Proof. Let a1i := α
κssi + (1− β`ρ)κxxi
κs + (1− β`ρ)κx
denote the equilibrium action of an informed firm and let
a0i := αxi denote the equilibrium action of an uninformed firm. Recall that ` denotes the fraction








i di. By replacing
the equilibrium actions in the expressions for the firms’ payoffs and then taking the expectations
conditional on θ, we get
E
[








[(1− β`ρ)κx + κs]2
− (1− β`ρ)
2κx + κs
















Next note that we can use the two conditional expectations (2.14) and (2.15) to compute the
(unconditional) expectation for a firm’s surplus given by
∆ := E
[




π(a0i , A, θ)
]
.
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[(1− β`ρ)κx + κs]2
,
which completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 2.9.2. The provider sets pi = p
∗(λ) for all i ∈ [0, λ], where p∗(λ) is equal to the expected
equilibrium surplus of an informed firm when the fraction of informed firms is λ. Furthermore,
p∗(λ) is such that all firms that receive the provider’s offer accept in equilibrium, thus ` = λ.
Proof. Consider the simultaneous game of accepting/rejecting the provider’s offer. Recall that in
such game each firm i ∈ [0, λ] accepts the offer if her expected surplus is bigger than her individual
price pi while taking the decisions of the rest of the firms as given.
We suppose that a fraction ` ∈ [0, λ] of firms has accepted the provider’s offer, and we write
the optimal decision of each firm i ∈ [0, λ] as a function of firm’s i individual price. We have
bi(pi) =

1 if ∆(`) > pi
0 if ∆(`) < pi
∈ {0, 1} if ∆(`) = pi
,
where ∆(`) is given by equation (2.13) and denotes the expected surplus of an informed firm when
a fraction ` is informed.








1 if ∆(`) > pi
0 if ∆(`) < pi
∈ {0, 1} if ∆(`) = pi
, ∀i ∈ [0, λ]. (2.16)
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pi ≤ ∆(λ) if ` = λ
inf
i∈[0,λ]
pi ≥ ∆(0) if ` = 0∫ λ
0
I{pi<∆(`)}di ≤ ` ≤
∫ λ
0
I{pi≤∆(`)}di if ` ∈ (0, λ)
,
Recall that without loss of generality the pricing schedule p : [0, λ] → R+ is non-decreasing, thus
we can further simplify the set of constraints as

pλ ≤ ∆(λ) if ` = λ (2.17a)
p0 ≥ ∆(0) if ` = 0 (2.17b)
p` ≤ ∆(`) and p`+ ≥ ∆(`) if ` ∈ (0, λ). (2.17c)
The proof proceeds by showing that for any equilibrium of the subgame that results from a
fraction ` of the firms accepting the provider’s offer, there exists an optimal pricing schedule such
that pi = ∆(`) for all i ≤ ` and pi =∞ for all i > `. There are three cases to consider.






s.t. pλ ≤ ∆(λ).
In this case a fraction ` = λ of firms accepts and as we show below it is optimal for the provider
to set pi = ∆(λ) for all i ∈ [0, λ]. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that p is optimal but
u := sup{i ∈ [0, λ] : pi < ∆(λ)} ≥ 0. If u = 0, then we have pi = ∆(λ) except for a set of measure
0, so this case is immaterial. If u > 0, the maintained assumption that p is non-decreasing implies
that
pi < ∆(λ), ∀i < u and pi = ∆(λ), ∀i ≥ u.
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This implies that we can construct pricing schedule p′ such that
pi < p
′
i ≤ ∆(λ), ∀i < u and p′i = pi, ∀i ≥ u,
that is feasible and achieves a higher objective value. Thus, it must be that pi = ∆(λ) for all i ≤ λ.
For case (2.17b), ` = 0 and the objective function is always equal to 0. Thus, p can be chosen such
that pi =∞ for all i ∈ [0, λ].






s.t. p` ≤ ∆(`)
p`+ ≥ ∆(`).
First, we show that the provider can always set pi = ∞,∀i > `. Note that the individual price of
each firm i > ` does not affect the objective function of the provider. This implies that all feasible
solutions p that differ only on (`, λ] attain the same objective value, so it is without loss of generality
to focus on solutions that are such that pi =∞ for all i > `. Next, we show that pi = ∆(`), ∀i ≤ `.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that p is optimal but u := sup{i ∈ [0, `] : pi < ∆(`)} ≥ 0.
If u = 0 we have pi = ∆(`), except for a set of measure 0. If u > 0, the assumption that p is
non-decreasing implies that
pi < ∆(`), ∀i < u and pi = ∆(`), ∀i ≥ u,
which in turn implies that we can construct a pricing schedule p′′ such that
pi < p
′′
i ≤ ∆(`), ∀i < u and p′′i = pi, ∀i ≥ u,
that is feasible and achieves a higher objective value. Thus, it must be that pi = ∆(`) for all i ≤ `.
Thus, there always exists an optimal pricing schedule such that pi = ∆(`) for all i ≤ ` and
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pi = ∞ for all i > `, which implies that only a fraction ` of firms accepts the provider’s offer
and the latter’s optimal profit is ` · ∆(`). Without loss of generality the provider sets λ = ` and
pi = ∆(λ) for all i ∈ [0, λ]. Thus, all firms accept her offer in equilibrium and the provider’s profit
is given by λ ·∆(λ). Setting p∗(λ) = ∆(λ) completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
By Lemma 2.9.2, the provider’s problem simplifies to choosing λ, κy and ρ in order to maximize the
expected profit Π := λ · p∗(λ, κs, ρ, κx) = λ ·∆(λ, κs, ρ, κx), subject to the constraints imposed by
the information structure. Replacing the expected surplus (2.13) into the objective function yields








[(1− βλρ)κx + κs]2
, (2.18)
and thus the provider’s problem can be rewritten as
max
ρ,κs,λ




≤ ρ ≤ 1 (2.19)
κs ≤ κz
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.





[(1− βλρ)κx + κs]3
, (2.20)
is positive for β ∈ (0, 1/2), which implies that ρ∗ = 1. Replacing this into (2.18) and differentiating









(κx + κx)[(1 + βλ)κx + κs]
[(1− βλ)κx + κs]3
. (2.21)
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) (1− βλ)κx + (1− 2βλ)κs
[(1− βλ)κx + κs]3
. (2.22)
In addition, note that (2.21) and (2.22) are positive for β ∈ (0, 1/2), so the provider finds it optimal
to set λ∗ = 1 and κ∗s = κz. Replacing ρ








[(1− β)κx + κz]2
, (2.23)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3
Consider the provider’s expected profit (2.18) and her profit-maximization problem (2.19), and let
−(1 + κz/κx) ≤ β < 0. In this case, the partial derivative of Π with respect to ρ given in (2.20)
is negative, which implies that the provider finds it optimal to set the level of correlation to its
minimum, i.e., ρ∗ξ = 0 or ρ







) (1 + βλκs/κz)κx + κs
[(1− βλκs/κz)κx + κs]3
, (2.24)









(κx + κs)[(1 + βλκs/κz)κx + κs]
[(1− βλκs/κz)κx + κs]3
. (2.25)
The assumption on β implies that (2.24) and (2.25) are positive, which results in λ∗ = 1 and
κ∗s = κz. The proof follows by replacing the optimal values for ρ
∗, λ∗, and κ∗s into expression
(2.18).
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Proof of Proposition 2.3.4
Consider the provider’s expected profit (2.18) and her profit-maximization problem (2.19), and let
β < −(1 + κz/κx). First, note that in this case (2.20) is negative, so the provider finds it optimal
to set ρ∗ = κs/κz. Replacing this into (2.18) and differentiating with respect to κs and λ we again
obtain (2.24) and (2.25) respectively. Both (2.24) and (2.25) are equal to 0 if and only if
(κz + βλκs)κx + κzκs = 0. (2.26)




is given by the solutions to (2.26).
Finally, replacing κ∗s, ρ













which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
We solve the game by backward induction, i.e., first, we characterize the firms’ equilibrium actions in
the competition subgame that results from a (subset) of them obtaining the provider’s information
signal; then, we solve for their acceptance/rejection decisions; and, finally, we turn to the provider’s
problem and complete the proofs of parts (a) and (b) of the proposition.
Recall that the provider possesses a signal z = θ + ζ, with ζ ∼ N(0, 1/κz), and offers to firm
i ∈ [0, 1] a signal si = z + ξi with ξi ∼ N(0, κξi). Without loss of generality we assume that the
provider does not add any correlation to the signal she sells, i.e., corr(ξi, ξj) = 0. The market signal
si offered to firm i ∈ [0, 1] can be rewritten as
si = θ + ηi, ηi ∼ N(0, 1/κsi),
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where κs = (1/κz + 1/κξi)
−1 and Cov(si, sj) = 1/κz.
We have the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 2.9.3. The competition subgame between the firms has a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium
in linear strategies, given by















and α = γ0/(γ2 − γ1).
Proof. The first-order optimality condition of firm i with respect to action ai implies that in equi-
librium
ai = E[βA+ (1− β)αθ|xi, si]. (2.27)
Assume that each firm i ∈ [0, 1] uses a linear strategy cixi + hisi, for some constants ci, hi ∈ R.
Then, we can rewrite the equilibrium condition (2.27) as





(cjxj + hjsj)dj + (1− β)αθ
∣∣∣xi, si] . (2.28)
Using equations















which are obtained using the formula for the conditional expectation of Gaussian random vectors,
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we can rewrite (2.28) as











































hjdj + (1− β)α
κx
κx + κsi












hjdj + (1− β)α
κsi
κx + κsi
∀i ∈ [0, 1]. (2.30)
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Finally, noting that ci + hi = α and setting hi = αωi completes the proof.
The next step in our analysis involves studying the firms’ acceptance/rejection decisions that
precede the competition subgame. We restrict attention to subgame perfect equilibria in which all
firms accept the provider’s offers. This is without loss of generality, since the case in which there
is a firm i that rejects the provider’s offer is surplus-equivalent to the case in which the provider
offers a signal of precision κsi = 0 at price pi = 0 to firm i, and firm i accepts the offer.
The equilibrium acceptance/rejection decisions can be characterized as follows. Each firm i ∈
[0, 1] accepts the provider’s offer if
∆i = E[π(a(κsi, κs−i))]− E[π(a(0, κs−i))] ≥ pi,
i.e., if price pi is lower than the expected surplus of firm i. Thus, it is optimal for the provider to
offer pi = ∆i for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Using the equilibrium characterization from Lemma 2.9.3, we can compute the expected surplus

















































s.t. 0 ≤ κsi ≤ κz ∀i ∈ [0, 1].
The following lemma allows us to further simplify the optimization problem above and charac-
terize the set of optimal solutions.
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Furthermore, for any optimal solution {κ∗si}i∈[0,1] of problem (2.33), there exist a constant solution
κ̄s that is feasible and achieves the same objective value of {κ∗si}i∈[0,1].
Proof. The first statement follows directly from expression (2.32). For the second statement, let













= D∗, which implies that κ̄s achieves the
same objective value as {κ∗si}i∈[0,1]. Finally, we need to verify that κ̄s is feasible. By the feasibil-




0 ≤ κ̄s ≤ κz. This implies that the constant κ̄s is feasible and it achieves the maximum objective
value, which completes the proof.
Lemma 2.9.4 allows us to solve a simplified problem, in which the provider offers a signal of
precision κs to all firms i ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, using the optimal value for κs together with equation
(2.34) allows us to characterize the set of optimal solutions for the original problem (2.33). In










[(1− βκs/κz)κx + κs]2
(2.35)
s.t. 0 ≤ κs ≤ κz.
Proof of part (a): Let β ≥ −(1 + κz/κx) and consider the simplified problem (2.35). Differen-






) (1 + βκs/κz)κx + κs
[(1− βκs/κz)κx + κs]3
. (2.36)
The assumption on β implies that (2.36) is positive, which means that it is optimal to set κ∗s = κz.
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is an optimal solution. Thus, problem (2.33) has a unique optimal solution in this case, i.e.,κ∗si =









[(1− β)κx + κz]2
= p∗.
Proof of part (b): Let β < −(1 + κz/κx) and consider problem (2.35). In this case, the partial
derivative given in (2.36) evaluated at κ∗s = κz is negative, so the provider is better off by offering












di = − κz
βκx
, (2.37)
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Proof of Proposition 2.5.1
Throughout this proof we rescale firms’ profit so that α = γ0/(γ2 − γ1) = 1, this is without loss of
generality and it simplifies the notation. We conjecture that equilibrium strategies are linear in xi,
si, and Si, and then we verify our hypothesis. In particular, we conjecture that
a(xi, si, Si) = b1xi + b2Si + b3si.
By definition A =
∫ 1
0





Using the above equation for A, firm’s i expected profit simplifies to
E[πi|xi, si, Si] = γ0aiE[θ|xi, si, Si] + γ1ai



















Taking the first-order condition with respect to ai,
∂
∂ai
E[πi|xi, si, Si] = 0, and recalling that z =
ζ + θ, we can express the equilibrium action of firm i as
ai =
[
(1− β) + β b1 + b3
1− b2
]





E[ζ|xi, si, Si]. (2.38)
Before proceeding, we make a change of variable, setting κs = tκz with t ∈ [0, 1].
The conditional expectations in (2.38) are given respectively by
E[θ|xi, si, Si] = κx
(1− b2) 2κz + (1− t)b23κν
D
xi + κν




(1− b2) 2κz − b1b3κν
D
zi, (2.39)
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and
E[ζ|xi, si, Si] = −κx
(1− b2) 2tκz + b3 (b1 + b3) (1− t)κν
D
xi + κν










b21κz + b3(1− t) (b3 (κx + κz) + 2b1κz)
]
+ κz (1− b2) 2 (tκz + κx) ,
which are obtained using the formula for the conditional expectation of Gaussian random vectors.
Substituting (2.39) and (2.40) into (2.38), and identifying b1, b2, b3, yields the following system of
equations, which the equilibrium coefficients must satisfy:
b1 = κx














(1− b2) [βb1 + (1− β) (1− b2)]κz + b3 [β (1− b2) (κx + κz)− (1− β)b1κν ]
D
. (2.43)
Let a1i := b1xi + b2Si + b3si denote the equilibrium action of firm i and let a
0
i := b̃1xi + b̃2Si denote
the action that firm i takes if she deviates from the equilibrium path and does not observe si, her
information set is thus (xi, Si) and the coefficients b̃1, b̃2 can be characterized following the same
procedure used for b1, b2, b3. We have
b̃1 = κx
(1− β)b23κν + (1− b2) [βb1 + (1− β) (1− b2) + βb3]κz
κx
[
b23κν + (1− b2) 2κz
]
+ (b1 + b3) 2κνκz
, (2.44)
b̃2 = κν
βb23κx + (b1 + b3) [βb1 + (1− β) (1− b2) + βb3]κz
κx
[
b23κν + (1− b2) 2κz
]
+ (b1 + b3) 2κνκz
, (2.45)
note that this coefficients must depend on b1, b2, b3, since they are derived under the assumption
that firms i deviates, while all other firms are playing their equilibrium strategy. Using a1i and a
0
i
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we can characterize the expected profits of a firm that observes (xi, si, Si) as
E[πi(a
1




























and the expected profit of a firm that does not observe si as
E[πi(a
0





















The equilibrium surplus of a firm is now ∆ := E[πi(a
1
i , A)] − E[πi(a0i , A)], in Lemma 2.9.2 we
proved that in the simultaneous acceptance/rejection game the monopolist offers to each firm a




pi di = ∆, i.e.
Π(t, κν , β) = γ2
{[
























Proof of part (a): Recall the change of variable κs = tκz, the provider needs to chose t ∈ [0, 1].
Clearly it is never optimal to set t ≤ 0, with this observation the provider problem simplifies to:
maximize Π(t, κν , β) subject to t ≤ 1. Define
Π∗(κν) := max
t
Π(t, κν , β) s.t. t ≤ 1,
we are interested in characterizing how the maximum profit changes when we introduce some







We will use the envelope theorem for constrained optimization problems. In particular, the La-
grangean associated to the provider’s problem is
L(t, µ, κν , β) = Π(t, κν , β) + µ(1− t),
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where the second equality holds because the constraint itself does not depend on κν .
First, differentiating (2.46) with respect to κν yields
∂Π
∂κν
(t, κν , β) =γ2
(



























































b̃k(t, κν), k = 1, 2. (2.49)
Next, we need to evaluate (2.48) at κν = 0, to do so we first compute and evaluate all the coefficients
at κν = 0 and then we replace them in (2.48).
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Evaluating equations (2.41)-(2.45) at κν = 0 yields
b1(t, 0) =
(1− βt)κx
tκz + (1− βt)κx
, b2(t, 0) = 0, b3(t, 0) =
tκz
tκz + (1− βt)κx
,
b̃1(t, 0) = 1, b̃2(t, 0) = 0.
Differentiating (2.41)-(2.45) with respect to κν , and then evaluating at κν = 0 yields
bκν1 (t, 0) = −
κx
[
(1− βt)2κx + (1− t)tκz
]
2
[(1− βt)κx + tκz] 4
,
bκν2 (t, 0) =
(1− βt)2κx + (1− t)tκz
[(1− βt)κx + tκz] 2
,
bκν3 (t, 0) = −
tκz [κx + (1− 2β)tκx + tκz]
[
(1− t)tκz + (1− βt)2κx
]
[(1− βt)κx + tκz] 4
,
b̃κν1 (t, 0) = −
t2κ2z + (1− βt)2κ2x + t(2− βt)κxκz
κx [(1− βt)κx + tκz] 2
,
b̃κν2 (t, 0) =
t2κ2z + (1− βt)2κ2x + t(2− βt)κxκz
κx [(1− βt)κx + tκz] 2
.



















2κ2x [tκz + (1− βt)κx] 5
(2.50)
where
c5 = −1, c4 = 3βt− 5, c3 = −[(5β2 − 1)t− 14β + 2]t− 9,
c2 = −7 + t{−4 + 19β + t[1 + (4 + t)β − (15 + 4t)β2 + 5tβ3]},
c1 = 2(βt− 1)2((2β − 1)t− 1).






, there are two relevant cases.
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Case 1: β ∈ (−∞, 0). Recall that t ∈ [0, 1], and consider Equation (2.50). It is easy to see
that denominator is always positive, we next show that the numerator is always negative. Note
that coefficients c5, c4 and c1 are always negative. Moreover, we have that (5β
2 − 1)t− 14β + 2 >
−14β + 1 > 0, which implies that c3 is negative for all β < 0 and t ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, noting that
1 + (4 + t)β − (15 + 4t)β2 + 5tβ3 < 1 it is easy to verify that c2 is negative. This establishes that
∂Π
∂κν
(t, κν , β)
∣∣∣∣
κν=0
< 0 for all β < 0 and t ∈ [0, 1]. In particular,
∂Π
∂κν
(t∗, κν , β)
∣∣∣∣
t∗=t∗(κν),κν=0
< 0 ∀β < 0.
Case 2: β ∈ [0, 1/2). Recall that when κν = 0 we have t∗ = 1 for all β in this interval. We
next substitute t∗ = 1 in Equation (2.50) and show that it is negative. Note that the denominator
simplifies to 2κ2x [κz + (1− β)κx] 5 < 0, and the numerator simplifies to
−κz
[
κ4z + (5− 3β)κxκ3z + (10− 14β + 5β2)κ2xκ2z + (1− β)(10− 14β + 5β2)κ3xκz + 4(1− β)3κ4x
]
.
Noting that 10− 14β + 5β2 is positive, since it is a convex quadratic with negative determinant, it
is easy to see that the numerator is always negative. This establishes that
∂Π
∂κν
(t∗, κν , β)
∣∣∣∣
t∗=t∗(κν),κν=0
< 0 ∀β ∈ [0, 1/2).
Combining the results of Case 1 and Case 2, we can now apply the envelope theorem, and use






< 0 ∀β ∈ (−∞, 1/2),
which completes the proof of part (a).
Proof of part (b): Let β̂ = −(1 +κz/κx). When κν = 0, we know from Proposition 2.3.3 that β̂
is exactly the level of β where the provider’s constraint κs ≤ κz becomes non-binding, i.e.,κ∗s = κz
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is the unconstrained optimum at β = β̂. Adapting to the change of variable, we have
arg max
t








We want to show that ∃ K̄ such that ∀ κν ≤ K̄, ∃ T̄ such that ∀ t ∈ [1− T̄ , 1) the following holds
Π(t, κν , β̂) > Π(1, κν , β̂),
which means that when there is some leakage it is optimal for the seller to distort her signal at
β = β̂, and then we will use the continuity of Π to establish the final result.
In order to prove the above, let us define
g(κν , β) =
∂
∂t







(0, β̂) < 0. For a generic β, we have
∂g
∂κν
(0, β) = γ2
(
G0 +G1 +G2 +G3 +G4 +G5 +G6 +G7 +G8 +G9
)
, (2.52)



















































2β(1− b̃2) + (b̃22 − 1)











2β(1− b̃2) + (b̃22 − 1)













































































b̃k(t, κν), for k = 1, 2 ,
,
and the remaining coefficient were defined in (2.49). The first step in the computation of the
second-derivative above is to evaluate all the coefficients at t = 1 and κν = 0, which is done as
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follows.
Evaluating (2.41)-(2.45) at (t = 1, κν = 0), and solving the resulting system yields
b1(1, 0) =
(1− β)κx
κz + (1− β)κx
, b2(1, 0) = 0, b3(1, 0) =
κz
κz + (1− β)κx
, b̃1(1, 0) = 0, b̃2(1, 0) = 0.
Differentiating (2.41)-(2.45) with respect to κν , evaluating at (t = 1, κν = 0), and solving the
resulting system yields
bκν1 (1, 0) = −
(1− β)4κ3x
[(1− β)κx + κz] 4
,
bκν2 (1, 0) =
(1− β)2κx
[(1− β)κx + κz] 2
,
bκν3 (1, 0) = −
(1− β)2 [2(1− β)κx + κz]κxκz
[(1− β)κx + κz] 4
,
b̃κν1 (1, 0) = −
(1− β)2κ2x + (2− β)κxκz + κ2z
κx [(1− β)κx + κz] 2
,
b̃κν2 (1, 0) =
(1− β)2κ2x + (2− β)κxκz + κ2z
κx [(1− β)κx + κz] 2
.
Differentiating (2.41)-(2.45) with respect to t, evaluating at (t = 1, κν = 0), and solving the
resulting system yields
bt1(1, 0) = −
κxκz
[(1− β)κx + κz] 2




[(1− β)κx + κz] 2
,
b̃t1(1, 0) = 0, b̃
t
2(1, 0) = 0.
Finally, differentiating (2.41)-(2.45) with respect to both t and κν , evaluating at (t = 1, κν = 0),
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and solving the resulting system yields
bt,κν1 (1, 0) =
2(1− β)2 [3(1− β)κx + κz]
[(1− β)κx + κz] 5
κ2xκz,
bt,κν2 (1, 0) = −
3(1− β)κx + κz
[(1− β)κx + κz] 3
κz,
bt,κν3 (1, 0) =
−3(1− β)3κ3x + 5(1− β)2κ2xκz + 5(1− β)κxκ2z + κ3z
[(1− β)κx + κz] 5
κz,
b̃t,κν1 (1, 0) = −
2βκxκz
[(1− β)κx + κz] 3
,
b̃t,κν2 (1, 0) =
2βκxκz
[(1− β)κx + κz] 3
.
We now substitute the coefficients in the Equation (2.52), and simplify it, to get
∂g
∂κν





β2 + β + 2
)
κ3x + 5(1− β)2κ2xκz + (4β2 − 9β + 4)κxκ2z + (1− 2β)κ3z
]
[(1− β)κx + κz] 6
.
It is easy to verify that the above equation is strictly negative for all β ∈ (−∞, 1/2), and in
particular it is strictly negative at β̂ = −(1+κz/κx). Moreover, noting that g(0, β̂) = 0 holds, since
it is a restatement of (2.51), we can conclude that ∃K̄ such that ∀κν < K̄ we have g(κν , β̂) < 0.
This in turn implies that ∃ T̄ such that ∀ t ∈ [1− T̄ , 1) we have
Π(t, κν , β̂) > Π(1, κν , β̂).
Thus, at β = β̂ it is optimal for the seller to set t∗ < 1, i.e.,κ∗s < κz.
To complete the proof, note that by continuity of Π(t, κν , β) with respect to β, there exists
β̄ ∈ (0, β̂) such that Π(t, κν , β̂) − Π(1, κν , β̂) > 0 for all β ∈ [β̂, β̄), and thus κ∗s < κz for all
β ∈ [β̂, β̄).
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Proof of Proposition 2.6.1
Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2.4.1 we can derive the equilibrium quantity
decisions of each firm i in the competition subgame. These, in turn, allow us to compute the
equilibrium surplus of a firm i that observes a signal of precision κsi as



















Moreover, firm i ∈ [0, 1] accepts the provider’s offer {pi, κsi} if and only if ∆i ≥ pi. Thus, it is
optimal for the provider to offer pi = ∆i for all i ∈ [0, 1] and leave no surplus to the firms.





















0 ≤ κsi ≤ κz ∀i ∈ [0, 1].











= K · 1 + γ1Dκx/κz
ci(κx + κsi)2(1− γ1Dκx/κz)3
− v, (2.53)
for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Part (a): Let v = K/(cminκ
2
x). Suppose that v > v and consider the profile of precisions
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for all i ∈ [0, 1], thus the provider can only increase her profit by decreasing κsi for some i. Then
the non-negativity constraint on κsi imply that the optimal solution is to set κ
∗
si = 0 for all i ∈ [0, 1].























]3 . Suppose that v < v and consider







































all i ∈ [0, 1], thus the provider can only increase her profit by increasing κsi for some i. Then, the
constraint κsi ≤ κz ∀i ∈ [0, 1], imply that the optimal solution is to set κ∗si = κz for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Part (c): Consider now the remaining case in which v takes an intermediate value.






di. Substituting the optimal









for all i ∈ [0, 1].

















which implies that dΠ/dκsi < 0 for all κ
∗















which implies that dΠ/dκsi > 0 for all κ
∗
si ∈ [0, κz], thus it is optimal to set κ∗si = κz in this case.
Finally, for intermediate values of ci the optimal κ
∗










Proof of Proposition 2.6.2
Consider the optimal thresholds v and v characterized in the Proof of Proposition 2.6.1, adapting
















κz + (1 + γ1/c)κx





. It is easy to see that when v > v or v < v the optimal precisions are not
affected by a marginal increase in dispersion. For intermediate values of v there are four relevant
cases. Before proving the result for each of the cases, recall from Proposition 2.6.1 that the optimal
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selling strategy has the following structure
κ∗sk =



















































































is always negative since γ1 < 0 and 2+γ1D
∗κx/κz > 0.
We now proceed with the proof of the four relevant cases.










. The optimal precision takes intermediate values
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which is always negative since
∂c∗
∂δ





































































+ δ c∗3/2 > 0,















and (1/c− δ) < 1
c∗
. In this case, κ∗s1 takes intermediate













< 0, which implies that
∂c∗
∂δ


















For type 2 firms we have
∂κ∗s2
∂δ
= 0, which follows from κ∗s2 = 0 and continuity of the optimal
threshold with respect to δ.
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∗ . In this case, κ
∗
s2 takes inter-

























< 0, which implies that
∂c∗
∂δ






















Case (iv): (1/c− δ) < 1
c∗




∗ . In this case, κ
∗
s2 = 0 and κ
∗




















Proof of Proposition 2.7.1
We begin by stating a lemma which is the discrete analogue of Proposition 2.3.1 presented in Section
2.3. The proof of the lemma follows similar arguments and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 2.9.5. The competition subgame between the firms has a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium
in linear strategies. Furthermore, the equilibrium quantities of the firms are given by
qi =

αn[(1− ωk,n)xi + ωk,nsi] if i ∈ K
αnxi if i ∈ N \K
,








and αn = γ0/
(
γ2 − n+1n γ1
)
.
Using the above lemma we can characterize the expected equilibrium profits of an uninformed













[(1− βnρ)κx + κs]2
− (1− βnρ)
2κx + κs


















where we used the assumption that k = n. The provider extracts all surplus generated by the
information she sells. Thus, we can use the law of total expectation to characterize the provider’s
expected profit as



















[(1− βnρ)κx + κs]2
.







≤ ρ ≤ 1
κs ≤ κz.
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) βnκs(κx + κs)
[(1− βnρ)κx + κs]3
, (2.58)
which is always negative since βn < 0. Thus, it is optimal for the provider to set ρ
∗ = κs/κz.








) (1 + βnκs/κz)κx + κs
[(1− βnλκs/κz)κx + κs]3
.
When βn ≥ −(1 + κz/κx), the above expression is always positive and it is optimal to set κ∗s = κz.
Otherwise, the optimal precision is given by the solution to
(1 + βnκs/κz)κx + κs = 0,
which implies that κ∗s = −κz/(βn + κz/κx). Substituting the optimal strategy into the objective,












[(1− βn)κx + κz]2










thus completing the proof.
2.10 Measure Theoretic Framework
In Appendix 2.10, we provide formal conditions for an “exact law of large numbers” to hold in our
context. Our discussion largely builds on the results in Sun [2006] and Sun and Zhang [2009]. We
show that, within the appropriate measure theoretic framework, our environment with a continuum
of firms retains the most important measure theoretic properties of an environment with a finite
number of firms. The main results are a Fubini property, which allows us to exchange the order of
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integration, and a strong law of large numbers for pairwise independent random variables, which
allows us to work with aggregate uncertainty. In what follows we will first introduce formally our
measure theoretic framework, which entails a definition of an extension of the Lebesgue unit interval
as our set of firms, and then state formally the properties mentioned above.
Consider a measure space ([0, 1],L,m) of firms, where L is the σ-algebra of Lebesgue measurable
sets and m is the Lebesgue measure, and a probability space capturing the uncertainty in the
model (Ω,F ,P), where Ω is the sample space, F is the σ-algebra of events, and P is a probability
measure. As per the discussion in Sun [2006], our objective is to define an extension ([0, 1], I,M )
of the measure space ([0, 1],L,m) such that L ⊆ I and the restriction of M on L coincides with m.
To this end, consider the Cartesian product [0, 1]×Ω, and endow it with the product σ-algebra
I ⊗ F := σ(R), which is the σ-algebra generated by the class of measurable rectangles
R := {I × F | I ∈ I and F ∈ F}.
In addition, define the product measure M ⊗ P with the property that
M ⊗ P(I × F ) = M(I) · P (F ), ∀ I ∈ I, F ∈ F .
Since M and P are probability measures, and thus σ-finite, the desired property is straightforward
from the product measure theorem (see Billingsley [2008]). After having defined the product space
([0, 1]× Ω, I ⊗ F ,M ⊗ P), the next step is to define a Fubini extension. Before proceeding with
the formal definition, we introduce some additional notation. In particular, for a process f :
[0, 1] × Ω → R we let fi denote the random variable f(i, ·) : Ω → R and fω denote the random
variable f(·, ω) : [0, 1]→ R.
Next, we define an extension ([0, 1]× Ω, I  F ,M  P) of the product space described above,
such that I⊗F ⊆ IF and the restriction of M P on I⊗F coincides with M ⊗P . The extension
([0, 1]× Ω, I  F ,M  P) satisfies the following Fubini-type property: for any M  P -integrable
process f on ([0, 1]× Ω, I  F), we have that fi is P − integrable and fω is M − integrable. In




fi dP is M − integrable, and
∫
[0,1]



















Throughout the paper, and with special reference to the derivations presented in Appendix 2.9,
we assume that all relevant quantities lie in the Fubini extension of the product probability space
constructed above. For additional details we refer the interested reader to Sun [2006] that provides
a detailed treatment of the construction and establishes that there are Fubini extensions in which
one can construct processes with pairwise independent random variables taking any distribution
and Sun and Zhang [2009] that show that this result holds for the case in which the index space is an
extension of the Lebesgue unit interval. Moreover, we require any process f on ([0, 1]×Ω, IF) to
be measurable, which is consistent with the information structure specified throughout the paper.
This assumption, coupled with the fact that M  P is a probability measure, implies that f is
M  P -integrable. Thus, the Fubini-type property above holds for any random variable in the
paper. Showing existence of conditional expectations is immediate.
The other important relation that we use in the paper is a law of large numbers for stochastic
processes depending on a continuous parameter. Sun [2006] proves such a law, which he calls an
exact law of large numbers, in the framework of a Fubini extension. In the following lemma, we
adapt and present a key auxiliary result stemming from his work.
Lemma 2.10.1. Consider a process f : [0, 1] × Ω → R and assume it is square integrable with
respect to M  P. If the random variables {fi}i∈[0,1] are uncorrelated, then for any set I ∈ I such
that M(I) > 0, we have
∫
I
f(i, ω) dM(i) =
∫
I×Ω
f(i, ω) d(M  P)(i, ω) for P − almost all ω ∈ Ω.
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This lemma essentially states that the sample average of a random variable over any set of firms
I with positive measure is exactly equal to its expectation. We use this result in the derivations
of Appendix 2.9 and, specifically to claim that
∫
[0,1]
ε(i, ω) dM(i) =
∫
[0,1]
ξ(i, ω) dM(i) = 0. We
should clarify that we slightly abuse notation throughout the paper to simplify the exposition of
our analysis and results. In particular, we write
∫ 1
0





Monopoly Pricing in the Presence of
Social Learning
3.1 Introduction
Launching a new product involves uncertainty. Specifically, consumers may not initially know the
true quality of the new product, but learn about it through some form of a social learning process,
adjusting their estimates of its quality along the way, and making possible purchase decisions
accordingly. The dynamics of this social learning process affect the market potential and realized
sales trajectory over time. The seller’s pricing policy can tactically accelerate or decelerate learning,
which, in turn, affects sales at different points in time and the product’s lifetime profitability. This
paper studies a monopolist’s pricing decision in a market where quality estimates are evolving
according to such a learning process.
Consumers arrive at the market according to a Poisson process and face the decision of either
purchasing a product with unknown quality, or choosing an outside option. They differ in their
base valuation for the observable attributes of the product, which, together with the product
quality, determines their willingness-to-pay. These base valuation parameters are assumed to be
independently and identically drawn from a known distribution. If consumers knew the true product
quality, then the distribution of the base valuations would map directly into a willingness-to-pay
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(WtP) distribution and, in turn, into a demand function that the monopolist could use as a basis
of her pricing decision.
In our model the quality is unknown, and consumers’ prevailing estimate of the unknown quality
evolves according to a social learning mechanism. Consumers who purchase the product experience
its true quality plus some small quality disturbance, which is independent and identically distributed
across purchasers. Purchasers report whether they “liked” or “disliked” the product, i.e., if their ex-
post utility was positive or negative, respectively. Consumers do not report their base valuations,
so a positive review may result from a high quality or high idiosyncratic quality preference. An
arriving consumer observes the history of purchase decisions and reviews made prior to his arrival,
combines this information with his prior quality estimate, infers the associated product quality,
and makes his own purchase decision. The sequence of purchase decisions affects the evolution
of the observable information set, and, as such, the dynamics of the market response over time.
Optimizing the monopolist’s pricing policy requires detailed understanding of the learning dynamics
and not just its asymptotic properties.
It is typical to assume that fully rational agents (consumers) update their beliefs for the unknown
quality of the product through a Bayesian analysis that takes into account the sequence of decisions
and reviews, and accounts for the fact that each such decision was based on different information
available at that time. This sequential update procedure introduces a formidable analytical and
computational onus on each agent that may be hard to justify as a model of actual choice behavior.
Instead, we postulate a non-Bayesian and fairly intuitive learning mechanism, where consumers
assume that all prior decisions were based on the same information, and under this bounded
rationality assumption, consumers pick the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of the quality
level that would best explain the observed sequence of positive and negative reviews (non-purchase
decisions are not observable). New reviews change the available information and the resulting MLE
over time, and, of course, the rate at which consumers choose to purchase and later on submit new
reviews about their experiences.
As a motivating example consider the launch of a new hotel. It is typically hard to evaluate
the quality of such premises without first hand experience or word-of-mouth, which explains the
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importance that online review sites such as Tripadvisor have had on the hospitality industry.1
Assume the hotel is sufficiently differentiated from its competitors to be considered a monopoly in
some category; e.g., it may be the only hotel with a private beach in the area. Suppose it offers
better services than what consumers think at first. Initially some consumers’ idiosyncratic tastes
would convince them to choose this hotel; perhaps they have strong preferences for having a private
beach. These consumers would recommend the hotel by posting a review, which, in turn, increases
future demand, as potential consumers learn that the hotel is better than previously thought.2 The
price charged by the hotel affects this learning process by controlling the number of guests who
review the hotel and their degree of satisfaction. By accounting for the learning process the hotelier
may be able to avoid a sluggish start and realize the establishment’s full potential demand faster.
Regarding the learning mechanism, the information reported by consumers is subject to a self-
selection bias, since only consumers with a high enough base valuations purchase the product. The
intuitive MLE procedure takes into account this crucial point, and, as we show in Section 3.3.2,
the resulting quality estimate converges to the true product quality almost surely.
Detailed understanding of the learning trajectory is essential in optimizing the tradeoff between
learning and the monopolist’s discounted revenue objective. Second, Section 3.3.3 derives a mean-
field (fluid model) asymptotic approximation for the learning dynamics motivated by settings where
the rate of arrival of new consumers to the system grows large. Proposition 3.3.3 shows that the
asymptotic learning trajectory is characterized by a system of differential equations. Restricting
attention to uniformly distributed base valuations across consumers and focusing on the case where
the markets prior quality estimate is below the true quality, Section 3.3.4 derives the closed form
transient of the fraction of likes and dislikes over time, as well as that of the associated quality
estimate. The transient dynamics imply that the instantaneous demand function evolves over
time according to an ODE, which itself depends on the seller’s price, i.e., it emerges endogenously
through the interplay between consumer behavior and the seller’s decisions. The solution of the
1According to TripAdvisor 90% of hotel managers think that review websites are very important to their business
and 81% monitor their reviews at least weekly.
2Many empirical papers found that positive consumer reviews increase sales. For example, Luca [2011] finds that
a one star increase in the average consumer review on a popular review site (on a five star scale) translates to a 5-9%
increase in sales for restaurants in Seattle, WA.
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mean-field model gives a crisp characterization of the dependence of the learning trajectory on
the price, and specifically show that the time-to-learn decreases if the monopolist lowers her price.
This result naturally exploits the suitability of mean field approximations to characterize transient
behavior of discrete and stochastic systems. The paper illustrates that method in the context of
the specific consumer learning model described above, however, the approach is fairly general and
can be used to describe the transient learning dynamics under a broader set of micro consumer
behavioral models, see Ifrach [2012, Sections 2.2 and 3.2].
Third, we study the seller’s pricing problem under the assumption that the seller knows the
true product quality, but that the consumers do not use the seller’s price as a signal of quality.
Section 3.4 studies the monopolist’s problem of choosing the static price that optimizes her infinite
horizon discounted revenues. Proposition 3.4.1 characterizes the optimal solution, which exists and
is unique, and lies in the interval of two natural price points: (a) the optimal price assuming that
consumers do not learn and always make purchase decisions based on their prior quality estimate;
and (b) the optimal price in a setting where consumers knew the true quality all along. The
learning transient and its speed in relation to the seller’s discount factor determines the optimal
price. Intuitively, if the learning transient is slow relative to the discounting of revenues, then she
prices almost as if all consumers made purchasing decisions based on their prior on the quality;
and, if learning is fast, then the seller’s price will approach the one that the monopolist would set
if all consumers knew the true product quality.
Lastly, Section 3.5.1 studies a model where the seller has some degree of dynamic pricing
capability, namely she can change her price once, at a time of her choosing. In this case the
monopolist may sacrifice short term revenues in order to influence the social learning process in the
desired direction and capitalize on that after changing the price. Proposition 3.5.1 shows that when
consumers initially underestimate the true quality, the first period price is lower than the second
period one. This policy accelerates learning and increases revenues considerably. The numerical
experiments of Section 3.5.2 suggest that a pricing policy with two prices performs very well, and
that the benefit of implementing more elaborate pricing policies may be small.
We conclude this section with a brief literature review. The social learning literature is fairly
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broad. Much of this work can be classified into two groups depending on the learning mechanism,
which is either Bayesian or non-Bayesian. Banerjee [1992] and Bikhchandani et al. [1992] are
standard references in economics on observational learning where each agent observes a signal and
the decisions of the agents who made a decision before him, but not their consequent satisfaction
(in fact preferences are homogeneous). Agents are rational and update their beliefs in a Bayesian
way. They show that at some point all agents will ignore their own signals and base their decisions
only on the observed behavior of the previous agents, which will prevent further learning and may
lead to herding on the bad decision.
For social learning to be successful, an agent must be able to reverse the herd behavior of
his predecessors. Smith and Sørensen [2000] show that this is the case if agents’ signals have
unbounded strength. Goeree et al. [2006] show that this is achieved with enough heterogeneity in
consumers’ preferences. Our Assumption 3.2.1, which is key in proving learning, is similar in nature
to that of Goeree et al. [2006].3 Social learning has been studied in great generality by Arieli and
Mueller-Frank [2014].
Several papers have considered variations of the observational learning model with imperfect
information. Acemoglu et al. [2011] and Acemoglu et al. [2014] greatly contribute to the under-
standing of the interplay between social learning and the structure of the social network. Acemoglu
et al. [2011] identify conditions on the network under which social learning is successful and, alter-
natively, herding may prevail. Acemoglu et al. [2014] consider agents who can delay their decision
in order to obtain information from others by utilizing their social network. Jadbabaie et al. [2012]
consider a model where consumers communicate over a social network and update their information
in a non-Bayesian way. They provide conditions for learning to occur in this setting. Herrera and
Hörner [2013] consider a case where agents can observe only one of two decisions of their predeces-
sors, which in the language of our model means that the number of no purchase decisions is not
observed. Instead, consumers know the time of their arrival, which is associated with the number
of predecessors who chose the unobservable option. They show that this relaxation does not change
3See the surveys by Bikhchandani et al. [1998], and, more recently, by Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [2011] for many
extensions to this model.
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the asymptotic learning result of Smith and Sørensen [2000].
There is a growing literature in economics that studies non-Bayesian learning mechanisms that
employ simpler and perhaps more plausible learning protocols. Ellison and Fudenberg [1993, 1995]
consider settings in which consumers exchange information about their experienced utility and use
simple decision rules to choose between actions. The nature of word-of-mouth in our paper is
similar, although we consider reviews and not utilities directly.
A few papers in the operations management literature have considered social learning. In Debo
and Veeraraghavan [2009] consumers observe private signals about the unknown value of the service
and decide whether or not to join a queue, where congestion conveys information about the value of
the service. Debo et al. [2012] study a server who chooses her service rate to signal quality, again in
a queueing context. Related applications in inventory systems and retailing explore how stock outs
or observed inventory positions may also signal product quality. The mean field approach of this
paper may be applicable in studying transient learning phenomena in these operational settings.
Some recent papers have considered models of social learning in the presence of consumer
reviews. Ifrach et al. [2015] study a Bayesian model where both the quality of the product and the
reviews can assume only two possible values and they provide conditions for learning. Besbes and
Scarsini [2015] deal with a model where customers only observe the sample mean of past reviews,
and show under which conditions customers can recover the true quality of the product based on
the feedback they observe. They use stochastic approximation techniques to obtain their results. In
our model the decision rule is not fully rational, yet consumers do account for the self-selection bias
in their predecessors review, unlike other models that studied consumer reviews (e.g., Li and Hitt
[2008]). Lafky [2014] experimentally deals with the fundamental issue of why people rate products
and which biases arise in the behavior of reviewers.
Mean-field approximations have been used extensively in the area of revenue management4;
perhaps the first reference in that area is Gallego and van Ryzin [1994]. More broadly, the use of
mean-field approximations that rely on an appropriate application of the functional strong law of
large numbers to study the transient behavior of stochastic processes has a fairly broad literature
4Talluri and van Ryzin [2005] provides a good overview of that work.
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that we will not review here. The particular result we will employ, due to Kurtz [1978], was
originally derived for studying the asymptotic behavior of Markov Chain models with process-
dependent transition parameters, used to analyze diffusion and epidemic systems.
The learning dynamics in our model give rise to a sales trajectory which, when properly inter-
preted, resembles the famous Bass diffusion model, see Bass [2004].5 Contrary to the Bass model
that specifies up front a differential equation governing social dynamics, we start with a micro
model of agents’ behavior and characterize its limit as the number of agents grows large. This limit
—given by a differential equation as well—induces a macro level model of social dynamics. The
application of mean-field approximation to our model bridges the literature on social learning and
that on social dynamics by filling the gap between the detailed micro level model of agent behavior,
and the subsequent macro level model of aggregate dynamics.
Several papers have studied pricing when agents are engaged in social learning or embedded in
a social network. Bose et al. [2006] consider pricing in the classic Bayesian observational learning
model when a monopolist and agents are equally uninformed about the value of the good. Campbell
[2013] studies the role of pricing in the launching of a new product in a model of social interaction
that builds on percolation theory, where the latter focuses on dynamic pricing. Candogan et al.
[2012a] consider optimal pricing strategies of a monopolist selling a product to consumers who are
embedded in a social network and experience externalities in consumption. Strategic behavior of
firms and consumers in the presence of social learning has been studied by Papanastasiou et al.
[2014]; Papanastasiou and Savva [2014], where in particular study a two period problem and study
the effect of the firm’s pricing policy on consumer purchase decisions as well as the impact of early
adaptor reviews on downstream demand.
Also related is the literature on pricing of experience goods, whose quality can be determined
only upon consumption; see, e.g., Bergemann and Välimäki [1997] and Vettas [1997]. Most of
these papers consider consumers that are homogenous ex-ante, i.e., before consuming the good.
Bergemann and Välimäki [1997] consider a duopoly and heterogeneous consumers on a line who
report their experienced utility, and show that the expected price path for the new product is
5In particular, by considering a population with finite mass, and by simplifying consumers’ decisions.
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increasing when consumers initially underestimate the quality; our Proposition 3.5.1 is consistent
with their findings.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 The Monopolist’s Pricing Problem
A sequence of consumers, indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , sequentially decide whether to purchase a newly
launched good or service (henceforth, the product), or choose an outside alternative. The intrinsic
quality of the product, denoted with q, is initially unknown and can take values in the interval
[qmin, qmax] with qmin ≥ 0. The quality experienced by consumer i, if he chooses to buy the
product, is subject to a random disturbance εi and given by qi := q+εi. This quality shock reflects
variability in service levels (e.g., waiting times), production defects or exogenous factors influencing
the way the product is consumed (e.g., weather).
Consumers are heterogeneous; this is represented by a parameter αi that determines consumer
i’s base valuation, e.g., that would correspond to the observable attributes of the product. His
utility from consuming the product is
ui = αi + qi − p,
where p is the price charged by the monopolist, which, for the time being, we assume to be fixed.6
The utility derived from choosing the outside alternative is normalized to zero for all consumers.
Preference parameters, {αi}∞i=1, are i.i.d. random variables drawn from a known distribution
function F . We denote the corresponding survival function by F̄ (·) := 1 − F (·), and assume that
F has a differentiable density f , which is uniformly bounded by some constant fmax and has con-
nected support [αmin, αmax], or [0,∞). The αi can be interpreted as an idiosyncratic premium that
consumer i is willing to pay for the product. The failure rate of the quality preference distribution
is defined as h(x) := f(x)/F̄ (x). Throughout this paper we will assume that F has an increasing
6The functional form of the utility function does not play a big role in the subsequent analysis. For example, another
tractable alternative would be a vertically differentiated market in which utility takes the form ui = αi · qi − p.
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failure rate (IFR), that is, h is strictly increasing for all x ≥ 0.
The quality disturbances are short-lived; they are i.i.d. random variables with mean zero and
independent of the underlying quality, as well as of the preference parameters. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that εi follows a symmetric, two-point distribution: specifically, εi takes the
values {−ε̄, ε̄} with equal probabilities 0.5. It is natural to think that the quality disturbances εi
are small relative to the magnitude of the unknown quality q. Moreover, both q and the εi’s are
expressed in the units of the consumer’s utility, e.g., in dollars.
Heterogeneity in terms of the αi’s implies that even if the product quality, q, was known, not
all consumers would make the same decision: only those with αi ≥ α∗ := p− q would purchase the
product, assuming that they are risk neutral with respect to quality disturbances. Equivalently,
only consumers with WtP α + q ≥ p would purchase; the distribution of α gives rise to a WtP
distribution α+ q for the product.
The product is launched at time t = 0, and consumers arrive thereafter according to a Poisson
process with rate Λ, independent of the product’s quality and consumers’ preference parameters.
Denote by ti the random time consumer i enters the market and makes his purchasing decision.
Consumer i does not re-enter the market regardless of his decision at ti; this assumption is reasonable
if the time horizon under consideration is not too long.
Consumers initially have some common prior conjecture on the quality of the product, q0 ∈
[qmin, qmax]. This prior conjecture could be the expected value of some prior distribution of the
quality, or could simply be consumers’ best guess given the product’s marketing campaign and
previous encounters with the monopolist in other categories.
The information transmission in our model is often called word-of-mouth communication. A
consumer i who purchased the product, truthfully reports a review about his experience with the
product, denoted by ri that takes two values: ‘like’, denoted by r
L and ‘dislike’, denoted by rD. A
consumer who purchases the product reports that he likes it if his ex-post utility was nonnegative,
taking into account the unknown quality and quality disturbance, as well as his preference param-
eter; he reports that he dislikes it if his ex-post utility was negative. Consumers report neither
their preference parameter nor the quality disturbance they faced and, as such, reviews are not
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fully informative. For example, a ‘like’ could result from a high preference parameter, the product
being of high quality or a positive quality shock (not necessarily all).7 This binary report is a
simplification of the star rating scales of online review systems. Consumers who did not purchase
the product do not report a review and are not observed. We will denote their decision by ri = r
O.
We make the following assumptions on the set of feasible prices.
Assumption 3.2.1. The price p charged by the monopolist belongs to [pmin, pmax], where
(i) pmax is such that F̄ (pmax − qmin + ε̄) > 0. (Equivalently pmax < αmax + qmin − ε̄.)
(ii) pmin is such that F̄ (pmin − qmax + ε̄) < 1. (Equivalently pmin > αmin + qmax − ε̄.)
Assumption 3.2.1–(i) implies that, even at the lowest possible quality level, there will always
be some consumers who choose to buy the product (this follows from pmax < αmax + qmin), and
moreover, at least some of these consumers will like the product—the latter ensures that new
information about q will enter the learning process; if this assumption is violated and pmax >
αmax + qmin− ε̄, then at q = qmin all buyers with a negative shock would dislike and all buyers with
a positive shock would like. Assumption 3.2.1–(i) is similar to the “unbounded belief assumption”
often used in Bayesian social learning in the sense that it implies that some new information will
enter the system over time, which will ultimately allow the market to learn the unknown product
quality. Assumption 3.2.1–(ii), states that there are always some low-WtP consumers who will
dislike the product if they get a negative disturbance realization. It is easy to verify that both
conditions are satisfied if the support of α’s is sufficiently wide relative to the unknown quality
[qmin, qmax] and the magnitude of the subsequent quality disturbances ε̄ is small.







is the number of consumers who
purchase and like the product out of the first i− 1 consumers, and, similarly, Di is the number of
consumers who purchase and dislike the product. The information available to consumer i before
making his decision is
Ii = (Li, Di). (3.1)
7This assumption is motivated by the fairly anonymous reviews that one may get online today. One possible
extension would consider a model where consumers gather two sets of information, one from a process like the one
above, and the other from a smaller set of their “friends” whose quality preferences are known with higher accuracy.
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The index ‘i’ itself is not observable. Before describing the evolution of information and consumers’
decision rule, we introduce the monopolist’s pricing problem, which is the main focus of this paper.





















ri(p) 6= rO | Ii
)]
, (3.2)
where δ > 0 is the monopolist’s discount factor, and the expectation is with respect to consumers’
arrival times, the idiosyncratic quality preferences αi’s, and the sequence of quality disturbances
εi’s. The monopolist is assumed to know the true quality, the prior quality estimate, as well as
the distribution of quality preferences and disturbances. Expression (3.2) reveals the complexity of
the pricing problem in the presence of social learning. Consumers’ purchasing decisions influence
future revenues through the information available to successors. As such, the dynamic of the social
learning process must be understood in order to solve for the optimal price. Section 3.5 considers a
problem where the seller can select two prices as well as the optimal time to switch between them.
3.2.2 Decision Rule
We introduce a plausible non-Bayesian decision rule that consumers are assumed to employ to
decide whether to purchase the product. It is composed of two parts: consumer i (a) uses his
available information to form a quality estimate q̂i, and (b) purchases the product if and only if his
estimated utility is non-negative αi + q̂i − p ≥ 0.
In broad terms, consumers try to answer the following question: given the observed number of
likes and dislikes, the distribution of idiosyncratic quality preferences, and the distribution of the
quality shocks that affect the experienced quality, what value of intrinsic quality best explains the
observed data assuming that all past purchasers made decisions based on the same quality estimate?
The crucial simplification is that consumers disregard the fact that reviews have been submitted
sequentially, and that the information available to the respective purchasers was itself evolving over
time. Review information is typically aggregated in the form we postulate, but review aggregator
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sites often allow users to expand the information set and view the sequence and timestamps of
the various reviews. Accessing this information is, however, cumbersome, and using this detailed
information is computationally hard (perhaps implausible). Our simplifying behavioral assumption
is a form of bounded rationality on the consumers’ regard. Disregarding the sequence of reviews
and processing the aggregated number of likes and dislikes, consumers are assumed to invoke a
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) procedure to compute their quality estimate.
Under the assumption that a consumer was using the correct value for q, the probability of a
‘like’ conditional on a purchase is
P(consumer j likes | consumer j buys, q̂j = q)
=
P(αj + qj − p ≥ 0, αj + q − p ≥ 0)
P(αj + q − p ≥ 0)
=
.5P(αj + q + ε̄− p ≥ 0, αj + q − p ≥ 0)
P(αj + q − p ≥ 0)
+
.5P(αj + q − ε̄− p ≥ 0, αj + q − p ≥ 0)
P(αj + q − p ≥ 0)
= .5 + .5
F̄ (p− q + ε̄)
F̄ (p− q)
= .5 + .5G(p− q)
where the second equality follows from Bayes’ rule and
G(x) := F̄ (x+ ε̄)/F̄ (x). (3.3)
Similarly, the probability of observing a dislike conditional on a purchase is
P(consumer j dislikes | consumer j buys, q̂j = q)
= 1− P(consumer j likes | consumer j buys, q̂ = q) = .5− .5G(p− q).
The likelihood of observing (Li, Di) likes and dislikes under the assumption that all consumers were
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acting under the same quality estimate is
Li(q) = (.5 + .5G(p− q))Li(.5− .5G(p− q))Di .
Next, consumers introduce the effect of their prior quality estimate into their learning mechanism.
In order to do this, the prior quality estimator q0 must be transformed into a number of fictitious
reviews, L0 and D0, that are consistent with q0 under our maximum likelihood learning mechanism.
We assume that the total weight assigned to the prior estimator will be the one that is equivalent
to the expected number of positive and negative reviews over a length of time of w time units. One
can also think of 1/w as the standard error of the prior quality estimate q0, i.e., the longer the
accumulation period of prior information the more certain the consumers are about their prior.
With that in mind, we define L0 and D0 to be the expected number of like and dislike fictitious
reviews under the assumption that the quality prior q0 is equal to the true product quality as
follows:
L0 = wΛP(customer i buys & likes | q̂i = q = q0) = .5wΛ
[




D0 = wΛP(customer i buys & dislikes | q̂i = q = q0) = .5wΛ
[
F̄ (p− q0)− F̄ (p− q0 + ε̄)
]
. (3.5)
Incorporating the effect of the prior quality estimate, consumers will pick the quality estimate q̂i
in the interval [qmin, qmax] so as to maximize the weighted likelihood function defined by
Lwi (q) = (.5 + .5G(p− q))L0+Li(.5− .5G(p− q))D0+Di . (3.6)
It is useful to spell out the probability that consumer i will like, dislike or not purchase the
product when his quality estimate, q̂i, is different from q. Consumer i reports a positive review if
he buys the product (αi + q̂i − p ≥ 0) and has a positive experience (αi + qi − p ≥ 0), where in the
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later we have to account for the disturbance εi.
P(ri = r
L) = P(αi + q̂i − p ≥ 0, αi + qi − p ≥ 0)
= P(α1 ≥ p−min(qi, q̂i))
= .5F̄ (p−min(q − ε̄, q̂i)) + .5F̄ (p−min(q + ε̄, q̂i)).
Similarly, the probability of a dislike is
P(ri = r
D) = P(αi + q̂i − p ≥ 0, αi + qi − p < 0)
= F̄ (p− q̂i)− .5F̄ (p−min(q − ε̄, q̂i))− .5F̄ (p−min(q + ε̄, q̂i))
and the probability of no purchase is given by
Pr(ri = r
O) = P(αi + q̂i − p < 0) = F (p− q̂i).
We finish this section with few brief comments.
Price as a signal. The seller’s price conveys information about the product quality, but we
assume that consumers do not adjust their quality estimate in response to that information; likewise
the monopolist does not need to take that consideration into account.
Prior weight. All consumers assign the same weight to their common prior quality estimate. The
weight assigned to the prior w is assumed to be constant over time, that is, consumers arriving later
in time still assign the same weight to the prior, but due to the accumulation of review information,
these consumers end up slowly “forgetting” their prior estimate as it becomes less significant in
the MLE procedure. The weight w is a measure of inertia of the learning process, or measure
of confidence in the prior estimate in the absence of other new information. As time goes by and
more reviews accumulate in the system, consumers place increasingly more confidence in the review
information versus their prior information, which is reflected into the fact that the effect of L0 and
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D0 on the weighted likelihood (3.6) becomes negligible as Li and Di grow.
No purchases. The MLE procedure described above can also be used to study social learning in
a model where consumers are informed on the number of previous consumers who decided not to
purchase. In that context, it is not hard to show that the quality estimator has similar properties to
the ones of the estimator that we then characterize. This is not surprising, since statistical estimates
can only improve with more information, but it is important because it shows the robustness of our
estimation procedure.
Consumer learning. Different information models and micro models of consumer behavior could
be considered. For example, consumers may only observe reviews from a random sample of their
predecessors, which grows large in an appropriate sense; or, consumers may weigh their predecessors’
reviews such that later reviews are more influential than earlier ones. The latter could also be done
by the review site that acts as an information aggregator; see Ifrach [2012, Sections 2.2 and 3.2].
3.3 Asymptotic learning and the associated learning transient
In this section we will establish that consumers eventually learn the true quality of the product,
and subsequently approximate the learning transient via the solution of an ordinary differential
equation derived as a mean-field limit in a large market.
3.3.1 The consumer’s MLE problem








and Bi := L0 + Li +D0 +Di, (3.7)
where li denotes the prevailing fraction of likes and di denotes the prevailing fraction of dislikes for
consumer i, then we can state the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.3.1. The MLE quality estimator
q̂i = argmax {Lwi (q) : qmin ≤ q ≤ qmax} , (3.8)




∗) if li > di,
qmin if li ≤ di,
(3.9)
where q∗ solves the following equation
G(p− q∗) = li − di = 2li − 1. (3.10)
(All proofs can be found in the Appendix.) The maximum likelihood estimate q̂i has appealing
properties. Equation (3.10) shows that it depends on the data only through the fraction of like
reviews. Moreover, by Lemma 3.6.1 (in the Appendix) we know that the function G(p − q) is
increasing in q, which implies that the estimator is increasing in the fraction of like reviews, as one
would expect. Lemma 3.6.1 also implies that G(p− q) is invertible for every q ∈ [qmin, qmax], which
means that (3.10) defines a one-to-one mapping between li and q̂i. We will exploit this observation
in the subsequent analysis.
3.3.2 Asymptotic learning
The stochastic learning process converges in the sense that the quality estimate q̂i converges to the
true quality q almost surely. Assumption 3.2.1 implies that new information continues to enter the
system since some consumers will always choose to purchase and as a result review the product.
This, in turn, ultimately guarantees that learning is achieved.
Proposition 3.3.2. Consider the sequential learning process described in the previous section,
where consumer i estimates the prevailing quality q̂i through (3.9). Then, q̂i → q as i→∞ almost
surely.
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The above result serves as a sanity check that learning is achieved under the proposed decision
rule; this result addresses the question that underlies most of the literature on social learning
of whether agents eventually learn the true state of the world. The ultimate goal of this paper
is to study the pricing question described in the previous section for which one needs to have
a more explicit characterization of the learning transient for the underlying stochastic learning
process. This is intractable, however, as is in almost all social learning models in the literature,
both Bayesian and non-Bayesian.8 Our approach is to approximate the learning transient through
a set of intuitive and tractable ordinary differential equations.
3.3.3 Approximation of learning dynamics in a large market
The proposed approximation is relevant in large market settings, and will be justified through
an asymptotic argument as the arrival rate of consumers making purchase decisions grows large,
rescaling processes so that the time scale within which information gets released and learning
evolves is the one of interest. The mean-field or fluid model approximation yields a tractable
characterization of the learning dynamics and provides insight on their dependence on the micro
model of consumer learning behavior and other problem primitives, including the seller’s price. We
comment at the end of this section on the generality of this approach.
We consider a sequence of systems indexed by n. In the n-th system consumers’ arrival process
is Poisson with rate Λn := nΛ. The state variables of the n-th system at time t is given by
Xn(t) := (Ln(t), Dn(t))), where Ln(t) is the number of consumers who report like by time t in the
n-th system, and Dn(t) is defined analogously. The superscript n indicates the dependence on the
arrival rate. Denote the scaled state variable X̄n(t) := Xn(t)/n and similarly for L̄n(t) and D̄n(t).
This state variable comprises the information available to the first consumer arriving after time t.
We will keep the prior initialization weight w constant, so the number of reviews associated with
the prior quality estimate will stay proportional to the fictitious number of purchasers that would
8Typical results establish that learning is achieved (or not) as i→∞, and in some cases the rate of convergence;
see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. [2009] for a characterization of the rate of convergence of Bayesian social learning for some
social networks.
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flow through the system over a fixed time window, e.g., a week.9
We carry the notation from the previous section with the necessary adjustments. Specifically,










where Bn := Ln0 + L
n + Dn0 + D
n and B̄n := Bn/n. Similarly, dn := (D0 + D
n)/Bn = (D̄0 +
D̄n)/B̄n =: d̄n. The fractions of likes and dislikes are independent of n, conditional on X̄n. Sim-
ilarly, q̂n(Xn(t)) is directly defined through (3.9) and (3.10). We also note that q̂n(X̄n(t)) =
q̂n(Xn(t)) through the normalized definitions of l̄n and d̄n, and, moreover, that the mapping q̂n
itself does not depend on n, that is, the same quality estimation procedure is applied throughout
the scaling that we consider, and simply evaluated at the appropriate state Xn(t).














p−min(q + ε̄, q̂(X̄n))
)]
,
with the interpretation that γL(X̄n) is the probability that a consumer who observes information






Note that the above expressions imply that γL and γD are independent of n.
With this notation in mind, we use a Poisson thinning argument to express the scaled state
variables as a Poisson processes with time dependent rates. Let N := (NL, ND) be a vector of












9It is possible to scale wn differently, of course, in which case we would need to apply the corresponding time
change in the X̄n(t) process. The above assumption simplifies the transient analysis without affecting, however, the
resulting structure and insights.
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where γ := (γL, γD). The dependence of the state-dependent rate functions γL and γD on the state
X̄n(t) enters through the quality estimate q̂(X̄n(t)).
If the rate processes inside the expressions (3.11) did not depend on the state X̄n(t) itself, then
a straightforward application of the functional strong law of large numbers for the Poisson process
would yield a deterministic limit for X̄n(t) as n grew large. Our model is a bit more complex, but
because the evolution of the state X̄n(t) depends on the decisions made by all predecessors, one
would expect it to vary slowly relative to the increasing number of consumers arriving at any given
point in time. Intuitively, considering a short time interval [t, t+∆], one would expect that the large
pool of heterogeneous consumers arriving in that interval, each with a different quality parameter
α, and making decisions based on similar information given by X̄n(s) for some s ∈ [t, t+ ∆], would
lead to a deterministic but state-dependent evolution of X̄n for large n; effectively, the stochastic
nature of the decisions due to consumer heterogeneity is “averaged out” in such a setting.
This argument is made precise in Proposition 3.3.3 that derives a deterministic limiting char-
acterization for the system behavior as n grows large using Kurtz [1978, Theorem 2.2] through a
sample path analysis based on a strong approximation argument and a subsequent application of
Gronwall’s inequality.





|X̄n(s)− X̄(s)| = 0 a.s.,





CHAPTER 3. MONOPOLY PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF SOCIAL LEARNING 92










L | Is = X̄(s)
)
ds.
This means that the scaled number of ‘likes’ at t is the sum over the mass of consumers who report
a ‘like’ in each s ≤ t, and this mass depends on past reviews via X̄(·). It follows that the scaled
number of consumers that arrive by time t is Λt and that the number of people that purchased the
product and submitted a report is B̄(t) := L̄0 + D̄0 + L̄(t) + D̄(t). It is convenient to derive from
(3.12) the expressions for (l̄(t), d̄(t)) in the limiting (fluid) model, since these quantities determine
the decision of an arriving consumer:
l̄(t) := l(X̄(t)) =
L̄0 + L̄(t)
B̄(t)
and d̄(t) := d(X̄(t)) =
D̄0 + D̄(t)
B̄(t)
= 1− l̄(t). (3.13)
From the definition of (γL, γD), (3.10) and (3.13), it follows that (L̄, D̄) is absolutely continuous
and therefore differentiable almost everywhere. We refer to time t where (L̄, D̄) is differentiable as
regular. At regular points t, (L̄, D̄) satisfies the differential equations:
˙̄L(t) = .5Λ
[






F̄ (p− q̂t)− .5
[
F̄ (p−min(q − ε̄, q̂t)) + F̄ (p−min(q + ε̄, q̂t))
]]
= ΛF̄ (p− q̂t)− ˙̄L(t), (3.15)
where q̂t is the maximum-likelihood estimator defined in (3.10) and evaluated at (l̄(t), d̄(t)).
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, the approach of employing a mean field approximation
to characterize the transient of the social learning process can be used to study additional micro
learning models in other settings of interest. One key characteristic that underlies this approach
is that each individual consumer has a diminishing influence on the others, and as such on the
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aggregate behavior, as the size of the population scales. This condition typically holds when agents
decisions depend on system aggregates. This is related to the literature on the diffusion of products,
innovation, and epidemics, often called social dynamics, that focuses on the evolution of system
aggregates, such as the fraction of adopters. The approach described above allows one to determine
how the structure of the micro model of consumer behavior affects the aggregate learning dynamics.
3.3.4 Transient learning dynamics: uniformly distributed valuations
In the remainder of the paper we will assume that α ∼ U [0, ᾱ]10 and, without loss of generality,
we will normalize qmin = 0. This allows us to simplify the ODEs (3.14) and (3.15) as follows. At
regular times t, we have
˙̄L(t) = Λ
(
ᾱ+ .5 min(q − ε̄, q̂t) + .5 min(q + ε̄, q̂t)− p
ᾱ
)
and ˙̄D(t) = Λ
(





and the quality estimator can now be written as
q̂t = p− ᾱ+
ε̄
2(1− l̄(t))








The subsequent analysis of the paper will primarily focus on the learning transient when the prior
estimate q0 initially underestimates the true quality of the product, i.e., q0 < q, and, moreover,
focus on the portion of the learning transient over which q̂t < q − ε̄ (we refer to this as “phase 1”).
When ε̄ is small, this first phase of the learning process is the most important to understand. 11
Underestimating prior (q0 < q); phase 1 of learning q̂t < q − ε̄. At times where the
prevailing quality estimate is such that q̂t < q− ε̄, the consumers who purchase with ᾱ+ q̂t− p ≥ 0
are guaranteed to have a positive ex-post utility realization since ᾱ+ q− ε̄− p ≥ ᾱ+ q̂t− p ≥ 0. As
10It follows that F̄ (x) = 1− x/ᾱ for all x ∈ [0, ᾱ], and that G(x) = (ᾱ− x− ε̄)/(ᾱ− x) for all x ∈ [0, ᾱ− ε̄].
11The Appendix studies the case where the prior overestimates the true quality q0 > q, and also shows how to
approximate the evolution of the learning ODEs at times where q − ε̄ < q̂t < q + ε̄ for the case where ε̄ is small.
Moreover, note that equation (3.17) corresponds to the solution of equation (3.10) when l̄(t) ≤ 1 − ε̄/2ᾱ, otherwise
we have a different solution. We only consider the above solution since in the relevant cases l̄(t) is never too close to
1.
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a result only like reviews will be submitted as long as q̂t < q− ε̄. In this case, the ODEs (3.16) can
be solved in closed form and the solutions can then be used together with (3.17) to characterize the
learning trajectory for q̂t. We do this in Proposition 3.3.4, which is the main result of this section.
Before presenting the result, we formally define the time-to-learn
τ := inf{t : t ≥ 0, |q − q̂t| ≤ ε̄}.
This is the time it takes q̂t to reach within ε̄ of q and it measures the duration of the learning phase.
Proposition 3.3.4. Consider the ODEs for the learning dynamics given in (3.16) and assume that
q0 < q. Then, for t ≤ τ ,







τ = w log
(
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)
. (3.19)
Proposition 3.3.4 characterizes the learning transient in the underestimating case. In particular,
expression (3.18) describes the learning trajectory of the quality estimate q̂t for all t ≤ τ , and
expression (3.19) characterizes the time-to-learn as a function of the relevant model parameters,
i.e., the market heterogeneity ᾱ, the distance q−q0 of prior quality from true quality, and the price.
First, expression (3.18) shows that q̂t starts at the prior estimate q0 at time 0 and it increases
monotonically to reach q − ε̄ at time τ . Moreover, the lower the prior weight w, the faster the
learning trajectory, i.e., when consumers place less weight on their prior estimate, they are more
sensitive to the review information and as a result the quality estimator is updated faster.




q − q0 − ε̄
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)
,
which allows us to make some interesting comparative statics observations on the learning transient.
In particular, note that the time-to-learn τ is decreasing in the maximum (or equivalently the range
of the) base valuation ᾱ, because if consumers have higher valuations, more consumers choose to
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buy (and review) the product and thus information accumulates faster. Moreover, τ is increasing
in (q − q0), i.e., the more severely consumers underestimate quality, the longer it takes to learn
q. Finally, the expression for τ highlights that the speed of the learning transient is proportional
to w, which is a natural time scale if we think of learning as the process of accumulating enough
information to overcome the bias of the prior estimate q0.
12
Before moving to the revenue maximization problem, we make one last important observation
that relates the learning process to the monopolist’s pricing decision.
Corollary 3.3.1. The time-to-learn τ is increasing in p.
This result can be explained as follows. Let
dt(p) := F̄ (p− q̂t) =
ᾱ+ q̂t − p
ᾱ
,
which denotes the instantaneous demand function at time t in our large market setting. At any
given t ≤ τ , a price increase affects the instantaneous demand function through two channels: first,
a direct channel, a higher price means a lower instantaneous demand at time t; second, through
q̂t, a higher price means a lower q̂t at time t.
13 Therefore, by increasing the price, the monopolist
effectively decreases the rate at which consumers are buying (and reviewing) the product, thus
slowing down learning. Finally, using the characterization of q̂t from (3.18) we can rewrite dt(p),
12Note that the specific way in which the ODEs for the transient analysis depend on w is determined by the
assumptions that we make on w in the large market approximation. In particular, recall our assumptions that as
the arrival rate of consumers scales, the prior weight itself scales, and likewise the reviews corresponding to the prior
Ln0 , D
n
0 , all scale proportionally to the scaling constant n. This assumption is desirable because it implies that the
ensuing transient of the quality estimate evolves on the natural time-scale of the system, e.g., if we measure time in
days, then the prevailing quality estimate also evolves in the time frame of days. We could have assumed that the
prior weight scales, for example, with order of
√
n reviews, in which case we would have obtained the same ODE
characterization after an appropriate rescaling of time. To understand how the analysis relates to the study of a
system of original interest, consider an example where Λ̂ = 1000 consumers per day, and ŵ = 100 reviews. These
parameters are then embedded in a sequence of systems of growing scale, say Λn = 10 · n and wn = 1 · n, which we
then study asymptotically to obtain tractable characterizations of their evolution; the 100th system in that sequence
is the original system we wanted to analyze. We could have just as well defined a different sequence, for example
Λn = 10 ·n and wn = 10 ·
√
n. This modeling choice affects the downstream scaling of the system processes as briefly
explained above, but not the results.
13This can easily be verified by differentiating (3.18) with respect to p and noting that, for all 0 < t ≤ τ , ∂q̂t/∂p =
1− exp (t/w) < 0.
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for all t ≤ τ , as
dt(p) =
(









The instantaneous demand function thus takes the linear form dt(p) = at − bt · p with at = (1 +
q0/ᾱ) exp(t/w) and bt = (1/ᾱ) exp(t/w). Note that the instantaneous demand is positive for all
p ∈ [pmin, pmax], which follows directly from Assumption 3.2.1, and that both the slope bt and the
intercept at are increasing in t. Thus, when consumers initially underestimate quality (q0 < q), the
instantaneous demand and consequently the instantaneous revenue are increasing with t. Similarly,
note that as time passes and the quality estimate increases, the monopolist can achieve the same
instantaneous demand with a higher price, thus generating more revenue. In the following sections,
we will further elaborate on these insights and we will study the pricing strategy of the monopolist.
The overestimating case q0 > q and the analysis of the ODEs after time τ in the case of a
small quality disturbance ε̄ are briefly reviewed in the Appendix. In both cases the transient is
more complicated and its solution cannot be written in closed form, however, numerical solutions
are very simple to attain and one can still establish useful structural properties, such as the fact
that the quality estimate monotonically converges to the true value q from below (above) in the
underestimating (overestimating) case.
3.4 Static Price Analysis
In this section we solve the monopolist’s problem of choosing a static price to maximize her revenue
as given in (3.2). Following the analysis of the previous section, the stochastic learning trajectory
is replaced by its deterministic mean field approximation. This enables us to solve an otherwise
intractable problem. The next two sections focus on the price optimization problem, for the case
in which consumers initially underestimate quality through their prior, i.e., q0 < q. Adapting by
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where πt(p) = p · dt(p) denotes the instantaneous revenue function at time t, and τ is the time-
to-learn that was defined in the previous section. We assume that once the learning process has
converged to q̂τ = q − ε̄, revenues are accrued from then on according to q̂t = q for t ≥ τ . This is










where π∞(p) denotes the instantaneous revenue at the true quality (q̂∞ = q).
14 The monopolist’s
revenue maximization problem can be written as
maximize
{
R̃(p) : pmin ≤ p ≤ pmax
}
. (3.21)
Before stating our main result, we define
pm(q0) := argmax
p∈[pmin,pmax]
{π0(p)} and pm(q) := argmax
p∈[pmin,pmax]
{π∞(p)} ,
which are the static monopoly prices at q0 and q respectively.
15 The following proposition charac-
terizes the optimal monopoly price in the presence of social learning.
Proposition 3.4.1. Consider the case q < q0. For ε̄ sufficiently small, the monopolist revenue
optimization problem (3.21) has a unique optimal solution p∗ = p∗(δ, w) that satisfies the following:
(a) p∗ ∈ [pm(q0), pm(q)].
(b) p∗(δ, w)→ pm(q) as δw → 0 and p∗(δ, w)→ pm(q0) as δw →∞ .
Proposition 3.4.1 characterizes the (unique) solution of the monopolist’s revenue maximization
problem. In particular, Part 3.4.1 states that the optimal price is straddled between two natural
14Lemma 3.6.4 in the Appendix provides an intuitive characterization of the revenue function (3.20) and establishes
a bound on |R̃(p)− R̄(p)|, which is of order ε̄.
15Note that Assumption 3.2.1?? implies that the constraints in the definition of pm(q) are never binding and
pm(q) = (ᾱ + q)/2. Moreover, Assumption 3.2.1?? implies that the constraints in the definition of pm(q0) are not
binding if and only if (ᾱ+ q0)/2 > qmax − ε̄, which is always true for reasonable values of ᾱ and q0.
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end points: the price that a monopolist would charge if consumers did not engage in social learning
and based their purchase decisions only on their prior estimate q0; the price that a monopolist
would charge if consumers were fully informed of the product quality q.
Part 3.4.1 highlights the importance of the monopolist’s patience level δ and the weight w,
that consumers attach to their prior, on the optimal price with social learning. In particular, if
the monopolist is very patient (δ ≈ 0), then the optimal price is close to the price under full
information, since in this case the learning transient is short relative to the extent of revenue
discounting. However, if the monopolist is very impatient (δ  0), then she finds it optimal to
significantly decrease her price, in the limit learning is not important and the monopolist prices as
if q̂t = q0 for all t ≥ 0. Finally, note that the prior weight w is a natural time unit that determines
the learning speed and the effect of discounting on revenues.
In what follows, we numerically illustrate the solution to (3.21) for different model parameters
and derive some observations regarding comparative statics. We consider the underestimating case
(q0 < q) with a demand rate of 10 potential consumers per week. The most important parameters
in the pricing problem are the monopolist’s discount factor δ, the error in consumers prior estimate
q0 relative to the true quality, and the maximum base valuation ᾱ. As already noted, the learning
transient also scales proportionally to the weight w attached to the prior estimate.
We consider three different prior estimates q0 ∈ {.40, .20, .10}, with a prior weight of w = 10.
The true quality is q = 2, and we set the small quality disturbance term ε̄ to 5% of the true quality.
The monopolist is either patient, semi-patient, or impatient, corresponding to annualized discount
rates δ ∈ {2.5%, 7.5%, 15%}. We fix ᾱ = 4 and we think that this is a reasonable value for this
parameter, which corresponds to a maximum quality premium of 2q.16
The left plot in Figure 3.1 highlights how the optimal price p∗ varies with the prior q0 and the
monopolist’s patience level. The monopoly price under full information pm(q), which is normalized
to 1, and the monopolist price at q0 are also plotted in black. In line with our theoretical result,
we see that the optimal price with social learning is always between the static monopoly price at
q0 and the static monopoly price at q. Moreover, the price p
∗ is closer to the static monopoly price
16Note that if ᾱ q then learning becomes less important.
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Figure 3.1: Optimal Static Price and Learning Phase Duration.
under full information when the monopolist is more patient and consumers’ prior estimate q0 is
closer to q. On the contrary, when the monopolist is impatient, her optimal price is always closer
to the static monopoly price at q0. The right plot in Figure 3.1 reports the learning phase duration
τ∗ for different values of q0 and different patience levels. It always takes 5.5 to 8.5 weeks for the
quality estimate to get ε̄-close to q. This observation is not surprising, since the facts that w = 10




ᾱ+ q0 − p∗
)
,
however, the numerical results highlight that it always takes significantly longer to learn q when the
monopolist is more patient. For the parameter values considered, learning q when the monopolist
is patient always takes 15%− 25% longer than when the monopolist is impatient.
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3.5 Two Price Analysis
Social learning implies a time varying demand process. As such, the ability to modify the price over
time is valuable. Indeed, it is common for sellers to modify the prices of their products in proximity
to their launching, for example by setting a low introductory price. Many factors and consider-
ations, possibly separate from social learning, can support such pricing policies. A few examples
include learning-by-doing, demand estimation, and endogenous timing of the purchasing decision
(consumers with high valuations purchase first). These considerations are not part of our study
which exclusively focuses on the impact of social learning on the dynamics of the pricing decision,
and highlights the appeal of the tractable mean field approximation of the learning phenomenon to
analyze the otherwise complex revenue optimization problem. For concreteness we focus on a two
period pricing problem.
3.5.1 Optimal Prices
Consider the situation in which the monopolist can adjust her price once. She sets an initial price p0
until time s, then p1, and she can optimally choose (p0, p1, s) to maximize her discounted revenue
objective. In this setting, we will show that the monopolist may choose to sacrifice short-term
revenue to optimally speed up learning.
At the time of the price change consumers aggregate all information into a new prior q1 := q̂s,
i.e., the new prior equals the prevailing quality estimate at the time of the price change. Thus,





moreover consumers use the following weight for the new prior,
w1 = w + Λ
∫ s
0













The (q1, w1) specification incorporates the fact that the reviews before time s were under a
different price point. From time s onward the problem is analogous to the single price version
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studied in the previous section. In particular, after time s the learning process evolves according to
equation (3.18), with initial condition q1, price p1, and prior weight w1. The expected discounted
revenue of the monopolist is given by









As in the static price case, we study the situation in which once the learning process has
converged to q̂t = q − ε̄, revenues are accrued from then on according to q̂t = q. In this setting, it
is without loss of generality to focus the attention on policies such that s ≤ τ .17 Which leads to
the following revenue function












This setting is the natural extension to the static price case, indeed if p0 = p1 = p one can easily
verify that the revenue function as well as the learning process would be identical to the static price
case. The monopolist solves the following optimization problem
maximize R̃(p0, p1, s)
s.t. p0, p1 ∈ [pmin, pmax] (3.23)
s ≤ τ,
and the following proposition provides a characterization of the optimal pricing policy.






be the optimal solution to (3.23). Then, the optimal prices (p∗0, p
∗
1) are such that p
∗
0 ≤ p∗1 and
p∗1 ∈ [pm(q1), pm(q)].
Proposition 3.5.1 states that, when consumers underestimate quality, the optimal price p∗1 is
always between the static monopoly price pm(q1) and monopoly price under full information, p
m(q).
17A formal argument is provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.2: Optimal Prices and Learning Phase Duration.
Moreover, the optimal price path is increasing. This supports the intuition that the monopolist has
an incentive to lower the initial price in order to speed up learning.
Figure 3.2 displays numerical solutions to (3.23) for different model parameters, which provide
some additional insights on the optimal pricing policy.18 The left plot in Figure 3.2 shows the
optimal prices p∗1 (above) and p
∗
0 (below) for different priors and different monopolist’s patience
levels. We clearly see that, in the two-price case, the monopolist may find it optimal to initially
price below pm(q0) in order to speed up learning, and then switch to a price which is very close
to the full information monopoly price pm(q) in order to extract more revenues. Moreover, if
the monopolist is more patient, i.e., δ is small, then the first period price p∗0 is lower. This has
interesting implications for the speed of learning: the right plot in Figure 3.2 shows that a patient
monopolist, who is willing to sacrifice initial revenues by under-pricing more aggressively, achieves
faster learning than an impatient one.
18The choice of parameter values for the numerical experiments is the same as the one described in Section 3.4.
CHAPTER 3. MONOPOLY PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF SOCIAL LEARNING 103
q0 static two prior true
.40 4.25 3.13 9.86 5.30
Patient .20 6.18 4.05 12.37 7.25
.10 7.19 4.67 13.72 8.42
.40 12.05 9.21 14.66 14.05
Semi-Patient .20 15.31 11.61 18.13 18.72
.10 17.06 12.91 19.97 21.44
.40 19.32 16.29 20.41 23.64
Impatient .20 23.78 20.18 24.83 30.50
.10 26.09 22.22 27.12 34.32
Table 3.1: %-gap in revenues relative to full information scenario.
3.5.2 Revenue Comparison of Pricing Policies
In this section we numerically compare the revenue performance of the optimal static price policy
and the optimal two prices policy. Our measure of revenue performance for a given policy is
the %-gap between the total revenue attained by using that policy and the total revenue that
the monopolist would attain in an ideal scenario in which consumers know q and the monopolist
charges the monopoly price under full information.19 We also report revenue performances for two
benchmark policies: prior and true. For these cases, revenues are computed under the assumption
that consumers follow the learning process specified in our model, but the monopolist does not take
it into account and she charges the static price pm(q0) and the static price p
m(q) respectively.
The first two columns in Table 3.1 show the revenue performance of the static price and of the
two prices policies respectively. The optimal two-period pricing policy performs consistently better
than the optimal static price, and the relative revenue improvement becomes more significant as
the seller’s discount factor increases. In the last two columns of Table 3.1 we report the revenue
performance of the prior and true policies respectively. By comparing the static price policy to
these two benchmark policies we can appreciate the effectiveness of taking social learning into
account when devising an optimal pricing policy.
19Note that when consumers underestimate quality, the latter provides an upper bound on the revenue that can
be attained in our model by any policy.
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3.6 Proofs
Throughout this appendix, given a real number x we denote its orthogonal projection onto a closed
real interval [a, b] as proj[a,b](x), given a vector y = (y
1, . . . , yk) we define |y| = ‖y‖1 =
∑k
j=1 |yj |,
and given a function y(t) of time, ẏ(t) denotes its derivative.
Proofs of Section 3.3
Lemma 3.6.1. The function G(x) defined in (3.3) is non-increasing for all x ≤ αmax, and is
strictly decreasing for all x ∈ [αmin− ε̄, αmax− ε̄]. Equivalently, G(p− q) is non-decreasing in q for
all q ≥ p− αmax and is strictly increasing in q for all q ∈ [qmin, qmax].
Proof. First note that G(x) is a well-defined function if and only if x ≤ αmax. If x < αmin − ε̄ then




= −f(x+ ε̄) < 0.






(h(x)− h(x+ ε̄)) < 0,
where the strict inequality follows from the assumption that α is IFR, or equivalently h(x)−h(x+
ε̄) < 0. Finally, if x ≥ αmax − ε̄, then G(x) = 0. Thus proving that G(x) is non-increasing for all
x ≤ αmax and strictly decreasing for all x ∈ [αmin − ε̄, αmax − ε̄].
A direct consequence of the above lemma is that G(p− q) is invertible for every q ∈ [p−αmax +
ε̄, p− αmin + ε̄]. This follows from the fact that G is invertible wherever it is strictly monotone.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1. Taking logs of the weighted likelihood function in (3.6) yields
log(Lwi (q)) = (L0 + Li) log(.5 + .5G(p− q)) + (D0 +Di) log(.5− .5G(p− q)),
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L0 + Li +D0 +Di
(1 +G(p− q))(1−G(p− q))
)
G′(p− q)(li − di −G(p− q)). (3.24)
Lemma 3.6.1 and Assumption 3.2.1 imply that 0 < G(p − q) < 1 for all q ∈ [qmin, qmax] and
moreover that G(p − q) is strictly increasing in q for all q ∈ [qmin, qmax]. We will now use these
observations and (3.24) to construct the unique optimal solution to problem (3.8).
First, note that 0 < G(p − q) < 1 implies that the denominator in (3.24) is always positive.
Since G(p − q) is strictly increasing in q, then li − di − G(p − q) is strictly decreasing in q. If
li − di −G(p− qmin) ≤ 0, then
d
dq
log(Lwi (q)) ≤ 0 for all q ∈ [qmin, qmax],




log(Lwi (q)) > 0 for all q < q′.
This implies that the quality that maximizes the log-likelihood is the solution to
d
dq
log(Lwi (q)) = 0 ⇐⇒ G(p− q) = li − di,
given by q∗ if li − di − G(p − qmax) ≤ 0, or by qmax if li − di − G(p − qmax) > 0. Note that since
G(p− q) is strictly increasing for all q ∈ [qmin, qmax] then q̂i = q∗ is always unique in [qmin, qmax].
Summarizing the above conditions, the quality estimate that maximizes the log-likelihood can
be defined as follows: if li ≤ di then li−di−G(p−qmin) ≤ 0 and thus q̂i = qmin; otherwise, if li > di
then q̂i = proj[qmin,qmax](q
∗). To complete the proof, note that di = 1− li implies li−di = 2li−1.
The following lemma is instrumental in the proof of Proposition 3.3.2.
Lemma 3.6.2. Suppose that Assumption 3.2.1?? holds, then
∑∞
i=1(Bi)
−2 <∞ almost surely.
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Proof. The proof will proceed as follows. First, we rewrite the process {Bi, i = 1, 2, . . . } in a more
convenient form {B0 +Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . }, where B0 := L0 +D0 is the total number of initial reviews
associated to the prior q0, defined in (3.4) and (3.5), and Xi is an appropriately defined sequence
of random variables. Then, we bound from below the process {Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . } with a process
{Yi, i = 1, 2, . . . }, which is more tractable for the purpose of the analysis. Finally, we use the




almost surely and complete the proof.
Note that Assumption 3.2.1?? implies that for all i there exists an η > 0 such that for all
admissible p the following is true:
P(i-th customer buys | Ii−1, p) ≥ P(i-th customer buys | qmin, p) ≥ 2η,
where Ii is defined as in (3.1). Thus, we can rewrite Bi in the form Bi = B0 +
∑i
j=1 χj(ηj), where
χj is a Bernoulli random variable with success (i.e., purchase) probability ηj > η for all j, and ηj
depends on Ij and the price p. Let Xi =
∑i
j=1 χj for all i = 1, 2, . . . .
Next, define the random variables ξj = χj(ηj) · υ(η/ηj), where the random variable υ(η/ηj) is
Bernoulli with success probability η/ηj , independent of χj . That is, ξj is a random sample of the
customers that purchased. It is easy to verify that the distribution ξj is Bernoulli with success
probability η and that ξj is independent of ξk for all j 6= k. Let Yi =
∑i
j=1 ξj and note that, by
construction, Yi +B0 ≤ Xi +B0 = Bi for all i = 1, 2, . . . .
Finally, the Strong Approximation Theorem Glynn [1990, Theorem 5] implies that there exist
a probability space that supports a standard Brownian motion W and a sequence Y ′i such that
{Y ′i : i ≥ 1}
D
= {Yi : i ≥ 1}, and
Y ′i = i · η + σηW (i) +O(log i) a.s.,
and W (·) is a standard Brownian motion. (The symbol D= denotes equality in distribution.) In the
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sequel we write Yi instead of Y
′
i . Rewriting the above expression we have that











From the strong law of large numbers for the standard Brownian motion we know that W (i)/i→ 0
a.s., which implies that, for any ε > 0, there exists a constant M1 > 0 such that W (i)/i < ε for all
i > M1 and almost all sample paths. Similarly, there exists a constant M2 > 0 such that the error


























Proof of Proposition 3.3.2. We study the evolution of li, and relate it to q̂i using (3.10). It is easy















































which is equivalent to the recursion
li = li−1 + (Bi)
−1Yi−1 + (Bi)
−1Zi−1,
where the projection term Zi−1 := li − li−1 − (Bi)−1Yi−1.
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This stochastic recursion process belongs to the class of processes studied in Kushner and Yin
[2003]. We next show that the assumptions of Kushner and Yin [2003, Chapter 5, Theorem 2.1]
hold and then identify the equilibrium point of the process using a Lyapunov function. For this
purpose, it is useful to define the maximum likelihood quality estimate as a function of the fraction
of likes
q̂(li) := p−G−1(2li − 1),
and note that Lemma 3.6.1 implies that G−1(2li − 1) is well-defined for all li ∈ [lmin, lmax].
Assumption (A.2.1). By subadditivity of the absolute value, it follws that





















































are mutually exclusive. It then follows that supiE|Yi|2 ≤ 1 <∞.
Assumption (A.2.2). We have that

































where the last equality follows by substituting
li = .5(1 +G(p− q̂(li))) = .5
(
1 +
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Thus, we can define the function
g(li) := E[Yi | l0, Yj , j < i], (3.25)
which is measurable since F (·) is measurable. Finally, note that the above derivation implies that
finite difference bias terms βi = 0,∀i, which follows from the fact that the distribution function F
is known.
Assumption (A.2.3) follows from the fact that F is continuous.
Assumption (A.2.4) is shown in Lemma 3.6.2.
Assumption (A.2.5) is immediate since βi = 0, ∀i, as the proof of Assumption (A.2.2) shows.
Before applying the theorem it is useful to further decompose li as follows. First note that
Yi := g(li) + M̄i, where the function g(li) is the drift function that we defined in (3.25) and M̄i is
a martingale difference noise given by











Then, it is straightforward to see that




Now we can apply Kushner and Yin [2003, Chapter 5, Theorem 2.1], to conclude that li converges
almost surely to the set of locally asymptotically stable points of the ODE l̇ = g(l) that we denote
with S. We next show that the ODE has a unique locally asymptotically stable point denoted by
l∗ := .5(1+G(p−q)). For that purpose we define the candidate Lyapunov function V (l) = (l− l∗)2.
We need to show that V̇ (l) = ∇V (l)g(l) < 0 for all l ∈ [0, 1]/{l∗} and V̇ (l∗) = 0. See Khalil [2002]
for details on Lyapunov stability. Thus, we have to show that g(l) > (<)0 when l < (>)l∗ (or
equivalently when q̂(l) < (>)q).
Case 1: l < l∗ (or equivalently q̂(l) < q). In this case min(q̂(l), q + ε̄) = q̂(l) and g(l) =
.5
[
F̄ (p − min(q̂(l), q − ε̄)) − F̄ (p − q̂(l) + ε̄)
]
. In addition, −min(q̂(l), q − ε̄) ≥ −q̂(l) + ε̄. If
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q̂(l) ≤ q − ε̄, then g(l) = .5
[
F̄ (p− q̂(l))− F̄ (p− q̂(l) + ε̄)
]
> 0, since F̄ is a decreasing function. If
q > q̂(l) > q − ε̄, then g(l) = .5
[
F̄ (p− q + ε̄)− F̄ (p− q̂(l) + ε̄)
]
> 0, since q̂(l) < q. We conclude
that g(l) > 0 in this case.




















which can be shown to be negative, using −min(q̂(l), q + ε̄) > −q̂(l) and that F̄ is decreasing.
We conclude that V̇ (l) < 0 at all points l 6= l∗. It is easy to verify through the above expressions
that at l = l∗ and q̂(l) = q we get that V̇ (l∗) = 0. Also, by construction V (l∗) = 0, which establishes
that S = {l∗} and that li → l∗ almost surely. Applying the continuous mapping theorem, we get
that q̂i → q almost surely, which completes the proof.
Lemma 3.6.3. [(a)]
1. For all x, y, z ∈ R we have
|min(x, y)−min(z, y)| ≤ |x− z| and |max(x, y)−max(z, y)| ≤ |x− z|.







(|x1 − x2|+ |y1 − y2|).
Proof. 1 Minimum operator: If x, z ≥ y or x, z ≤ y this holds trivially. If x ≤ y and z ≥ y then
|min(x, y) −min(z, y)| = |x − y| = y − x ≤ z − x = |x − z|. For the maximum operator take −x,
−y, and −z.
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(|x1 − x2|+ |y1 − y2|).
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3. Throughout this proof, to reduce the notational burden and without
loss of generality, we rescale time such that Λ = 1. We verify the conditions of Theorem 2.2 of
Kurtz [1978]. First we note that Xn(t) ∈ Z2+, X̄n(t) = Xn(t)/n ∈ {k/n | k ∈ Z2+} as required. To
satisfy the conditions of the theorem we validate the construction (3.12) and then show that the
following inequalities hold
γ(x) ≤ Γ1(1 + |x|) and |γ(x)− γ(y)| ≤ Γ2|x− y| (3.26)
for x, y ∈ R2 and x, y ≥ [L0, D0] componentwise, and for some finite constants Γ1 and Γ2.
The integral form of X̄n(t) in (3.12) follows from Poisson arrivals and Poisson thinning of the






































where An is a Poisson process with rate n and, with some abuse of notation, rs is a review given
by a consumer arriving at time s. The second equality follows by splitting the Poisson process into
likes, dislikes, and outside options; the probability with which an arriving consumer submits one
of these reviews depends on his quality preference and on his observable information Xn(s). The
Poisson thinning property guarantees that the process that counts only those consumers who like
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the product is still Poisson with rate proportional to the probability of liking the product. Similarly,
this can be shown for Dn(t).
Finally, focusing on the rate conditions required for Theorem 2.2 of Kurtz [1978]. The first
inequality in (3.26) holds for Γ1 = 1 since γ
k are probabilities for k = L,D. We derive the last
inequality there for γL in two steps. First, we observe that γL(Xn(t)) depends on Xn(t) through
q̂(Xn(t)). It follows from Lemma 3.6.31 and the fact that the density of α is uniformly bounded
by fmax that γ
L is Lipschitz continuous in q ∈ [qmin, qmax]. Second, we show that q̂(x) is Lipschitz
continuous in x = Xn(t). Lemma 3.6.32 for a = L0 and b = D0 establishes that q
∗, defined in (3.10),
is Lipschitz continuous in x = Xn(t). The projection operator of q∗ onto [qmin, qmax] preserves the
Lipschitz property. Similarly, one can show that γD is Lipschitz continuous, which establishes that
γ is Lipschitz. Finally, invoking Theorem 2.2 of Kurtz [1978] we complete the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4. The ODEs (3.16) reduce to
˙̄L(t) = Λ
(
ᾱ+ q̂t − p
ᾱ
)
and ˙̄D(t) = 0,




(1 + L̄0/D̄0 + L̄(t)/D̄0). This equation is readily solvable in closed form, and the
particular solution with initial condition L̄0 is given by











The trajectory for q̂t can now be obtained by replacing (3.27) and D̄(t) = 0 into (3.17), which yields
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Rewriting (3.4) and (3.5) for α uniformly distributed we get that
L̄0 =






and plugging them in q̂t and τ yields





and τ = w log
(
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)
.
In the sequel, we provide a sketch for the solution of the ODE’s derived in the main body of
the paper for the cases not considered in Proposition 3.3.4.
Overestimating prior (q0 > q); phase 1 of learning q̂t > q + ε̄. The following proposition
characterizes the trajectories for L̄(t) and D̄(t) in this case. From these one can easily obtain the
trajectory for q̂t by using (3.17).
Proposition 3.6.1. Consider the ODEs for the learning dynamics given in (3.16) and assume that
q0 > q. Then, for t ≤ τ ,
L̄(t) = Λ
(











(ε̄/2)L̄(t)− (ᾱ+ q − p)D̄(t)
(ε̄/2)L̄0 − (ᾱ+ q − p)D̄0
)ε̄/2
= 1. (3.29)
Proof. (Sketch only.) In this case the ODEs (3.16) reduce to
˙̄L(t) = Λ
(

















It can be easily verified that the solution for L̄(t) with initial conditions L̄0 is given by (3.28), and
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− (ᾱ+ q − p)
]
.
Which is an ODE of the form


















(ᾱ+ q − p), c = Λε̄L̄0
2ᾱ
.




















This equation for Z(t) is solvable, which, in turn, leads to the solution for D̄(t) given in (3.29).
Phase 2 of learning q − ε̄ < q̂t < q + ε̄. In this case the ODEs are less tractable, nonetheless
we will establish a useful structural property for q̂t in Proposition 3.6.2, and then provide an
approximation of the q̂t trajectory when ε̄ is small.
Proposition 3.6.2. Assume that q − ε̄ < q̂t0 < q + ε̄ for some t0 > 0. Then, q̂t → q as t → ∞.
Moreover, if q̂t0 < q then q̂t is strictly monotonically increasing for all t ≥ t0, otherwise, if q̂t0 > q
then q̂t is strictly monotonically decreasing for all t ≥ t0.
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(ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p). (3.31)
It follows from Assumption 3.2.1 that p < ᾱ − ε̄, which implies that ˙̄L(t) > 0 for all t, moreover,
using equation (3.17) for q̂t, it is easy to see that
˙̄D(t) > 0 if and only if q̂t > q− ε̄. These, coupled
with the fact that L(t0) and D(t0) are strictly positive, imply that L̄(t) and D̄(t) are positive and
increasing for all t ≥ t0. Using l̄(t) = L̄0 + L̄(t)/(L̄0 + L̄(t) + D̄0 + D̄(t)), we can now write the
ODE for the fraction of likes l̄(t) as
˙̄l(t) =
1
L̄0 + L̄(t) + D̄0 + D̄(t)
[
(1− l̄(t)) ˙̄L(t)− l̄(t) ˙̄D(t)
]
, (3.32)
and noting that L̄0 + L̄(t) + D̄0 + D̄(t) > 0 for all t ≥ t0, we have that the steady state l∗ must be
such that (3.32), evaluated at l∗, is equal to 0. Noting that 1+(L̄0+L̄(t))/(D̄0+D̄(t)) = 1/(1− l̄(t))
and replacing (3.30) and (3.31) into condition (3.32) we find the unique steady state
l∗ =
ᾱ+ q − p− ε̄/2
ᾱ+ q − p
.




replacing in l∗ for l̄(t) we can readily verify that quality in steady state is equal to q. Moreover,
since q̂t is increasing in l̄(t), it follows from
˙̄l(t) > 0 ⇔ l̄(t) < l∗ that dq̂t/dt > 0 ⇔ q̂t < q. Thus,
if q̂t0 < q then q̂t is strictly monotonically increasing in t, otherwise it is strictly monotonically
decreasing.
When ε̄ is small we can approximate the trajectories of L̄(t) and D̄(t) as follows. Note that the
initial conditions for the system of ODEs defined by (3.30) and (3.31), when q̂τ = q − ε̄, are given
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(ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p), ˙̄Dτ = 0. (3.33)
First, note that we can write
L̄(t) = L̄τ +
∫ τ+t
τ




( ˙̄L(s)− ˙̄Lτ ) ds,
D̄(t) = D̄0 +
∫ τ+t
τ















We already established that ˙̄D(s) > 0 if and only if q̂s > q − ε̄, it follows from the definition of τ


















˙̄D(s) ds, we can rewrite L̄(t), D̄(t) as follows
L̄(t) = L̄τ +
˙̄Lτ t+ χ(t) and D̄(t) = D̄0 + χ(t),
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Substituting the above ratio into equation (3.31), and differentiating twice one obtains a third
order, non-homogeneous linear ODE, that is solvable in terms of the matrix exponential (not in
closed form due to the non-homogeneous coefficients).
Proofs of Section 3.4
Lemma 3.6.4. The monopolist’s revenue function (3.20) can be written as




ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p






ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p




Moreover, R̃(p) is such that |R̃(p)− R̄(p)| ≤ ε̄[Λ(p/ᾱ)h∞(p)].
Proof. First, recall that when q0 < q − ε̄ we have





and τ = w log
(
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)
,
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ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p




= π0(p) · h0(p).
























ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)−δw
δ
= π∞(p) · h∞(p).
Thus we have established that R̃(p) = Λ [h0(p) · π0(p) + h∞(p) · π∞(p)].
To establish the bound, note that q̂t ≥ q − ε̄ for all t ≥ τ implies the following inequality





e−δt(q − q̂t) dt






= ε̄ · Λ
( p
ᾱ
) ( ᾱ+ q − ε̄− pᾱ+ q0 − p
)−δw
δ





Proof of Proposition 3.4.1. The proof will proceed as follows. First we establish that for ε̄ suffi-
ciently small the revenue maximization problem (3.21) admits a unique optimal solution. Then we
establish its properties, proving in order Part 3.4.1 and Part 3.4.1.
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h′0(p) · π0(p) + h0(p) · π′0(p) + h′∞(p) · π∞(p) + h∞(p) · π′∞(p)
]
.
and, differentiating twice, we get
R̃′′(p) = Λ
[
h′′0(p) · π0(p) + 2h′0(p) · π′0(p) + h0(p) · π′′0(p)
+h′′∞(p) · π∞(p) + 2h′∞(p) · π′∞(p) + h∞(p) · π′′∞
]
.
Noting that π′′0(p) = π
′′
∞(p) = −2/ᾱ, the latter equation simplifies to
R̃′′(p) = Λ
{[












h0(p) + h∞(p) =
(
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p






ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p




h′0(p) · π′0(p) + h′∞(p) · π′∞(p) =
(
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)−1−δww(q0 − q + ε̄)[p(q − q0) + ε̄(ᾱ− 2p+ q0)]
ᾱ(ᾱ+ q0 − p)3
,
h′′0(p) · π0(p) + h′′∞(p) · π∞(p) =(
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)−δww(q0 − q + ε̄)[(p− q − ᾱ)(q − q0) + ε̄(3(α− p+ q)− δw(q − q0))− ε̄2(2− δw)]p
ᾱ(ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p)2(ᾱ+ q0 − p)2
.
It follows from Assumption 3.2.1–(ii) that the revenue function R̃(p) = R̃(p, ε̄) ∈ C∞(ε̄) for all
p ∈ [0, pmax]. This can be easily verified by noting that pmax < ᾱ− ε̄ implies that the quantity
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
in h0 and h∞ is always bounded away from 0. The statement above implies that R̃
′′(p, ε̄) is a
continuous function of ε̄ for all p ∈ [pmin, pmax], in particular it is continuous at ε̄ = 0. We will
now prove that, when ε̄ is sufficiently small, the revenue function R̃(p) is strictly concave for all
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ᾱ+ q − p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)−δw ( 2
δw
+ (q − q0)
(
2ᾱ− 2p− q + 3q0 − δw(q − q0)
(ᾱ+ q0 − p)2
− ᾱ+ q
ᾱ+ q − p
· (q − q0)(δw − 1)





Case 1: δw > 1. The denominator of the above equation is always negative. Moreover, since
ᾱ+ q
ᾱ+ q − p
> 1 for all p ∈ (0, ᾱ+ q0)
and the numerator of (3.34) is strictly increasing in this term, replacing (ᾱ+ q)/(ᾱ+ q− p) with 1





ᾱ+ q − p





ᾱ+ q0 − p
))
(3.35)





ᾱ+ q − p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)1−δw)
. (3.36)
Now note that q > q0 and δw > 1 imply that
(
ᾱ+ q − p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)1−δw
< 1 for all p < ᾱ+ q0.
This implies that (3.36) is strictly bigger than 0 and so is the numerator of (3.34). Thus, we
conclude that R̃′′(p, 0) < 0 for all p ∈ (0, ᾱ+ q0).
Case 2: δw < 1. The denominator in equation (3.34) is always positive. Moreover, since
ᾱ+ q
ᾱ+ q − p
> 1 for all p ∈ (0, ᾱ+ q0)
CHAPTER 3. MONOPOLY PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF SOCIAL LEARNING 121
and the numerator is strictly decreasing in this term, replacing (ᾱ + q)/(ᾱ + q − p) with 1 we
find that the numerator of (3.34) is strictly smaller than the quantity in (3.35). Moreover, since
δw < 1, replacing 1/δw with 1 in (3.35) we find that the quantity in (3.35) is strictly smaller than
the quantity in (3.36). Now note that q > q0 and δw < 1 imply that
(
ᾱ+ q − p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)1−δw
> 1 for all p < ᾱ+ q0.
This implies that (3.36) is strictly smaller than 0 and so is the numerator of (3.34). Thus, we
conclude that R̃′′(p, 0) < 0 for all p ∈ (0, ᾱ+ q0).
Case 1 and Case 2 establish that R̃′′(p, 0) < 0 for all p ∈ (0, ᾱ + q0). Moreover, since R̃′′(p, ε̄)
is continuous at ε̄ = 0, there exists ε′ > 0 such that R̃′′(p, ε̄) < 0 for all ε̄ < ε′. In particular,
this implies that when ε̄ is sufficiently small, R̃(p) is strictly concave for all p ∈ [pmin, pmax], and
therefore Problem (3.21) admits a unique optimal solution.
Proof of Part 3.4.1. First, note that, since R̃(p) is strictly concave, then R̃′(p) is strictly decreasing
for all p ∈ [pmin, pmax].
Now, note that R̃′(p, ε̄) is a continuous function of ε̄ at ε̄ = 0 for all p ∈ [0, pmax]. This
follows directly from R̃(p, ε̄) ∈ C∞(ε̄) for all p ∈ [0, pmax], which was established above. We will
now prove that p∗ ∈ [pm(q0), pm(q)]. By definition, pm(q0), pm(q) ∈ [pmin, pmax], and it is easy to
verify that that pm(q0) = max{pmin, (ᾱ + q0)/2}. If pm(q0) = pmin then clearly p∗ ≥ pm(q0). If
pm(q0) = (ᾱ+ q0)/2, then evaluating the first-derivative R̃
′(p, ε̄) at (pm(q0), 0) yields










since q > q0, thus p
∗ > pm(q0). It follows from Assumption 3.2.1?? that p
m(q) = (ᾱ + q)/2, so
evaluating the first-derivative at (pm(q), 0) we have
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Note that q > q0 implies that (
ᾱ+ q
ᾱ+ 2q0 − q
)1−δw
> 1,
which in turn implies that when δw > 1 the denominator in (3.37) is always strictly negative
and the numerator is always strictly positive. When δw < 1 the reverse inequalities hold for the
denominator and numerator in (3.37), therefore R̃′(pm(q), 0) < 0. By continuity of R̃′(p, ε̄) at ε̄ = 0,
there exists ε′′ > 0 such that R̃′(pm(q0), ε̄) > 0 and R̃
′(pm(q), ε̄) < 0 for all ε̄ < ε′′. Thus proving
that, for ε̄ sufficiently small, we have p∗ ∈ [pm(q0), pm(q)].
Proof of Part 3.4.1. Setting R̃′(p) = 0, we get the following first-order condition for the monopolist’s
problem
h′0(p) · π0(p) + h0(p) · π′0(p) + h′∞(p) · π∞(p) + h∞(p) · π′∞(p) = 0.
Dividing both sides of the above equation by h0(p), and then dividing again by 1 + h∞(p)/h0(p),
the first-order condition can be rewritten as






(ᾱ+ q0 − p)(1− δw)
ᾱ+ q0 − p+ δw
(
q − ε̄− q0 − (ᾱ+ q0 − p)
(
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p





(h′0(p)/h0(p)) · π0(p) + (h′∞(p)/h0(p)) · π∞(p)
1 + h∞(p)/h0(p)
= ε̄ · p(q0 − q + ε̄)(1− δw)δw
ᾱ(ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p)
(
ᾱ+ q0 − p+ δw
(
q − ε̄− q0 − (ᾱ+ q0 − p)
(
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)δw)) .
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Clearly, as δ → 0 or w → 0 we have ω(p)→ 1 and ξ(p)→ 0 for all p ∈ (0, ᾱ+ q0), consequently the
left-hand side of (3.38) goes to π′∞(p). Finally, let p
∗ = p∗(δ, w) be the unique solution of (3.38)
and note that by strict concavity R′′(p∗) < 0, then p∗ converges to the solution of π′∞(p) = 0, i.e.
p∗(δ, w) → pm(q) as δ → 0 or w → 0. For the other case, as δ → ∞ or w → ∞ we have ω(p) → 0
for all p ∈ (0, ᾱ+ q0). This is easy to verify by first dividing numerator and denominator in (3.39)
by δw, next noting that
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
> 1
since q0 < q − ε̄, and then taking the limit. Moreover, as δ →∞ or w →∞ we have ξ(p)→ 0 for
all p ∈ (0, ᾱ + q0), this can be verified as follows. Divide numerator and denominator by δw and
note that





ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
)δw ,
for the obvious choices of A,B,C and D. It is easy to see that since
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p
ᾱ+ q0 − p
> 1,
then ξ(p) → 0 as δ → ∞ or w → ∞. Thus, the left-hand side of (3.38) goes to π′0(p) and p∗
converges to the solution of π′0(p) = 0, i.e. p
∗(δ, w) → (ᾱ + q0)/2 as δ → ∞ or w → ∞, if
(ᾱ + q0)/2 ≥ pmin. Otherwise, if pmin > (ᾱ + q0)/2 then p∗(δ, w) → pmin as δ → ∞ or w → ∞.
Recalling that pm(q) = max{pmin, (ᾱ+ q0)/2} completes the proof.
CHAPTER 3. MONOPOLY PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF SOCIAL LEARNING 124
Proofs of Section 3.5
First, we argue that setting s ≤ τ in the monopolist’s problem is without loss of generality. We
define formally the discounted revenue, for a generic s > 0, as













When s ≤ τ the above equation reduces to (3.22), when s > τ the revenue function is given by












Suppose that R̃(p∗0, p
∗
1, s
∗) is optimal and s∗ > τ , clearly it must be that p∗1 = argmax
p1∈[pmin,pmax]
{π∞(p1)}.
But this implies that R̃(p∗0, p
∗
1, τ) ≥ R̃(p∗0, p∗1, s∗), thus it is without loss of generality to consider
only policies such that s ≤ τ .
Before proving the proposition, we introduce the following definition
τk := inf{t : t ≥ 0, |q − q̂t| ≤ ε̄ | qk, pk}, k = 0, 1,
where τk denotes the time that the prevailing quality estimate reaches within ε̄ from q, starting from
a prior qk and a price pk. This is analogous to the simpler definition of τ = inf{t : t ≥ 0, |q− q̂t| ≤ ε̄}
that was introduced previously, and it simplifies the exposition of the following proofs.
The following lemma is needed for the proof of Proposition 3.5.1.
Lemma 3.6.5. The monopolist’s revenue function (3.22) can be written as
R̃(p0, p1, s) = Λ
[
h0(s) · π0(p0) + e−δs [hs(p1) · πs(p1) + h∞(p1) · π∞(p1)]
]
,







ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p1






ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p1




Proof. (Sketch only.) First, note that q0 < q − ε̄ and that s ≤ τ implies that q1 ≤ q − ε̄. Thus, for
all t ≤ τ the quality estimate is given by
q̂t =






if t < s





if t ≥ s
.
Following the argument of the proof of Lemma 3.6.4, we establish the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1. First we establish that p∗1 ∈ [pm(q1), pm(q)]. Differentiating R̃ twice






= Λ · e−sδ ·
2−
(
ᾱ+ q − p1






+ (q − q1)
(
2ᾱ− 2p1 − q + 3q1 − δw1(q − q1)
(ᾱ+ q1 − p1)2
− ᾱ+ q
ᾱ+ q − p1
· (q − q1)(δw1 − 1)





The following two cases establish that the equation above is always negative.
Case 1: δw > 1. The denominator of the equation (3.40) is always negative. Since
ᾱ+ q
ᾱ+ q − p1
> 1 for all p1 ∈ (0, ᾱ+ q1)
and the numerator of (3.40) is strictly increasing in this term, replacing (ᾱ+ q)/(ᾱ+ q − p1) with
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ᾱ+ q − p1





ᾱ+ q1 − p1
))
(3.41)





ᾱ+ q − p1
ᾱ+ q1 − p1
)1−δw1)
. (3.42)
Now note that q > q1 and δw1 > 1 imply that
(
ᾱ+ q − p1
ᾱ+ q1 − p1
)1−δw1
< 1 for all p1 < ᾱ+ q1.
This implies that (3.42) is strictly bigger than 0 and so is the numerator of (3.40). Thus, we
conclude that (3.40) is strictly smaller than 0 for all p1 ∈ (0, ᾱ+ q1).
Case 2: δw < 1. The denominator in equation (3.40) is always positive. Since
ᾱ+ q
ᾱ+ q − p1
> 1 for all p1 ∈ (0, ᾱ+ q1)
and the numerator of (3.40) is strictly decreasing in this term, replacing (ᾱ+ q)/(ᾱ+ q−p1) with 1
we find that the numerator of (3.40) is strictly smaller than the quantity in (3.41). Moreover, since
δw1 < 1, replacing 1/δw1 with 1 in (3.41) we find that the quantity in (3.41) is strictly smaller than
the quantity in (3.42). Now note that q > q1 and δw1 > 1 imply that
(
ᾱ+ q − p1
ᾱ+ q1 − p1
)1−δw1
> 1 for all p1 < ᾱ+ q1.
This implies that (3.42) is strictly smaller than 0 and so is the numerator of (3.40). Thus, we
conclude that (3.40) is strictly less than 0 for all p1 ∈ (0, ᾱ+ q1).






< 0 for all feasible s, p0 and p1 ∈ (0, ᾱ+ q1).




R̃(p0, p1, s) as a function of ε̄, is continuous at ε̄ = 0 for all feasible s, p0 and
p1 ∈ [0, pmax], it follows that, when ε̄ is sufficiently small, R̃(p0, p1, s) is strictly concave in p1 for
all feasible s, p0 and p1 ∈ [pmin, pmax].
We next show that p∗1 ∈ [pm(q1), pm(q)]. By definition, pm(q1), pm(q) ∈ [pmin, pmax], and it is
easy to verify that that pm(q1) = max{pmin, (ᾱ+ q1)/2}. If pm(q1) = pmin then clearly p∗ ≥ pm(q1).
If pm(q1) = (ᾱ+ q1)/2, then evaluating the first-derivative at p1 = p
















since q > q1. It follows from Assumption 3.2.1?? that p
m(q) = (ᾱ + q)/2, so evaluating the
first-derivative at p1 = p















Note that q > q1 implies that (
ᾱ+ q
ᾱ+ 2q1 − q
)1−δw1
> 1,
which implies that when δw1 > 1 the denominator in (3.43) is always strictly negative and the nu-
merator is always strictly positive. When δw1 < 1 the reverse inequalities hold for the denominator
















m(q), s) < 0,
when ε̄ is sufficiently small.
Finally, to establish that p∗0 ≤ p∗1 we first obtain an equivalent problem (see Boyd and Vanden-
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berghe [2004, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3] for the formal definition of equivalent optimization problems)
by making a change of variable. Noting that s ≤ τ if and only if s ≤ τ0, we replace the last con-
straint in the monopolist’s optimization problem and set φ = s/τ0, equivalently s = φτ0. We let
the monopolist choose φ ∈ [0, 1] instead of s. It is clear that the optimal solution (p∗0, p∗1, s∗) of the
original problem, can be readily obtained from the optimal solution (p∗0, p
∗
1, φ
∗) of the transformed
problem and vice versa, thus the two problems are equivalent. Making the change of variable in
the monopolist’s objective (3.22) yields












and the associated monopolist’s problem is
max R̃(p0, p1, φ)
s.t. p0, p1 ∈ [pmin, pmax]




∗) be the optimal solution to the above problem and suppose, by contradiction, that
p∗0 > p
∗





















w(q − ε̄− q0)
(ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p0)(ᾱ+ q0 − p0)
> 0 for all p0 ∈ [pmin, pmax].
Moreover, one can immediately verify that
q1(p0, φ) = p0 − ᾱ+ (ᾱ+ q0 − p0)
(
ᾱ+ q − ε̄− p0
ᾱ+ q0 − p0
)φ











′)}. Now, consider the revenue function evaluated at the new solution and












since by construction q̂t ≤ q1(p∗0, φ∗) and πt(p0) is a strictly concave function of p0 which is maxi-
mized at p0 = (ᾱ+ q̂t)/2 ≤ p′0 < p∗0. Finally, note that our choice of p′1 implies that the continuation









∗). Thus, we reach the contradiction R̃(p′0, p
′
1, φ
′) > R̃(p∗0, p
∗
1, φ
∗). It must be p∗0 ≤ p∗1.
Chapter 4
Dynamic Pricing, Social Influence,
and Price Commitment
4.1 Introduction
The overall popularity of many types of products is influenced and amplified by the mass of con-
sumers that purchase in the early release stages and spread the word about the product. The types
of products we have in mind are cultural products, like books or movies, for which the urge to
adopt a popular product is driven by preference for conformity or sharing with peers. This type
of social influence is pervasive in today’s economy, where information on the behavior of peers, or
even socially distant consumers, is readily available at the touch of a finger. A seller that wants to
launch a new product must therefore take the social influence channel into account when devising
her optimal pricing strategy.
This chapter studies a model of a seller that is launching a new product to a large market
of consumers. There are two periods in the selling season, an introductory period and a mature
period. Consumers are on the market at the beginning of the selling season and remain on the
market until they purchase the product or the selling season ends. Consumers are influenced by
other consumers that purchased before them, i.e., their net utility at the time they are making a
decision is increasing in the mass of consumers that have already purchased, we call the intensity
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of this effect the level of social influence. Motivated by the increasing sophistication of pricing in
cultural and online markets, we want to study the optimal dynamic pricing policy of the seller.
We consider two scenarios: (I) is a scenario in which the seller is able to commit upfront or pre-
announce a sequence of prices for the entire selling season; (II) is a scenario in which the seller does
not have such a commitment power and thus engages in “responsive pricing”, which means that she
can change her price at the beginning of the mature period.
Our main result compares the equilibrium profit that the seller attains in scenario (I) to the
equilibrium profits she attains in scenario (II) as the level of social influence in the economy varies.
We show that when social influence is low, then committing upfront to a sequence of prices always
yields higher profits than not doing so, however, when social influence is high the profits in the two
scenarios are equal and the value of price commitment for the seller is zero.
In our other results, we derive a complete characterization of the market equilibria in the two
scenarios, in terms of seller’s optimal pricing decisions, consumers’ optimal purchasing decisions
and equilibrium profits. Our analytic characterization of the optimal solutions allows us to drive
interesting sensitivity analysis conclusions on prices and demands. In particular, we see that when
social influence is present it is generally optimal to offer an introductory price in the first period
and a higher price in the second period. Finally, we show that the difference between mature and
introductory prices is always increasing in the level of social influence. Which means that the seller
chooses to use the first period discounted price as a lever to generate hype about her product and
then exploit with a higher price in the second period. The seller uses this lever more aggressively
the higher the impact of early purchases on late ones.
Before moving to a survey of the literature we want to highlight the normative nature of our
results. In this model, we try to specify plausible assumptions on how social influence affects
consumers’ decisions in markets for cultural products. Then, we derive results that dictate how a
seller should optimally price her product, in the absence of other exogenous constraints. In reality,
cultural markets have historically been subjected to various types of constraints. Orbach [2004]
and Orbach and Einav [2007] show that pricing of motion pictures in movie theaters is affected
by regulatory and legal constraints that severely limit the ability of a seller to engage in dynamic
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pricing and price differentiation. Similar constraints apply to other types of cultural products,
such as books in physical bookstores. In these cases, our results may not reflect actual behavior of
sellers. However, our model captures some of the most significant features of the effects of dynamic
pricing in cultural markets when consumers behave strategically, and all our propositions should be
regarded as normative statements. Finally, we note that new markets for cultural products, where
books and movies are sold on line in different formats, have less regulatory constraints and one can
easily conduct experiments and empirical tests on the value of social influence in cultural markets
that may inform future extensions of this work.
4.1.1 Related Literature
The question of conditioning a pricing strategy on some social parameter has received increased
attention in the operations research community, Candogan et al. [2012b] study static price dis-
crimination when consumers are embedded in a social network, and characterize optimal individual
prices as a function of consumers network positions. Our model is a two-period model with inter-
temporal externalities, where the choices of early consumers affect the payoffs of late consumers,
and it is more related to Jing [2011] and Yu et al. [2015]. These papers study two-period dynamic
pricing models, and although they frame the externality from the introductory period to the next
in the form of social learning, they propose reduced form models of information transmission or
social learning intensity, that generate similar dynamics to our model of social influence.
Social influence is considered a key driver of consumers’ decisions in economics and related
disciplines. In this chapter, we model the social influence channel in a similar fashion to Arthur
[1989], i.e., we assume that a consumer utility is increasing in the installed base of a product when
the consumer makes a purchase. This can be considered a reduced form model of product adoption,
via word-of-mouth effects, in the style of Bass [1969], or as a boundedly rational model of network
effects in which consumers only take into account past adoptions, see Arthur [1994]. In particular,
we do not consider rational expectations over network effects as in Katz and Shapiro [1985]. Our
modeling framework is motivated by recent experimental evidence on consumer choice in cultural
markets, see Salganik et al. [2006], Salganik and Watts [2009], and Moretti [2011].
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The question of the value of price commitment has been considered, first in the economics and
then in the management science literature. Coase [1972], considers a monopolist that sells a good to
a large market of consumers with heterogeneous valuations, and discusses how a monopolist should
set the price in order to maximize profit. The optimal price should be decreasing over time, in order
to extract more value from consumers with high valuations in the initial periods. Further work by
Stokey [1979], Bulow [1982] and Besanko and Winston [1990] study more complex dynamic pricing
models and quantify Coase’s insights. Recent works in operations research tackle a similar problem
with more refined models of price commitment, sometimes paired with capacity commitment, see
Aviv et al. [2009], Su and Zhang [2008] and Besbes and Lobel [2015].
A recent stream of papers considers problems related to the value of price commitment in the
presence of strategic consumers, which is the main question of our work. Aviv and Pazgal [2008]
consider both a price commitment and a responsive pricing scenario and compare outcomes to a
benchmark in which consumers are myopic. Similar questions are addressed by Liu and Zhang
[2013] in the context of a two-firm competition game, and by the works of Cachon and Swinney
[2009] and Papanastasiou and Savva [forthcoming], however, none of these works studies the value
of price commitment in the presence of social influence. Our model is more related to the latter of
the above works, who studies a two-period dynamic pricing model where the main results depend
on an exogenous social learning intensity parameter. We study a different model, with an exogenous
level of social influence, but we believe that our main result sheds more light on their contrasting
result on the value of price commitment.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 contains our model and formally
introduces our measure of social influence and the seller’s problem. In Section 4.3 we fully char-
acterize the optimal prices of the seller when she can commit to a pricing policy upfront, and the
equilibrium decisions of consumer. In Section 4.4 we characterize optimal prices and consumers’
decisions when the seller does not have commitment power. Section 4.5 presents our main result
on the value of price commitment for the seller and Section 4.6 concludes. All proofs are presented
in the Appendix.
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4.2 Model
Monopolist The market features a monopolist launching a new product, which is made available
for purchase in two consecutive time periods t = 1, 2 , at unit price pt. We will consider two possible
scenarios.
(I) Price Commitment. The monopolist commits to (p1, p2) at the beginning of period 1.
(II) Responsive Pricing. The monopolist does not have commitment power, she sets p1 at the
beginning of period 1 and she sets p2 at the beginning of period 2.
Consumers There is a population of consumers whose size is normalized to one and consumers
are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The value of the product for a consumer i has two components: (i) a
private value component or individual willingness to pay, and (ii) a social influence component.
Consumers are heterogeneous in their private value αi for the product, {αi}i∈[0,1] are i.i.d.
random draws from a known distribution U [0, ᾱ]. On top of their private value, a consumer product
valuation is affected by the mass of consumers that have already bought the product at the time
he chooses to purchase. In particular, the social influence effect goes from one period to the next,
i.e., early consumers influence late consumers.
The net (undiscounted) utility of a consumer i that purchases the product at time t is
uit = α
i + βst−1 − pt, t = 1, 2 , (4.1)
where st ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of consumers that purchase the product in period t, and
since the new product is first available in period 1, we assume that s0 = 0. The parameter β > 0
measures the absolute intensity of social influence, given this parameter and the commonly known









which measures the intensity of social influence relative to consumers’ maximum private valuation.
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This is our metric for the level of social influence, and the main driver of our results.
Each consumer purchases at most one unit of the product, thus if a consumer decides to purchase
in period 1 he will not be on the market in period 2. Moreover, we assume that a consumer that
purchases in period t does not extract any utility from the product in period t+1. This assumption
captures diminishing returns of consumption, which are common for cultural products like books
or movies (see Varian [2000] and Rao [2015]).
Purchasing Decision Consumers are impatient and they discount their payoffs in period 2 by
δ ∈ (0, 1). Their purchasing decision can be spelled out as follows: (i) consumer i purchases the
product in period 1 if his utility in the current period is higher than both the utility from not
purchasing and the discounted utility in period 2, i.e., ui1 ≥ max{0, δui2}; (ii) if consumer i is still
on the market in period 2, he purchases if ui2 ≥ 0. Equivalently, replacing consumer utilities (4.1)
into the above inequalities and recalling our assumption s0 = 0, we can express the above decision
rule in terms of the consumers’ private valuations as follows:








(ii) if consumer i is still on the market in period 2, he purchases if
αi ≥ p2 − βs1 = λ2. (4.4)
The key feature of this decision rule is its simple threshold form, there are two thresholds λ1 and
λ2 that consumers use to make decisions based on their private valuations. In equilibrium, the
thresholds are determined by solving a fixed point equation.
Monopolist Objective The monopolist is also impatient and discounts future profits by δ, i.e.,
we assume that consumers and seller have the same discount factor. The seller is interested is
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setting a sequence of prices (p1, p2) in order to maximize her discounted expected profit
Π(p1, p2) = p1D1(p1, p2) + δp2D2(p1, p2), (4.5)
where D1(p1, p2) and D2(p1, p2) are the expected demands in periods 1 and 2 at prices (p1, p2). The
monopolist objective is clearly the same in the two scenarios, whether she has commitment power
or not, however the optimization problem she faces is different, as it can be its solution, which we
characterize in the two following sections.
4.3 Price Commitment
In the scenario where the seller has price commitment, her problem is to optimally choose (p1, p2) in
order to maximize (4.5) at the beginning of t = 1. Given (p1, p2), consumers compute the optimal
thresholds (λ1, λ2) consistent with decision rules (4.3) and (4.4). In this section, we present our
characterization of the optimal prices and thresholds that are a solution to the game described
above. We also show how the equilibrium profits change as a function of the level of social influence
(γ) and other relevant model parameters. Proposition 4.3.1 presents the results for the case in
which γ is small.
Proposition 4.3.1. If γ < 2 the equilibrium prices are such that p∗1 ≤ p∗2 and the equilibrium
thresholds are such that
1 > λ∗1 > λ
∗
2 > 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium profit for the seller is
Π∗ =
1− δ + γδ
4− (2− γ)2δ
ᾱ. (4.6)
The above proposition states that, when γ < 2, it is always optimal for the seller to set an
introductory price in period 1 that is lower than the price she sets for period 2. This means that,
even in the presence of low levels of social influence, when the monopolist has commitment power
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she finds it optimal to set a higher price in the mature period and extract consumers’ boosted
valuations.
Moreover, Proposition 4.3.1 shows that when γ is low the seller always finds it optimal to price
in such a way that she induces positive sales in both periods (λ∗1 > λ
∗
2) and not all the potential
demand is fulfilled (λ∗2 > 0). In particular, the seller prefers to exclude consumers with lower
valuations by charging higher prices and sell only to consumers with higher private valuations, thus
extracting more surplus from each consumer that purchases.
The equilibrium profit of the seller is increasing in the level of social influence γ. To see why this
is the case note that a higher γ induces higher valuations in period 2 while leaving them unchanged
in period 1. Moreover, the equilibrium profit is also increasing in the patience level δ. This is
a consequence of the fact that, as both seller and consumers become more patient part of the
sales shift to period 2, where the effect of social influence induces higher valuations for consumers.
Note also that the equilibrium profit that the seller can extract is proportional to the consumers’
maximum willingness to pay.
Our next result characterizes the equilibrium under price commitment when the social influence
level is high.
Proposition 4.3.2. If γ ≥ 2 the equilibrium prices are such that p∗1 ≤ p∗2 and the equilibrium
thresholds are such that
ᾱ/2 = λ∗1 > λ
∗
2 = 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium profit for the seller is
Π∗ = ᾱ(1− δ + γδ)/4. (4.7)
Proposition 4.3.2 shows that when the seller has commitment power and γ ≥ 2, it is again
optimal to set a lower introductory price in period 1 and a higher price in period 2. In this case,
since the level of social influence is high the seller has even more incentives to price low in period
1 to generate more demand in the current period and then price high in period 2 to capitalize on
inflated valuations.
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Moreover, the seller always sets prices so that all consumers buy by the end of period 2, i.e.
she engages in exhaustive sales. In particular, when γ is high enough the seller finds it optimal to
split the market, by selling to the half of the consumers with higher valuations (αi > ᾱ/2) in the
introductory period and extracting inflated valuations from all remaining consumers in the mature
period. Finally, note that the optimal profit in this case, (4.7), is always higher than the case when
γ is low, (4.6), and it is still increasing in both γ and δ.
Before concluding this section, we remark its most important results. Propositions 4.3.1 and
4.3.2 together establish that, under price commitment, when γ < 2 the monopolist finds it optimal
to exclude some consumers from the sale, while she sells to all consumers when γ ≥ 2. Moreover,
the seller always finds it optimal to set an increasing price path (p∗1 ≤ p∗1), and the equilibrium
profit is continously increasing in the level of social influence.
4.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis of Equilibrium Prices and Demands
In this subsection we present and discuss a comprehensive result that summarizes the sensitivity
of equilibrium prices and consumers’ demands to the relevant model parameters, for all levels of
social influence. In particular we are interested in how the above quantities vary with the social
influence and patience levels. We have the following result.






2) be the equilibrium prices and thresholds under price com-
mitment and let (D∗1, D
∗
2) be the corresponding equilibrium demands in periods 1 and 2. Then,








≥ 0; (a.ii) ∂
∂δ
(p∗2 − p∗1) ≥ 0.
(b) For all γ > 0, the equilibrium demands have the following properties:
(b.i) D∗1 ≥ D∗2; (b.ii)
∂D∗1
∂δ




≥ 0; (b.iii) ∂
∂γ
(D∗1 −D∗2) ≤ 0.
Part (a) of the above proposition establishes two properties of the equilibrium prices. Property
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(a.i) says that the introductory price in period 1 is always decreasing in the level of social influence
and the equilibrium price in period 2 is always increasing, clearly this implies that the difference
between the two prices, or the introductory mark-down, is increasing in the intensity of social
influence. Property (a.ii) says that the difference between the optimal price in period 2 and the
optimal price in period 1 is increasing in the patience level, which is a consequence of the fact
that with higher patience, the monopolist is more willing to sacrifice first period revenues to induce
higher valuations in the second period and the consumers discount second period utility by a smaller
factor.
Part (b) of the above proposition presents three properties of the equilibrium demands. Property
(b.i) says that demand is always higher in the introductory period, this mirrors the fact that
it is always optimal for the seller to set an increasing price path. Property (b.ii) states that
the equilibrium demand in the introductory period is decreasing in the discount factor and the
equilibrium demand in the mature period is increasing in the discount factor. Property (b.iii)
states that the difference between period 1 demand and period 2 demand is non-increasing in the
level of social influence. Note that when γ < 2 this difference is decreasing and when γ ≥ 2 the
demand is always split equally between the two periods.
4.4 Responsive Pricing
In the responsive pricing scenario, where there is no commitment power, the seller’s expected profit
in period 2 is π2 = p2D2 and her expected discounted profit in at the beginning of period 1 is
π1 = p1D1 + δπ2. The game unfolds as follows: the seller chooses p1 at the beginning of period 1 in
order to maximize π1, then observes how many consumers have purchased in the introductory period
(λ1) and chooses p2 in the beginning of period 2 in order to maximize π2, finally the remaining
consumers make their optimal purchase decision in period 2. In this section, we characterize the
equilibrium prices and thresholds in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game described above,
which we solve by backward induction. Moreover, we discuss how equilibrium profits are affected
by social influence and patience levels.
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The next proposition presents the equilibrium characterization for low levels of social influence,
in this case equilibrium prices require a more detailed discussion, that we will present in Proposition
4.4.3. We have the following result.
Proposition 4.4.1. If γ <
5δ − 2 +
√
4− 4δ + 17δ2
4δ
the equilibrium thresholds are such that
1 > λ∗1 > λ
∗
2 > 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium profit for the seller is
Π∗ =
(2− δ)2 + 4γδ
2[(8− 6δ) + 8γδ − 2γ2δ]
ᾱ. (4.8)
Proposition 4.4.1 states that, when γ is small enough, in equilibrium the seller sales in both
periods (λ∗1 > λ
∗
2) and not all the potential demand is fulfilled (λ
∗
2 > 0). The seller excludes
consumers with lower valuations from the sale, and the qualitative insights are the same as in the
case with price commitment. However, quantitatively the equilibrium prices, thresholds and profits
are different. Note that the equilibrium profits are still increasing in all the parameters of interest,
i.e., the social influence and patience levels and the maximum private valuation of consumers.
Our next result presents the equilibrium characterization for the cases in which the level of
social influence is high.
Proposition 4.4.2. If γ ≥ 5δ − 2 +
√
4− 4δ + 17δ2
4δ
the equilibrium prices are such that p∗1 ≤ p∗2
and the equilibrium thresholds are such that
ᾱ/2 = λ∗1 > λ
∗
2 = 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium profit for the seller is
Π∗ = ᾱ(1− δ + γδ)/4. (4.9)
The above proposition states that, when γ is higher than a given threshold, it is always optimal
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for the seller to set a lower introductory price in period 1 and a higher price in period 2. This is
in line with the optimal pricing strategy with price commitment and different from the responsive
pricing with low social influence, as we will see in Proposition 4.4.3. Moreover, the seller sells to
all consumers by the end of period 2 and sets prices in such a way that the demand splits evenly
between period 1 and period 2.
Most importantly, note that when the social influence level is high enough, all the equilibrium
quantities are both qualitatively and quantitatively the same as in the price commitment case. The
intuition behind this result is that, when the equilibrium sales become exhaustive, the seller is able
to sustain the same level of equilibrium prices that he would be willing to set if she had commitment
power.
In the next subsection, we provide a comprehensive characterization of how equilibrium prices
change as a function of the level of social influence in the responsive pricing scenario.
4.4.1 Equilibrium Prices and Social Influence
In Section 4.3, we saw that under price commitment the equilibrium price in period 1 is always
lower than the equilibrium price period 2. We already anticipated that results can be much different
in the absence of commitment power, and our next result establishes that with responsive pricing
an increasing price schedule is not always optimal.
Proposition 4.4.3. The seller’s optimal prices (p∗1, p
∗
2) have the following properties.
(i) There exist a threshold 0 < γ̃ <
5δ − 2 +
√
4− 4δ + 17δ2
4δ
such that
p∗1 ≥ p∗2 if γ ≤ γ̃ and p∗1 ≤ p∗2 if γ > γ̃.








≥ 0 for all γ > 0.
Property (i) of the above proposition focuses on the responsive pricing scenario with low levels
of social influence, i.e., the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 4.4.1. This property states that
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there exist a threshold γ̃ such that when the level of social influence is lower than this threshold,
then the equilibrium price in period 1 is higher than the equilibrium price in period 2. Otherwise,
for high levels of social influence we get an increasing price scheme, which is qualitatively the same
as in the price commitment scenario. Moreover, note that γ̃ approaches zero as δ approaches 1.
Property (ii) of the above proposition states that the introductory price is always decreasing in the
level of social influence and the price in the second period is always increasing. This holds for all
γ, even when the level of social influence is very low and p∗1 ≥ p∗2.
4.5 Value of Price Commitment
In both scenarios analyzed above, the price commitment in Section 4.3 and the responsive pricing
in Section 4.4, the seller was able to chose different prices in periods 1 and 2, the difference between
the two scenarios is that in the first one we endow the seller with some commitment power. In
this section, we ask what is the value of having commitment power to the seller. Our main result
characterizes the value of price commitment as a function of the level of social influence. The value
of price commitment is calculated as the equilibrium profit under price commitment minus the
equilibrium profit under responsive pricing.
Let Π∗PC be the equilibrium profit under price commitment, characterized in Propositions 4.3.1
and 4.3.2, and let Π∗RP be the equilibrium profit under responsive pricing, characterized in Propo-
sitions 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 4.5.1. The value of price commitment for the seller is characterized as follows.
(a) If γ < 2, the value of price commitment is strictly positive, i.e. Π∗PC −Π∗RP > 0.
(b) If γ ≥ 2, the value of price commitment is zero, i.e. Π∗PC −Π∗RP = 0.
Theorem 4.5.1 establishes that, in a market with many heterogeneous consumers and social
influence, commitment power can never decrease the seller’s equilibrium profit. This is in line
with most works in the literature that find that for dynamic monopoly pricing models having a
commitment mechanism is generally valuable.
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Statement (a) of the theorem states that when the level of social influence is low, the seller
always achieves strictly higher profit under price commitment than under responsive pricing. More
importantly, Statement (b) states that if the level of social influence is high enough, the ability
to commit to a pricing schedule does not give the seller any additional profit with respect to the
responsive pricing case.
We now provide some further explanations that allow to better appreciate why the above theo-
rem holds. Recall that in our model the total demand is normalized to one, and in particular it is
finite. When the level of social influence is high enough, it is optimal to set the price for period 2
in such a way that all demand is exhausted, and this is true irrespective of whether the seller has
commitment power. Thus, in both price commitment and responsive pricing scenarios, the optimal
period 2 price is the boundary solution that corresponds to exhaustive sales. Consequently, the
period 1 prices, which are pinned down by the best responses for period 1, are equivalent, and the
seller attains the same equilibrium profits in the two scenarios.
When the level of social influence is low, a seller with commitment power finds it optimal to
set prices in such a way that the consumers with low valuations are excluded from the sale, i.e.,
the optimal price in period 2 is always an interior solution. However, when the seller does not have
commitment power she finds it optimal to set a lower price in period 2. This hurts the seller in
two ways, by decreasing period 1 profits, since a higher fraction of consumers purchases in period
2 at a lower price, and also by decreasing period 2 valuations, since the social influence component
of utility is reduced by less consumers purchasing in period 1. As a result, in the absence of price
commitment the seller makes strictly lower profits when the level of social influence is low enough.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies a two-period pricing model with a seller that launches a new product to a large
market of consumers and she is able to set different prices for each of the two periods. Consumers are
heterogeneous in their private valuations, and their overall valuation for the product is also affected
by how many consumers have already purchased, through a positive social influence channel with
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exogenous intensity level. We study two scenarios, one in which the seller has commitment power
and one in which she does not. The optimal purchase decision of consumers always takes a simple
threshold form. We characterize the equilibrium in the two scenarios in terms of equilibrium prices
and thresholds and then compare the results.
In the presence of price commitment, we show that it is always optimal for the seller to set an
increasing pricing schedule. We also show that it is always optimal to exclude some consumers from
sale when the level of social influence is low and to sell to everyone when the level of social influence
is high. In the responsive pricing scenario we have a similar result on consumers’ equilibrium
decisions but different results on pricing. In particular, the seller still excludes some consumers
from sale when the level of social influence is below a given threshold, and sells to everyone when
it is above. In the latter case the seller finds it optimal to set an increasing price path, however,
when there is no price commitment and the level of social influence is very low the seller sets a
decreasing price path.
Our main result concerns the characterization of the value of price commitment in this model
as a function of the social influence level. We find that, when the level of social influence is below
a given threshold, then price commitment is always strictly valuable. However, for high levels of
social influence, a monopolist that engages in responsive pricing does equally well than one that
has access to commitment mechanism.
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4.7 Proofs
Recall that tail distribution of a U [0, ᾱ] random variable is
F (x) =

1 if x ≤ 0
1− x/ᾱ if x ∈ [0, ᾱ]
0 if x ≥ ᾱ
. (4.10)
Note that given consumers’ threshold purchasing decision, the expected demands in period 1 and
2 can be written as
D1 = F (λ1) and D2 =
[
F (λ2)− F (λ1)
]+
,
and the expected discounted profits (4.5) can be rewritten as
Π(p1, p2) = p1F (λ1) + δp2
[
F (λ2)− F (λ1)
]+
. (4.11)
The following lemma characterizes consumers’ equilibrium thresholds as a function of the seller’s
prices (p1, p2) and we will use it for the proofs of propositions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
Lemma 4.7.1. Let (p1, p2) be the prices set by the seller for period 1 and period 2, consumers’
equilibrium thresholds are determined as follows.
(a) If p1 ≤
p1 + δ(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ, then
λ1 =
p1 + δ(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ and λ2 =
βp1 − ᾱ(1− δ)(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
.
(b) If p1 >
p1 + δ(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ, then
λ1 = p1 and λ2 = p2 − β(1− p1/ᾱ).
Proof. In equilibrium all consumers make their optimal purchase decision in period 1 according to
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(4.3), since the private valuations are uniformly distributed it must be that s1 = 1−λ1/ᾱ. Replace
s1 in (4.3) and suppose that
p1 ≤
p1 − δp2 + δβ(1− λ1/ᾱ)
1− δ
,
then the equilibrium threshold in period 1 must solve
λ1 =





p1 + δ(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ. (4.12)
Proof of part (a): If p1 ≤
p1 + δ(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ then it follows from (4.3) that (4.12) is the equilibrium
threshold in period 1, and the equilibrium threshold in period 2 is obtained replacing s1 = 1−λ1/ᾱ
into (4.4) as follows
λ2 = p2 − β (1− λ1/ᾱ) =
βp1 − ᾱ(1− δ)(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
,
Proof of part (b): If p1 >
p1 + δ(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ it follows from (4.3) that λ1 = p1 and replacing into
(4.4) yields λ2 = p2 − β(1− p1/ᾱ).
Proof of Proposition 4.3.1
Using the tail distribution F defined in (4.10) we can write the seller’s problem as
max
p1,p2
p1(1− λ1/ᾱ) + δp2(λ1 − λ2)/ᾱ
s.t. λ1 − λ2 ≥ 0 (4.13)
ᾱ ≥ λ1, λ2 ≥ 0
p1, p2 ≥ 0.
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Suppose that p1 ≤
p1 + δ(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ, we will later verify that this is always true in equilibrium.
From Lemma 4.7.1 it follows that the optimal consumers’ threshold for period 1 is
λ1 =
p1 + δ(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ, (4.14)
and the optimal threshold for period 2 is
λ2 =
βp1 − ᾱ(1− δ)(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
. (4.15)
Replacing (4.14) and (4.15) into the objective function of Problem (4.13) yields
Π =
−ᾱp21 + ᾱ2(1− δ)p1 + (2ᾱ− β)δp1p2 + ᾱβδp2 − ᾱδp22
ᾱ[ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ]
, (4.16)
and the associated Hessian is
H =
1
ᾱ[ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ]
 −2ᾱ (2ᾱ− β)δ
(2ᾱ− β)δ −2ᾱδ
 .
Note that Π is jointly concave in (p1, p2) if and only if det(H) ≥ 0, i.e.
4ᾱ2 − (2ᾱ− β)2δ ≥ 0,






and it is always true in this case since γ = β/α < 2. Thus,
the optimal prices (p∗1, p
∗






= 0, which are
given by
−2ᾱp1 + ᾱ2(1− δ) + (2ᾱ− β)δp2
ᾱ[ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ]
= 0 and
(2ᾱ− β)δp1 + ᾱβδ − 2ᾱδp2
ᾱ[ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ]
= 0.
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It follows that
p∗1 =
2ᾱ2(1− δ) + 2ᾱβδ − β2δ
4ᾱ2 − (2ᾱ− β)δ
ᾱ =





2ᾱ2(1− δ) + ᾱβ(1 + δ)
4ᾱ2 − (2ᾱ− β)δ
ᾱ =





2) into (4.14) and (4.15) and simplifying yields
λ∗1 =
2(1− δ) + 3γδ − γ2δ
4− (2− γ)2δ
ᾱ and λ∗2 =
(2− γ)[(1− δ) + γδ]
4− (2− γ)2δ
ᾱ. (4.19)
Moreover, it is easy to verify our assumption that p∗1 ≤
p∗1 + δ(β − p∗2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ, note that the right-hand
side is equal to λ∗1 and clearly λ
∗
1 ≥ p∗1, and it is easy to verify that all the constraints of Problem
(4.13) hold under the condition γ < 2. In particular, note that λ∗2 > 0 if and only if γ < 2. To see
that λ∗1 > λ
∗
2 note that




To see that p∗1 ≤ p∗2 note that, subtracting (4.17) from (4.18) yields
p∗2 − p∗1 =
γ(1− δ + γδ)
4− (2− γ)2δ
ᾱ, (4.20)
which is always positive. Finally, replacing (p∗1, p
∗
2) into (4.16) and simplifying yields
Π∗ =
(1− δ) + γδ
4− (2− γ)2δ
ᾱ.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3.2
Consider the optimal solution of Problem (4.13) characterized in Proposition 4.3.1. In particular,
note that the optimal consumers’ threshold for period 2 becomes negative when γ ≥ 2. In this
case we need to solve the seller’s problem with the constraint that λ2 ≤ 0, which using the tail
distribution (4.10) can be written as
max
p1,p2
p1(1− λ1/ᾱ) + δp2λ1/ᾱ
s.t. λ1 − λ2 ≥ 0 (4.21)
ᾱ ≥ λ1 ≥ 0
λ2 ≤ 0
p1, p2 ≥ 0.
Suppose that p1 ≤
p1 + δ(β − p2)
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ, we will later verify that this is always true in equilibrium.
From Proposition 4.7.1 it follows that the optimal consumers’ thresholds for period 1 and period 2
are given by (4.14) and (4.15) respectively. Replacing (4.14) and (4.15) into the objective function
of Problem (4.21) yields
Π =
−p21 + ᾱ(1− δ)p1 + 2δp1p2 + βδ2p2 − δ2p22
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
, (4.22)
and the associated Hessian is given by
H =
1




Clearly the profit function is concave in p2, solving the first-order condition
∂Π
∂p2
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note that p̂2(p1) ≤ p̄2(p1) if and only if
p1 ≤
ᾱβ(1− δ)δ
2ᾱ(1− δ) + 2βδ
= p̄1.
If p1 ≤ p̄1, replacing p̂2(p1) into (4.22) yields
Π(p1, p̂2(p1)) =
β2δ2
4[ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ]
+ p1,
thus clearly it is optimal to set p1 = p̄1. Then it must be that p1 ≥ p̄1, which implies p̂2(p1) ≥ p̄2(p1)
and the best response p̂2(p1) is not feasible. Replacing p̄2(p1) into (4.22) yields
Π(p1, p̄2(p1)) =
[−p21 + ᾱ(1− δ)p1][ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ]
α2(1− δ)2
which is a concave quadratic in p1, thus solving the first-order condition to get p
∗
1 and then replacing
p∗1 into p̄2(p1) to get p
∗
2 yields
p∗1 = ᾱ(1− δ)/2 and p∗2 = β/2 = ᾱγ/2 (4.23)
and replacing (p∗1, p
∗
2) into (4.14) and (4.15) yields λ
∗




2 = 0. It is easy to
verify our assumption that p∗1 ≤ λ∗1, as well as that all constraints hold at the optimal solution.
Further note that clearly λ∗1 > λ
∗
2 = 0, and
p∗2 − p∗1 = ᾱ(γ − 1 + δ)/2, (4.24)
which is always positive. To complete the proof note that replacing (p∗1, p
∗
2) into (4.22) yields
Π∗ = ᾱ(1− δ + γδ)/4.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3.3






= −2ᾱγδ(2− 2δ + γδ)
[4− (2− γ)2δ]2





4− 8δ + 4δ2 + 4δ(1− δ)γ + δ(1 + δ)γ2
[4− (2− γ)2δ]2
ᾱ ≥ 0,
where the first inequality is immediate, and the second inequality follows from the fact that the
numerator of ∂p∗2/∂δ is a convex quadratic in γ with determinant δ(−1 + 2δ − δ2) ≤ 0 for all






= ᾱ/2 ≥ 0.
For property (a.ii), note that when γ < 2, differentiating (4.20) with respect to δ yields
∂
∂δ




When γ ≥ 2, differentiating (4.24) with respect to δ yields ∂
∂δ
(p∗2 − p∗1) = ᾱ/2 > 0. Which completes
the proof of Part (a).
Proof of Part (b): For property (b.i), note that the equilibrium demands are given by D∗1 = 1−λ∗1/ᾱ
and D∗2 = (λ
∗
1 − λ∗2)/ᾱ. When γ < 2, using the optimal thresholds λ∗1 and λ∗2 from (4.19), we can
compute the difference between period 1 and period 2 demands as




which is always positive in this case. When γ ≥ 2 the optimal thresholds are given by λ∗1 = ᾱ/2








2 = 1/2, and
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= 0. Finally, for property (b.iii), note
that when γ < 2 differentiating (4.25) with respect to γ yields
∂
∂γ
(D∗1 −D∗2) = −
(1− δ)[4 + (2− γ)2δ]
[4− (2− γ)2δ]2
≤ 0,
and when γ ≥ 2 we have ∂
∂γ
(D∗1 −D∗2) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.1
We solve the game by backward induction. Using the tail distribution F defined in (4.10), the




s.t. λ1 − λ2 ≥ 0 (4.26)
ᾱ ≥ λ1, λ2 ≥ 0
p2 ≥ 0.
The optimal consumers’ threshold in period 2 is given by λ2 = p2 − β(1− λ1/ᾱ), and replacing it
into the objective of Problem (4.26) yields
π2 =
−p22 + [β + (1− β/ᾱ)λ1]p2
ᾱ
,
which is a concave quadratic in p2. Solving the first-order condition
∂π2
∂p2
= 0 yields the best response
p̂2(λ1) =
ᾱβ + (ᾱ− β)λ1
2ᾱ
.
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Now we turn to the fist period decisions. The consumers’ optimal threshold in period 1 must be a
solution to the following fixed point equation
λ1 =
p1 − δp̂2(λ1) + δβ(1− λ1/ᾱ)
1− δ
,





The monopolist problem in the first period is
max
p1
p1(1− λ1/ᾱ) + δp1π2(λ1)
s.t. λ1 − λ2 ≥ 0 (4.27)
ᾱ ≥ λ1, λ2 ≥ 0
p1 ≥ 0
replacing p̂2(λ1) and then λ̂1(p1) into the objective of Problem (4.27) yields
π1 =
p21[(3δ − 4)ᾱ2 − 4ᾱβδ + β2δ] + p1[(2− δ)2ᾱ2 + ᾱβδ(4− δ)]ᾱ+ ᾱ2β2δ
ᾱ[(2− δ)ᾱ+ βδ]2
. (4.28)
Note that π1 is concave in p1 if and only if
∂2π1
∂p21
= 2β2δ − 8βδ − (8− 6δ) ≤ 0,
which is true when β/ᾱ ≤ (2 +
√
1 + 4/δ) and in particular it is always true in this case since
γ = β/ᾱ <
5δ − 2 +
√




1 + 4/δ). Thus, the optimal price for period 1 must
solve the first-order condition
∂π1
∂p1
= 0, which implies that
p∗1 =
(2− δ)2ᾱ2 + (4− δ)ᾱβδ − 2β2δ
(8− 6δ)ᾱ2 + 8ᾱβδ − 2β2δ
ᾱ =
(2− δ)2 + (4− δ)γδ − 2γ2δ
(8− 6δ) + 8γδ − 2γ2δ
ᾱ. (4.29)
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Replacing p∗1 into λ̂1(p1) and simplifying yields
λ∗1 =
(2− δ)2 + 3γδ − γ2δ
(8− 6δ) + 8γδ − 2γ2δ
2ᾱ,
replacing λ∗1 into the best response p̂2(λ1) and simplifying yields
p∗2 =
(2− δ) + (2 + δ)γ
(8− 6δ) + 8γδ − 2γ2δ
ᾱ, (4.30)
and replacing λ∗1 and p
∗
2 into λ2 = p2 − β(1− λ1/ᾱ) yields
λ∗2 =
(2− δ)2 − (2− 5δ)γ − 2γ2δ
(8− 6δ) + 8γδ − 2γ2δ
ᾱ.
It is easy to verify that all constraints hold at the optimal solution, and in particular, note that
λ∗2 > 0 if and only if γ <
5δ − 2 +
√
4 + δ(17δ − 4)
4δ
. Moreover, note that λ∗1 > λ
∗
2 since
λ∗1 − λ∗2 =
2− δ + γ(2 + δ)
(8− 6δ) + 8γδ − 2γ2δ
ᾱ > 0.
Finally, note that the equilibrium profit can be computed by replacing p∗1 into (4.28) and simplifying
to get
Π∗ =
(2− δ)2 + 4γδ
2[(8− 6δ) + 8γδ − 2γ2δ]
ᾱ,
thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.2
Consider the optimal consumers’ threshold for period 2 characterized in Proposition 4.4.1, and note
that the threshold becomes negative when γ ≥ 5δ − 2 +
√
4− 4δ + 17δ2
4δ
. In this case, we need to
solve the seller’s problem with the constraint that λ2 ≤ 0. Using the tail distribution (4.10), the
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s.t. λ1 − λ2 ≥ 0 (4.31)
ᾱ ≥ λ1 ≥ 0
λ2 ≤ 0
p2 ≥ 0.
The constraint λ2 ≤ 0 imposes the following upper bound on the period 2 price
p2 ≤ β(1− λ1/ᾱ) = p̄2(λ1).
Note that the above condition must hold with equality at the optimal solution because the objective
of Problem (4.31) is always increasing in p2, which implies that the optimal consumers’ threshold
for period 1 must be a solution to the following fixed point equation
λ1 =
p1 − δp̄2(λ1) + δβ(1− λ1/ᾱ)
1− δ
,
solving for for λ1 yields λ̄1(p1) = p1/(1− δ).
The seller’s problem in period 1 is
max
p1
p1(1− λ1/ᾱ) + δp1π2(λ1)
s.t. λ1 − λ2 ≥ 0 (4.32)
ᾱ ≥ λ1 ≥ 0
λ2 ≤ 0
p1 ≥ 0.
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Replacing p̄2(λ1) and then λ̄1(p1) into the objective of Problem (4.32) yields
π1 =
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ(1− δ)
p1 −
ᾱ(1− δ) + βδ
ᾱ2(1− δ)2
p21, (4.33)
which is a concave function of p1. Solving the first-order condition yields
p∗1 = ᾱ(1− δ)/2, (4.34)
replacing p∗1 into λ̄1(p1) yields λ
∗
1 = ᾱ/2 = ᾱγ/2, and replacing λ
∗
1 into p̄2(λ1) yields
p∗2 = ᾱγ/2. (4.35)
Clearly λ∗2 = 0, and it can be easily verified that all constraints hold at the optimal solution.
Finally, note that clearly λ∗1 > λ
∗
2 and that we compute the equilibrium profit by replacing p
∗
1 into
(4.33) and simplifying, which yields Π∗ = ᾱ(1− δ + γδ)/4, thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.3
For property (i), note that when γ <
5δ − 2 +
√
4− 4δ + 17δ2
4δ
the optimal prices are given by (4.29)
and (4.30), subtracting p∗1 from p
∗
2 yields
p∗2 − p∗1 =
2− 3δ + δ2 − γ(2− 3δ + δ2)− γ2δ
(8− 6δ) + 8γδ − 2γ2δ
ᾱ,
where the denominator is always positive and the numerator is positive when
γ >
−2 + 3δ − δ2 +
√
4 + 4δ − 11δ2 + 2δ3 + δ4
4δ
= γ̃(δ),
thus p∗2 − p∗1 is positive if γ > γ̃(δ) and it is negative otherwise. Clearly γ̃(δ)→ 0 as δ → 1. When
γ ≥ 5δ − 2 +
√
4− 4δ + 17δ2
4δ
the optimal prices are given by (4.34) and (4.35), subtracting p∗1 from
p∗2 yields p
∗
2 − p∗1 = ᾱ(γ − 1 + δ)/2 which is always positive in this case. Thus completing the proof
of property (i).
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For property (ii), when γ <
5δ − 2 +
√
4− 4δ + 17δ2
4δ
the optimal prices are given by (4.29) and




−δ2 + γ(−8 + 4δ + 2δ2)− γ2δ(4 + δ)
(8− 6δ) + 8γδ − 2γ2δ
,
which is negative since the numerator is positive for all γ <
5δ − 2 +
√
4− 4δ + 17δ2
4δ
and the nu-




8− 10δ + δ2 + γδ(4− 2δ) + γ2δ(2 + δ)
(8− 6δ) + 8γδ − 2γ2δ
,
which is positive since the numerator is positive for all γ <
5δ − 2 +
√
4− 4δ + 17δ2
4δ
and the nu-
merator is always positive. When γ ≥ 5δ − 2 +
√
4− 4δ + 17δ2
4δ
, differentiating the optimal prices






= ᾱ/2 ≥ 0,
thus completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.5.1
Define γ̄RP =
5δ − 2 +
√
4 + δ(17δ − 4)
4δ
, which is the threshold on γ from the no commitment case.
Note that γ̄RP < 2 since
2− γ̄RP =
2 + 3δ −
√
4 + δ(17δ − 4)
4δ
,
which is positive if and only if 8δ(2− δ) > 0, which is clearly true for all δ ∈ (0, 1].
Proof of Part (a): If γ < γ̄RP the equilibrium profit with price commitment is given by (4.6) and




δ[2 + (2− γ)δ]2
4[4− (2− γ)2δ][(4− 3δ) + 4γδ − γ2δ]
,
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which is strictly positive for all δ ∈ (0, 1]. To see this, note that the numerator is always positive,
and for the denominator, note that 4−(2−γ)2δ is clearly positive for all γ < 2 and (4−3δ)+4γδ−γ2δ
is positive if γ < 2 +
√
1 + 4/δ, which true since γ̄RP < 2.
If γ ∈ [γ̄RP , 2) the equilibrium profit with price commitment is given by (4.6) and the equilibrium




(2− γ)2δ[1 + (1− γ)δ]
4[4− (2− γ)2δ]
,
which is always positive in this case.
Proof of Part (b): It suffices to note that when γ ≥ 2 the equilibrium profit with price commitment is
given by (4.7) and the equilibrium profit with no commitment is given by (4.9), clearly Π∗PC = Π
∗
RP .
This completes the proof of the theorem.
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